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 ”I don’t necessarily think the British system, the official system is any better and I think they 
get very confused with trying to be PC1 and trying to do the right thing and knowing what 
the cultural etiquette’s are an respecting them. There’s a real fine line between trying to do 
the right things and actually doing the right thing and they sometimes mess up. I found that 
whole set-up really disturbing.” 
    
Hina, a Muslim woman from London, in   
Complexity, difference and 'Muslim personal law': rethinking the 
relationship between Shariah Councils and South Asian Muslim women 
in Britain by Samia Bano. 
INTRODUCTION 
Mounir and Neila married in Iran, before moving to Europe where they later divorced. 
Which laws govern the divorce settlement? If the courts have to apply Iranian laws, how do 
the courts proceed to interpret them? Can gender equality be upheld by the court? It is often 
assumed that Muslim laws are discriminatory towards women. While the debate has been 
focusing on issues such as divorce and polygamy, mahr, the Muslim dower, has passed 
largely unnoticed by the majority populations in European countries. A compulsory clause 
in the Muslim marriage contract, obliging the husband to pay sometimes considerable sums 
of money to the wife, it gives these women a particular claim which increasingly often is 
raised in divorce cases between Muslims residing in Europe. These women do not always 
want European laws to be applied on their divorce settlement. So when Muslims and 
Muslim laws migrate to Europe, what is the “right thing to do” for the courts, as seen by 
women like Hina in the quote above, in order to promote gender justice while at the same 
time respecting these women’s cultural – and religious – identities?  
 
In Western European countries today, a significant part of the population is Muslim. After 
several decades where both the Muslims themselves and the authorities saw this as a 
                                                 
1 Probably “politically correct”. 
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 temporary situation, people are now realising that they’re going to stay. Among Muslim 
immigrants, several normative systems are at work in two different situations depending in 
part on whether they’ve obtained a European nationality or not. Firstly, a conflict of laws 
situation arises where the European court may have to apply the laws of the Muslim 
country in question. This can be seen as a situation of formal or “weak” legal pluralism as 
described by John Griffiths: when the dominant legal system “commands different bodies 
of law for different groups in the population”.2 The conflict of laws rules concerning 
choice of laws oblige the court to choose between several normative systems, i.e. the laws 
of different countries, and sometimes to apply the laws of a foreign country. Secondly, the 
Muslims sometimes resort to Muslim norms within the Western European legal system, in 
a situation of informal or “strong” legal pluralism: “when in a given social field more than 
one source of law (…) is observable”.3 In this thesis the focus will be on private 
international law cases. Private international law is invoked in most court cases concerning 
mahr. I have found only two cases where mahr was claimed with no reference to private 
international law, in a situation of strong legal pluralism.4  
 
These situations create new questions concerning the ability of the judiciary to 
accommodate concepts and institutions foreign to, and sometimes opposed to the national 
law of the European country. The treatment they have received so far has been ambiguous. 
Political choices, that are sometimes difficult to separate from the legal treatment of these 
institutions, are often hidden. The cases are often badly received among the general 
population.5 One of the reasons for this is that the Muslims claim divine authority for these 
                                                 
2 Griffiths (1986) p.5. ”In general the groups concerned are defined in terms of features such as ethnicity, 
religion, nationality or geography, and legal pluralism is justified as a technique of governance on pragmatic 
grounds.” In private international law it is for the most part based on nationality or domicile – a variety of 
geography as basis for the choice of laws.  
3 Griffiths (1986) p.38. ”Law” is here defined as ”the self-regulation of a ”semi-autonomous social field””. 
4 A French case from the Cour d'appel de Douai, ch.7, 8 janvier 1976 and the Cour de Cassation, ch.civ.1, 4 
avril 1978, and a Danish case from Københavns Byret February 22 2002 and Østre Landsteds Ret April 6 
2005, published as U.2005.2314Ø.  
5 Foblets (1996) p.9. 
 2
 concepts and institutions. A newspaper headline about a Swedish or French court applying 
the Shari‛a is bad enough,6 and if a government makes efforts to accommodate it, the 
political implications may be disastrous. This way the Muslims feel that they are not 
accepted as citizens, and the conflict level increases. The vicious circle is completed.  
 
Not all Muslim laws, even the most patriarchal versions, are always discriminatory towards 
women. I’ve chosen to look into how European courts treat mahr, the dower or bridal gift, 
a compulsory gift given by the husband to the wife at the event of their marriage, on 
demand or, usually, at the time of divorce. It was instituted by Mohammad to improve 
women’s rights and position in a very patriarchal society. In practice it does not always 
improve the woman’s situation, though, sometimes even the contrary. Mahr is a much 
debated topic among Muslims, both where they’re the majority, and where they’re the 
minority, but there is little research on it, especially in the European context. Mahr is 
interesting to study in cases concerning private international law for two reasons: Firstly, 
it’s an institution totally foreign in European laws, which gives the courts more space than 
is the case concerning e.g. talaq, unilateral divorce. Secondly, if Muslim laws are applied 
correctly, the outcome may be better for the woman than it would have been if European 
laws were applied. Thus such cases call for careful consideration of the relationship 
between justice, equality and protection against discrimination on the basis of gender or 
religion or culture. The subject matter of this thesis is the interaction between private 
international law and human rights in divorce cases brought before European courts, in 
which the issue of mahr, the bridal gift, is raised. I focus on how European courts handle 
cases in where Muslims make claims based on Muslim norms and concepts.7 The courts 
have to deal with the matters that are brought before them as long as they’re within their 
                                                 
6 See for example Kristeligt Dagblad 16.02.2008. 
7 Research shows that most disputes between Muslim spouses are solved outside the courtroom, often 
involving negotiation by relatives or somebody from the mosque, or institutions such as the Shariah Councils 
in Britain. This means that the cases studied in this thesis are the ones which, for any number of reasons, 
made it to a European court. Suffice it here to refer to research on this subject, such as Bano (2004), Foblets 
(1996) and Schmied (1999). 
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 jurisdiction, and thus find themselves in the middle of the events while the policy- and 
lawmakers are usually a step behind. 
 
Jørgen S. Nielsen, who has studied Muslim communities in Europe for several decades, 
states that an important first step towards a solution to the conflicts and tensions between 
Muslim and Western European norms is to look away from the ideological basis of the 
rules in question,8 thus promoting a functionalist approach towards the norms concerned.  
This appears to be a fruitful starting point, in line with the comparative legal method as 
described by Zweigert and Kötz.9 The norms that are dealt with in private international law 
cases constitute formal codifications of religious norms. These formalised versions of Islam 
are also influenced by cultural practices, political thought and imported western laws. 
Behind the concept of “personal status law” in private international law lies the recognition 
of the cultural aspect of the law when it concerns matters that are closely linked to one’s 
person, such as family and inheritance law.10 A person’s personal status law, i.e. which 
country’s laws should regulate his personal matters, is normally determined either upon the 
basis of a person’s nationality or his or her domicile, depending on the private international 
law of the court of litigation. As stated by Anne Hellum et al. in a work on women’s human 
rights in Africa and South Asia, but just as relevant in Europe: “In dealing with women’s 
multiple positionalities, human rights and legal pluralist approaches need to be combined. 
This involves engaging a normative human rights framework with a descriptive analysis of 
its interaction with official and unofficial national and local norms in different contexts. 
Such a relational and contextual gender perspective epitomizes and reveals the complex, 
ambiguous and often contentious relationship between human rights and legal pluralism.”11  
 
Full recognition and application of foreign norms when the conflict of laws rules require it, 
is a logical consequence of a policy of multiculturalism applied on the legal system. The 
                                                 
8 Nielsen in Foblets (1996) p.41. 
9 See Zweigert (1998) and part I chapter 7. 
10 See e.g. Thue (2002). 
11 Hellum (2007) p.xix.  
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 courts have to choose between the laws of two very different legal cultures. The European 
legal systems were originally based upon Christian values, but have at the time of 
adjudication to a varying extent been modified and secularised. Today they provide a 
degree of gender justice by providing laws that are intended to be gender neutral – perhaps 
with the exception of English law, which is still to a large extent based upon the idea that 
the sexes are different.12 The laws from the Muslim countries are to a greater or lesser 
extent influenced by Islam and its laws schools, which do not have gender equality13 as a 
goal, but to a varying degree try and provide gender justice in the form of equal worth. But 
even in this context the states are under an obligation to promote gender justice. How do 
the European courts handle such a complex institution of mahr in terms of gender justice? 
If they try and achieve some sort of gender justice, is it in terms of gender equality or equal 
worth? The gender equality norm implies that both genders are treated the same way. The 
equal worth approach sees the two genders as different, but of equal worth, thus opening up 
for having different rules depending on people’s gender. These two approaches will be 
further discussed in part II chapter 6.  
 
In this thesis I compare divorce cases from French, English, Swedish and Norwegian 
involving the mahr with a view to the courts’ use of comparative legal method when they 
interpret the Muslim laws, and in a gender justice perspective. I have only found two cases 
from Norway that indirectly concern mahr; one of them is rather an example of how things 
should not be done. Looking at other countries provides a broader perspective and may 
provide interesting perspectives applicable in Norway as well. The most obvious countries 
to compare with are Scandinavian countries like Sweden and Denmark, due to the social, 
cultural and legal commonalities. The Scandinavian countries, however, have a fairly short 
history with Muslim immigration. There are very few cases yet concerning mahr; only two 
from Sweden and one from Denmark. The Danish case, however, does not deal with 
private international law. On this background I have chosen to look at two countries with a 
                                                 
12 Significant changes have happened since the Human Rights Act 1998 required that family law complied 
with the European Convention on Human Rights. Welstead (2006) p.7. 
13 See Part I ch.6.2. 
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 long history in this matter: France and Britain. These two countries have chosen different 
approaches, especially when it comes to the intersection between gender and minority 
cultures. Britain is known for promoting multiculturalism, in the sense that all cultures 
should be respected to as large a degree as possible. France has had a stronger tendency 
towards demanding assimilation and acceptance of what is considered to be French values, 
e.g. secularism and feminism. The British case law concerning mahr originates from the 
60ies and early 70ies, and apparently there have been several cases since, which follow the 
same line of arguments, but these are not published. I’ve therefore only looked at the two 
judgments that are considered as basis for today’s case law. In France I’ve only been able 
to find two private international law cases concerning mahr, and none where the wife 
claims it. This is an interesting find in itself, which demands further investigation, but this 
lies beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
The object of analysis, the method of approach and definitions of core concepts will be 
presented in part I; in part II the legal framework will be described, including the legal the 
concept of mahr and its functions in a Muslim legal context and relevant law in the 
European countries studied. In part III the judgments will be described and analysed 
country by country, and in part IV the findings will be discussed and compared. 
 6
 Part I. THE OBJECT OF ANALYSIS, HYPOTHESIS AND METHOD OF 
APPROACH 
1 Introduction 
In this part the object of analysis will be defined, the main hypothesis of this thesis and the 
framework for analysis: Gender justice norms and comparative legal method. Since the 
judgments I’ve studied are all texts, I’ve found it useful to supply with methodology 
concerning the analysis of texts.   
2 The object of analysis: The judgments as texts – and beyond 
The analysis of judgments as texts calls into focus the implicit communication contract 
between the writer and the reader of the text, and enables us to understand a foreign 
judgment better. A vital condition in these communication contracts is the context of the 
utterance, or the writing of the judgment, which again can be separated into two 
subcategories: the situational context and the cultural context, which both are necessary to 
understand the other, and to understand the text.14 This resembles comparative legal 
method, which stresses the importance of understanding the rules in the context of the 
entire legal system. It gives, however, a supplementary tool for the interpretation of 
judgments, as the comparative legal method mainly study rules, while the focus in this 
thesis is on judgments. Judgments concern rules, and may provide a basis for rules, but they 
are also texts. The situational contexts in the judgments may be seen as the facts in each 
                                                 
14 Asdal (2008) ch.2.  
 7 
 and every case, which have in common that we’re in a situation of a divorce settlement 
where one or both spouses are Muslims. But the content, outline and style of a judgment 
are shaped by an entire legal system, with its laws and its jurisprudence, applied on this 
specific situation, i.e. the text is shaped by the implicit norms of the legal system in each 
country. Thus this is a kind of text that is most of all understood through its cultural 
context: the legal culture, both in a national and an international sense, since they all 
concern private international law. One should also take into account that few of the 
judgments are from the Supreme Court, and are therefore not intended to provide a basis 
for case law. In order to understand the text in this context, I have applied comparative 
legal method, which will be described in chapter 7, and legal theory concerning private 
international law, described in part II chapter 3.  
 
The situational context is also an encounter between Muslim and Western European legal 
cultures and norms, in a context of husband versus wife, man versus woman: a situation of 
legal pluralism with gender justice at stake. This sets the frame of reference for my 
analysis: theories of legal pluralism and women’s human rights. These will be further 
described in chapters 5 and 6. 
 
My purpose is to explore how issues concerning gender justice and legal pluralism are 
handled in European courts, with a view to outline options and choices for future legal 
policy. We are in a context of legal pluralism where the European legal system to a greater 
extent than the Muslim laws in question sees gender justice as a matter of gender equality. I 
have chosen to focus on two approaches that I assume are interdependent in order to obtain 
a correct and equitable result; an approach which acknowledges both the gendered and 
cultural context: 1) that the courts must apply comparative legal method in order to provide 
a foundation for making a correct and fair decision, and 2) that they also need to apply a 
gender justice norm of equal worth to obtain an equitable result when they apply Muslim 
laws. I do not interpret the judgments with the purpose of using them as precedence – an 
exercise that often goes beyond the plain analysis of the judgment as a text, and demands a 
very sophisticated knowledge of the legal system it belongs to; that must be left to the 
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 lawyers of each legal system. I have, however used some articles on the precedence of the 
English judgments, in order to say something about the validity of these judgments today, 
since they date back to the 1960ies and 1970ies.  
3 Translations of judgments and literature 
It’s difficult to translate judgments, as the concepts often don’t have any real equivalent in 
the other language. Since I write in English, Common Law concepts have to be used, but I 
try and remedy this to a certain extent by giving the quote from the judgment in the original 
language in a footnote. When it comes to the labelling of the courts, Sweden, Denmark and 
France all operate with three levels in civil law cases. I have therefore chosen to use the 
term municipal court for the lowest level, and court of appeal for the second level courts 
for all countries. I use Supreme Court for the highest court in the Scandinavian countries. 
Court of Cassation is used for the French Cour de Cassation, since this is a description of 
its function, which differs from the Scandinavian courts. It only adjudicates in matters of 
law and very rarely makes the final decision itself. When an appeal is upheld, the case is 
normally sent back to the court of appeal, composed by other judges this time, for a new 
adjudication (cassation).  
 
Mahr is a compulsory gift from the husband to the wife, the amount of which is normally 
agreed upon in relation to the marriage contract, and it is paid either at the time of 
marriage, on demand, or at the dissolution of marriage by divorce or death. Mahr has no 
real equivalent in European law. The French translate it with the word dot, which is the old 
French dowry; a gift given from the parents of one of the spouses to the couple. In English 
it is common to translate mahr into the word dower, in lack of a real equivalent. Poulter 
and others consequently use dower to describe mahr, and dowry to describe “the transfer of 
property to the bride herself from her own parents”,15 a distinction probably originating 
                                                 
15 Poulter (1986) p.40. 
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 from the Indian subcontinent.16 The Scandinavians use a variety of translations, including 
the term for the ancient dowry, medgift, approximately the same as in France and Britain; 
morgongåva (morning gift); or, the closest equivalent, brudegave/-gåva (bridal gift). When 
the Arabic term mahr is translated into European languages, it tends to pick up some of the 
aspects of the European term, which was originally used to describe a different concept. 
Since I strive to use as correct terms as possible and there are no real equivalents in 
English, I will use the Arabic word mahr except when I quote others or for the sake of 
explanation.  
4 The multiculturalism versus feminism debate  
Multiculturalism as a policy “advocates a society that extends equitable status to distinct 
cultural and religious groups, with no one culture predominating”.17  Will Kymlicka, a 
Canadian professor in philosophy, sees minority groups as having their own “societal 
cultures”, and is one of the major contemporary proponents for the protection of these 
groups through group rights and privileges.18 The acceptance of the norms and institutions 
of such groups is by some seen as one of the legal aspects of such an approach, for example 
do many British and Canadian Muslims want formal acceptance of their Shari´a councils, a 
claim which e.g. the religious leader of the Church of England, the archbishop of 
Canterbury, supports. The opposite approach is complete assimilation, an approach that the 
French government has pursued concerning some issues, especially in its approach to 
headscarves in public schools. Feminism is often used as an argument against 
multiculturalism, and in 1997 Susan Moller Okin, a leading political theorist, strongly 
contested Kymlicka, asking whether multiculturalism is bad for women.19 She observed 
                                                 
16 See e.g. Diwan (1990). 
17 Wikipedia on multiculturalism, read 08.09.2008.  
18 Kymlicka (1995).  
19 Okin (1997). First published in Boston Review in 1997, republished in a book together with comments 
from other researchers upon her article: Cohen (1999). 
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 that “regnant cultural ideas – including religious ideas – sometimes provide rationales for 
controlling women’s bodies and ruling their lives”, and argued that “[w]hen the dominant 
ideas and practices in a group offend so deeply against the idea that men and women are 
moral equals, (…) we ought to be less solicitous of the group and more attentive to the 
costs visited on female members”.20 Many consider the solution to be a kind of 
multiculturalism that is gender sensitive, but how can this be done in practice?  
 
Each country has a set of rules that regulate transnational conflicts in order to determine 
which laws should be applied, which are called choice of laws rules. Concerning the choice 
of laws, especially when dealing with Muslim laws, the Belgian lawyer and legal 
anthropologist Marie-Claire Foblets poses two main questions: 1)” Does the European 
judge make some elements that comply with foreign law enforceable under his own 
jurisdiction?” 2) “And if so, does he acknowledge these elements to be on equal terms with 
his (own) legal system?”21 If the answer is yes to both of these questions, this can be seen 
as a first step towards an equitable result in terms of multiculturalism in the courtroom. At 
the same time, gender justice must be a goal. In our context, multiculturalism implies an 
acceptance of the formal legal pluralism in the shape of private international law. How can 
the courts apply Muslim laws while at the same promote gender justice? Before we move 
on to the framework of analysis – comparative law and gender justice norms – we need to 
look further into what legal pluralism is.  
5 Legal pluralism 
A national legal system is often perceived as uniform, monolithic and exclusive: One single 
legal system is seen as the only set of legal rules regulating the population’s behaviour. 
This monistic view is, however, challenged by the theories of legal pluralism: Every culture 
                                                 
20 As interpreted by the editors in Cohen (1999) p.4. 
21 Foblets (2005) p.299. 
 11 
 includes norms for behaviour, status and suchlike, which vary in strength and degree of 
uniformity, which in real life may be strong and uniform enough to create what Sally Falk 
Moore describes as a “semi-autonomous social field”.22 These fields can exist in various 
ethnic minority groups, in workplaces, and in any group in society, and will thus often 
overlap. In 1986 John Griffiths published a groundbreaking essay about legal pluralism, as 
he calls it, which is still considered a major contribution to the development of this concept, 
and which is used as a basis for this thesis.23 Griffiths was the first to distinguish between 
two types of legal pluralism: Formal or “weak” legal pluralism, and informal or “strong” 
legal pluralism. The formal legal pluralism is mainly used to describe the legal system in 
many formerly colonized countries, where local custom was applied to some ethnic groups, 
British or French law on others. One example is Lebanon, where the family law depends on 
which religious community you belong to, thus giving 19 different sets of rules.24 Griffiths 
sees law as “the self-regulation of a “semi-autonomous field”” as defined by Moore; “legal 
pluralism” thus “refers to the normative heterogeneity attendant upon the fact that social 
action always takes place in a context of multiple, overlapping, “semi-autonomous social 
fields”.”25 This situation is “the normal situation in human society”.26 This implies that 
also in a situation of formal legal pluralism, the informal pluralism is also present.  
 
It follows from this, that even though the focus of this thesis will be on the formal legal 
pluralism, the informal legal pluralism is always present. One should also bear in mind that 
the concept of legal pluralism is descriptive, not normative27. I use it as an explanation of 
the context of the judgments, and as a basis for my hypothesis on how the courts should 
handle such a context: a situation of legal pluralism. In order to thoroughly understand the 
                                                 
22 Moore (1978).  
23 Griffiths (1986). 
24 The 2007 report to the CEDAW committee made by the Committee for the Follow-Up on Women’s Issues, 
at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/ngos/CommitteeFollowuponWomen.pdf. 
25 Griffiths (1986) p.38. 
26 Ibid. p.39. 
27 Hellum (1998) p.70.  
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 unfamiliar norms the court will necessarily have to apply something similar to the 
comparative legal method. In these judgments the courts are in a situation of legal 
pluralism, where gender justice is at stake. The courts may choose their own laws, in which 
the judges are trained, which, perhaps with the partial exception of English law, are mainly 
based on ideas of gender equality. Or they may choose the Muslim laws, claimed to be of 
divine inspiration, if not authority, which gives men and women different rights and 
obligations in marriage and divorce and talk of equal worth as the desired gender justice.  
 
Mahr is a right the woman has because she is a woman, and the extent of her right, i.e. the 
amount or value of her dower, depends on social norms and the negotiations between the 
spouses and, often, their families. Even in a Muslim context mahr is debated, not only 
because of differences in opinion as to what gender justice means, but also because mahr is 
not always good for the woman, even in terms of an equal worth perspective on gender 
justice. However, it is more often of vital importance as a tool for gender justice in Muslim 
countries, so to reject it altogether is not a good move from a feminist perspective. So, 
when transferred to a European context, how do the courts handle this concept? Do they 
accept the claim no matter the justice of the result? Do they reject it altogether? Is there a 
common approach at all, even within the same country? 
6 Human rights obligations at the interface between gender justice and 
legal pluralism 
6.1 Introduction 
Cultural norms are often seen as conflicting with a gender equality norm, to a large extent 
implemented in all the countries studied in this thesis, although to a somewhat lesser degree 
in the United Kingdom. The quest for women’s rights is not likely to be successful if we 
don’t take the cultural context into consideration. I will thus focus on the state obligations 
concerning gender justice in a context of legal pluralism. The human rights obligations of 
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 the state may be seen as either negative or positive; i.e. a negative duty to refrain from 
certain actions, or a positive duty to provide.28 The cases in this study are litigations 
between two individuals. The main focus will therefore be on the state’s duty to provide 
gender justice between these individuals, as stated in the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 articles 2 and 3, which is the most 
detailed human rights convention concerning women’s rights. How should the convention 
be interpreted in order to include the cultural dimension of women’s lives? In order to 
answer this we first need to take a brief look into various theories concerning gender 
justice, both in a European and a Muslim context, and, more specifically, how the CEDAW 
may be interpreted concerning mahr. However, a negative duty may arise through the 
question of whether the result of the application of foreign law is against ordre public, 
which may be interpreted in relation to the state’s human rights obligations. We will come 
back to this issue in chapter 6.4. Since about half of the judgments came into being before 
the entry into force of the CEDAW29 I will not go into detail, and I use the CEDAW and 
related theory mainly as a standard of gender justice in general. The CEDAW committee 
also provides some views on mahr in relation to gender justice that are highly relevant.  
6.2 The CEDAW and gender justice norms 
6.2.1 Gender equality theory 
For a very long time the campaign for gender justice in Western Europe mainly happened 
within the paradigms of liberalism and Marxism. One of the main ideas of both is that all 
human beings are equal. A major criticism of this approach is that it may disguise 
inequality, that it gives women formal, but not substantial rights.30 Both types of feminists 
have been important in ensuring that the two sexes have formally equal rights. This is the 
gender equality approach, which was the dominant feminist approach until the 1980ies. 
McKinnon criticises liberal feminism of not taking into consideration that “men are as 
                                                 
28 This dichotomy is less used today, to the benefit of a more nuanced and complex approach, but is useful in 
this specific context. Steiner (2000) p.181 as quoted in Wærstad (2006) p.111.  
29 And of the ECHR protocol 7. 
30 See e.g. Barnett (1998) and Dahl (1985).  
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 different from women as women are different from men”, and that men still set the 
standard for comparison.31 The Marxists were among the main critics of liberalism, but this 
ideology has been criticised for being too essentialist and exclusionary, “essentialist 
because of the centrality of economic determinism, exclusionary in its failure to examine 
the position of women in society.”32  
6.2.2 Theories of equal worth 
Both in Europe and elsewhere, several scholars argue for a different approach, called 
difference feminism or cultural feminism, in a reaction against the gender equality thought 
in liberalism and Marxism. There is a variety of theories, counting among them the 
thoughts of Luce Irigaray33 and Carol Gilligan.34 They all strive to explain the differences 
between the sexes and promote a women’s perspective without falling into the stereotype 
trap; to promote the idea of equal worth instead of the mechanic equality.  
 
One has to distinguish between gender equality in a legal sense, and in the sense of feminist 
theory. “Gender equality” as a legal obligation is most often interpreted in a way that 
includes both and will be used in this sense throughout this thesis. Thus the recognition of 
women’s work at home as a basis for their financial claims in divorce situations may be 
seen as a gender equality measure, although the thought behind is obviously one of equal 
worth.35 The CEDAW committee explicitly recommends this approach.36 This is even 
more important in situations of legal pluralism: Research on the interrelationship between 
human rights and legal pluralism from Africa and South Asia,37 some of which concern 
Muslim laws, shows that a mechanic gender equality approach often leads to unfair results. 
                                                 
31 As quoted in Barnett (1998) p.133.  
32 Ibid. 
33 See for example Joy (2006). 
34 See for example Gilligan (2002). 
35 Ncube (1989), Sverdrup (1997).  
36 CEDAW General Recommendation no.13 s2. 
37 See for example Hellum (2007). 
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 The equal worth approach must be used with caution, though, as one risks falling into the 
trap of stereotyping, which is prohibited in article 5 a). 
 
Most feminists that work within the framework of Islam are promoting women’s rights on 
the basis of equal worth. This is mainly because the Qur’an gives men and women different 
rights and obligations very explicitly, together with the fact that it’s seen as the words of 
God, as spoken directly to Mohammad. Ali (2000), a Pakistani legal scholar, former 
politician and a major proponent for the compatibility of the CEDAW with Islam, 
interprets the CEDAW in terms of the equal worth norm.38 In addition to the use of 
comparative legal method, what I want to investigate in this thesis is whether the courts 
take gender justice into consideration, and if so, whether the courts apply a mechanic 
equality norm or an equal worth approach, and how the two may work. 
6.2.3 Mahr and the CEDAW 
The CEDAW article 16 obliges the state parties to “take all appropriate measures to 
eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family 
relations and in particular ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women (…) c) The 
same rights and responsibilities during marriage and its dissolution”. The text indicates that 
mahr is contrary to the CEDAW, as it’s a right only women have, on their basis of being 
women, and is part of a set of legal effects of marriage which is not based on gender 
equality. At the same time, according to the CEDAW art 3, the signatory states are under 
the obligation of providing substantial equality, not only formal equality. If one goes 
straight to a gender equality norm by rejecting rights women have that are contrary to this 
norm, this may have the effect of making the situation worse for women, not better, thus 
not fulfiling the obligation of providing substantial equality. This is especially relevant for 
the courts, which are perhaps the most important part of the state when it comes to the 
actual application of the law.  
 
                                                 
38 I base this on Hellum’s review of Ali’s book Equal before Allah and Unequal before man? See Hellum 
(2004). 
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 Initially, the CEDAW committee was very negative towards the Muslim dower, mahr: 
During the 14th session of the committee, committee member Ms. Cartwright, in the 
committee’s comments to the Tunisian country report, “noted that the persistence of the 
custom of providing a dowry indicated that women were still, to some degree, regarded as a 
commodity”.39 In the 27th session, committee member Ms. Manolo remarked, in the 
comments upon the Tunisian country report, ”that the continuation of that practice gave the 
impression that the bride was bought and could be managed like a chattel”.40 However, in 
the 38th session of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women it 
urged Syria to ”review its existing laws and policies to ensure that women who go to 
shelters do not forgo other legal rights, such as rights to maintenance and dower”.41 Most 
country reports from Muslim countries from after 2000 mention their legislation 
concerning mahr, but the comment just mentioned is the only one I’ve found from the 
committee in response. This seems to imply that the committee has changed its views on 
mahr, from something like the “sales price” of the woman, to a financial right vital for the 
economic situation of women. Since it’s a claim only women have, and thus quite contrary 
to the gender equality norm, this may indicate that the CEDAW committee opens up for the 
equal worth standard of gender justice also concerning mahr, and chooses a more culturally 
sensitive approach, instead of rejecting mahr on the basis of a strict and rather mechanical 
gender equality approach.  
6.3 State obligations 
The CEDAW article 2 and 3 establish a general duty for the states to eliminate all kinds of 
discrimination against women. For example according to article 2 d) and e), the states shall 
“refrain from engaging in any practice of discrimination against women and to ensure that 
public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation”, and “take all 
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person (…)”.  The 
states are under the obligation “to take all appropriate measures … for the purpose of 
                                                 
39 http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/801/12/PDF/N9580112.pdf?OpenElement read 10.09.08. 
40 http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/426/33/PDF/N0242633.pdf?OpenElement read 10.09.08. 
41 http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/375/96/PDF/N0737596.pdf?OpenElement read 10.09.08. 
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 guaranteeing [women] the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms on a basis of equality with men.”42 This should imply that the courts, as the 
judiciary branch of the state, are under strong obligations to promote gender justice when 
dealing with cases as studied in this thesis.43 44 All the European countries in this thesis 
have ratified the CEDAW, an important fact for the future adjudication of mahr. 
6.4 Human rights and ordre public 
In addition to the question of whether one has a right to have one’s personal status law 
applied, another aspect of the relationship between private international law and human 
rights must be taken into account. The relationship between private international law and 
ordre public must be considered with a view to whether the result of the application of a 
foreign rule is against the moral standards of the court’s country. In the countries I’ve 
studied, courts, legislators and legal scholars give scarce if any attention to the relationship 
between human rights obligations and private international law, except for in France. There 
the Court of Cassation have refused to accept the validity of a unilateral repudiation, talaq, 
if it was contested by the wife, on the basis of it being contrary to European Covenant on 
Human Rights (ECHR) protocol 7 art 5 on gender equality, and thus against French ordre 
public.45 This is a form of negative ordre public which might be of interest also for other 
countries. However, the gender justice norms are relevant when determining whether mahr 
is against ordre public, as it sets a limit to what can be applied of foreign laws on the basis 
of cultural standards and values in the European country concerned. 
                                                 
42 Article 3.  
43 For reasons of space I cannot go into detail of the state obligations. As most of the judgments came into 
being before the entry into force of the CEDAW this is mainly relevant for future adjudication.  
44 See e.g. Cook (1994) or Vandenhole (2005) for further discussion of this topic.  
45 Table ronde, Cour de Cassation, February 17 2005. As far as I can see the ECHR is the only human rights 
convention that has been used in order to determine the boundaries of French ordre public. 
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 7 Comparative law 
7.1 Introduction 
An assumption underlying comparative legal method is that if “legal science” is understood 
as including the discovery of models for preventing or resolving social conflicts, in 
addition to the techniques of interpreting the texts, rules etc of the national system, then 
comparative law can provide a much richer range of model solutions than a single legal 
system.46 Mahr has only been dealt with in a few cases in Scandinavia, and in a small 
number of published cases in France and Britain. The aim of this thesis is to engage with 
this assumption by looking into the techniques used by the different courts in dealing with 
the Muslim legal concept of mahr, in a gender equality perspective. Comparative law 
“dissolves unconsidered national prejudices, and helps us to fathom the different societies 
and cultures of the world and to further international understanding.”47 The part of my 
hypothesis that concerns the use of comparative law in the courts, is based on this 
assumption by Zweigert and Kötz,  which is in line with my own views on how one 
understands foreign cultures – which the legal system is part of.  
 
There has been little systematic writing about the methods of comparative law. 
Experienced comparatists have found that a detailed method cannot be laid down in 
advance, and the right method must largely be discovered by gradual trial and error.48 I 
have found no literature on the comparative analysis of judgments, only on the comparison 
of legal rules and concepts. Since interpretation of principles and concepts are an inherent 
part of court reasoning the situation is perhaps not all that different. In the following I 
analyse how the various legal systems deal with the same problem. The overall question is  
how do courts within these different jurisdictions handle mahr in divorce settlements 
between spouses who have married in accordance with Muslim laws, but who live in 
Europe?  
                                                 
46 Zweigert (1998) p.15. 
47 Ibid. p.16. 
48 Ibid. p.33. 
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 7.2 The method of comparative law 
“The basic methodological principle of all comparative law is that of functionality. From 
this basic principle stem all the other rules which determine the choice of laws to be 
compared, the scope of the undertaking, the creation of a system of comparative law, and 
so on. Incomparables cannot usefully be compared, and in law the only things which are 
comparable are those which fulfil the same function,”49 state Zweigert and Kötz, two 
German scholars whose work “An Introduction to Comparative Law” is considered a 
classic. This is indeed valid as long as one studies concepts, but slightly less so when one 
studies judgments. The Swedish scholar in comparative and private international law, 
Michael Bogdan, maintains that “[f]or a comparison to be meaningful, the two objects of 
the comparison must share some common type of characteristics, which can serve as the 
common denominator. (…) Within comparative law, one is normally interested in 
comparing the substantive contents of the legal rules, or more specifically, how the various 
legal systems regulate a certain situation that arises in both of the countries. (…) When 
comparing legal rules from different countries, one should consequently strive to compare 
such rules which regulate the same situations in people’s lives.”50  There are no rules in 
Scandinavian, British or French law that deal with mahr directly, which is what makes it so 
interesting to study. There are rules of private international law, but it is often unclear how 
concepts that are totally foreign should be qualified51 and interpreted. The main object of 
this study is thus how the courts, as the ultimate interpreter of a country’s laws, handle “a 
certain situation”. The case studies selected for the purpose of this study all concern the 
division of property in connection with divorce, and the interpretation of the mahr clause in 
Muslim marriage contracts within a European context. Important human rights issues are at 
stake, at the intersection between gender justice and minority rights. There are some minor 
differences. For example all the French and Swedish cases concern conflict of laws, but the 
French ones never concern a direct claim on mahr, only choice of property regime – of 
which mahr is considered an indicator. But the situational context is very much the same in 
                                                 
49 Ibid. p.34, my italics. 
50 Bogdan (1994) pp.58-59. 
51 See part II chapter 3.2. 
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 all the judgments, thus providing comparable objects for my analysis; the judgments “share 
some common type of characteristics, which can serve as the common denominator” as 
mentioned above. 
 
Kötz and Zweigert distinguish between microcomparison, which concerns specific legal 
institutions or problems and macrocomparison, which focuses on methods of thought, 
techniques of legislation and similar.52 For the purposes of this thesis I see these two 
categories as to a certain extent parallel to the situational and cultural contexts respectively. 
The main focus however, is on the former: How do the courts interpret the Muslim legal 
concept of mahr? But it’s rarely possible to do a good comparison without using both; 
macrocomparison of e.g. general policies provides a basis for the microcomparison of the 
adjudication of mahr.  
7.3 The relationship between comparative law and private international law 
Comparative law is essential for private international law, in that it provides tools for 
understanding the two legal systems and their concepts in relation to one another, and also 
in the application of the foreign law indicated by the conflict rules of the home system, 
when foreign terms have to be converted into the language of the court. The only way of 
doing this is to compare the institutions and concepts of both systems. Comparative law is 
also essential for the proper treatment of the concept of ordre public: when the result of a 
foreign rule is considered so alien or shocking that the domestic court is unwilling to apply 
it, even if it should according to a conflict of laws rule.53 It is necessary to understand the 
foreign rules thoroughly before one can determine whether they will give a result contrary 
to ordre public in a particular case. 
7.4 The use of comparative legal method in this thesis 
Comparative legal method is essential when dealing with legal pluralism. A basic rule in 
comparative legal method is to compare the function of the rules and concepts in question. 
                                                 
52 Zweigert (1998) pp.4-6. 
53 Ibid. pp.6-7. 
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 The most natural choice of method of approach to understand the Muslim norms in 
question is thus comparative legal method. Firstly, comparative legal method is used to 
understand the norms concerning mahr in their Muslim contexts, but with more emphasis 
on the functions of mahr than the comparison, but more importantly in the comparison of 
the judgments and in the analysis of the courts’ handling of the foreign norms. The 
comparative legal method is a necessity when the courts deal with legal pluralism, in order 
for them to understand and apply the norms in question correctly. When the courts have to 
deal with matters of private international law, comparative legal method seems to be the 
best tool also for them for determining the contents of the Muslim laws in question.  
 
The comparative method should provide the courts with a way to follow Nielsen’s 
recommendation about focusing on the functions of the foreign laws, not their ideological 
basis.54 Whether they use it, and if so, how, is looked into in the analysis of the 
international private law cases selected for the purpose of this study. The overall purpose of 
my analysis is to discuss the basic assumption underlying this thesis:  that the courts must 
apply comparative legal method in order to provide a foundation for making a correct and 
fair decision; if they don’t, they won’t be able to achieve a fair result in terms of gender 
justice. When I try and determine whether the courts apply the method of comparative law, 
I focus on whether they try and investigate into the functions of mahr in a Muslim legal 
context compared to the concepts and rules with similar functions in the European legal 
system. On the basis of information in the judgments themselves I have also paid attention 
to the sources the courts use as basis for their comparison.  
7.4.1 Interviews with lawyers from the various legal systems 
Bogdan stresses that “one must study the foreign legal system in its entirety”,55 which can 
be interpreted as understanding the judgment within its cultural context. He also warns that 
“the real importance of the various sources of law is by no means always expressed in the 
                                                 
54 See p.4.  
55 Bogdan (1994) p.49. 
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 country’s legal literature.”56 The size of this thesis does not allow for a detailed mapping of 
the each legal system, but I have, in addition to reading literature on each legal system, 
contacted British and French lawyers, both people trained in the relevant legal field and 
others, and asked them how they read the judgments concerned. I chose not to contact any 
Swedish lawyers as I found that I understood the judgments sufficiently well for the 
purposes of this thesis. The Swedish legal system is very similar to the Norwegian system, 
and the judgments are written in a style that provides quite a lot of information about the 
reasoning behind the decision.57
8 Other research on the adjudication of mahr 
I have only found one comparative study of the adjudication of mahr in various 
jurisdictions: an unpublished PhD thesis from Harvard University by the Canadian lawyer 
Pascale Fournier. She has been most kind to let me read it. Her approach has been how 
liberalism deals with religion, and “how the specific legal institution of Mahr is 
understood, reconstructed or erased by the legal system and the broader spectrum of 
ideology that permeates it”. She suggests that “Western liberal courts [French, German, 
Canadian and from the United States] have captured Mahr in three different ways: the 
Liberal-Legal Pluralist Approach (LLPA), the Liberal-Formal Equality Approach (LFEA), 
and the Liberal-Substantive Equality Approach (LSEA)”, of which “[t]he LLPA views 
                                                 
56 Ibid. p.46. 
57 In France, Fadi El Abdallah – a PhD student in contract law – gave me an introduction into the structure, 
reasoning and terminology of French judgments. Rama Chalak, a lawyer working within the field of private 
international law and family law, helped me place them further within their context of the French legal 
system, private international law and family law in particular. Maître Courjon, a Court of Cassation lawyer 
representing the husband (the winning party) in the very last French case concerning mahr, helped me 
understand this judgment in depth and provided some reflections upon the Court of Cassation and French 
ordre public. I did not manage to get in touch with British lawyers working with private international law, but 
LLM Ezekiel Ward read through the judgments with me and explained terminology, reasoning and the 
English technique of interpreting judgments.  
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 Mahr as central to cultural and religious recognition, the LFEA considers it as a mere 
secular contract, and the LSEA projects fairness principles into its regulation.” I commend 
her explanation of the different functions of mahr. I do however read all the French 
judgments, the Douai judgments58 in particular, quite differently from Dr. Fournier, and I 
question her interpretation of the Court of Appeal of Douai judgment in particular, since 
she bases her analysis on the result in that case being the opposite of what I understand that 
it was. Her quotes from this judgment originate from the Court of Cassation judgment, 
while she treats the two judgments as being from two different cases. But as they concern a 
man reclaiming mahr after a void marriage from the father of his bride, and no private 
international law is involved, I won’t go into further detail. The French judgments are the 
only ones we both have studied, and in my opinion she provides some interesting 
perspectives upon the adjudication of mahr, especially in a North American context. Her 
use of liberalist theory as a general basis, though, is constraining from a feminist 
perspective, especially while analysing such an institution as mahr. Myself I’ve chosen a 
different approach, with a stronger emphasis on feminist legal theory, which I’ll present in 
the following section. 
 
The remainder literature makes no comparisons between the adjudication of mahr within 
various European jurisdictions, and I will refer to it when I present the various cases and 
discuss them later on.  
 
                                                 
58 Cour d'appel de Douai, ch.7, 8 janvier 1976, Cour de Cassation, ch.civ.1, 4 avril 1978. 
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 Part II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1 Introduction 
Since we are in a situation of legal pluralism, the norms in question are part of the cultural 
context of the judgments as described in part I chapter 2. We therefore need to have a look 
at the norms in question before we study the judgments. I will start with presenting the 
concept of mahr, as it appears in a Muslim context. It must be noted that although the basic 
rules concerning mahr are rather similar in Muslim countries in North Africa, the Middle 
East and South Asia, the concept and rules do vary – also within a single country. Legal 
pluralism in the strong sense59 is indeed a valid description of the norms concerning mahr 
also in a Muslim context. For example in Tunisia, the official mahr is rather low, close to 
symbolic, but in rural areas large amounts of mahr is paid, though unofficially, thus not 
enforceable through Tunisian courts.60  
 
In this thesis I will focus on the basics that seem to be more or less generally accepted in 
the official laws of Muslim countries from Morocco in the west to Bangladesh in the east, 
thus excluding unwritten norms and countries like Indonesia, which is the most populous of 
all Muslim countries, and African countries south of the Sahara. The reason for the choice 
of written norms is quite simply accessibility. The reason for my choice of countries is my 
own background in Arabic and regional studies on the Middle East and North Africa; I 
have more knowledge about these countries, which provides a better foundation for my 
analysis.   
                                                 
59 See page 2. 
60 Conversation with Tunisian lawyer Lemia Trad 17.05.2008. 
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 2 Mahr in Muslim legal contexts 
2.1 Introduction 
What is mahr, a sales price for the woman’s uterus or a gift to honour her? Is it good or bad 
for women? Both questions need to be discussed within a Muslim context before we 
analyze how it’s interpreted in European courts. I will also say a little about the legal 
method and sources of law in Muslim countries, to provide a background for what the 
European judges have to deal with.  
2.2 Some basic facts about mahr 
Mahr61 is “the goods and/or cash to be given by the groom to the bride as a requisite of a 
valid Muslim marriage”.62 Some jurisdictions acknowledge mahr in the form of services as 
well, e.g. the teaching of the Qur’an, while some require it to be of economic value, for 
example Tunisia63 and Egypt.64 65It may be given at the time of the marriage ceremony, 
and is then often called mahr mu´ajjal, prompt dower, or at a later date, normally at the 
time of dissolution of marriage by divorce or the death of the husband. It is then called 
mahr mu’akhkhar, deferred dower.66 In theory the woman may claim a deferred mahr at 
any time after the marriage, but this is often interpreted as a sign of problems in the 
marriage. In practice, mahr is therefore seldom claimed before the event of divorce, as the 
                                                 
61 In the Qur’an the word mahr (ر ﻬ ﻣ ) is not used; several other terms are seen as synonymous: sadaq, which 
properly means “friendship”, “present”, ”a gift given voluntarily and not as a result of a contract” (Verse 
4:4);`ajr (pl. `ujur), which means “payment”, “salary” or “gift” (Verses 5:5, 60:10);  or most often: farida, 
which means, among other things, “a gift or disposition instituted by God” (Verses 2:236, 2:237, 4:24 ). In 
French it is called maher, in Hebrew it is mohar, in some non-Arabic speaking countries it is calles mehar 
and similar. The Encyclopaedia of Islam online on mahr, read March 31 2008. 
62 WLUML (2003) p.8. 
63 Code du Statut personnel art. 12.  
64 Dupret (2002) p.23.  
65 See also Siddiqui (1995).  
66 See e.g. Blanc (1995), Wani (1996), Diwan (1990) ch.5.   
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 social obstructions to an earlier claim are significant.67 Whether mahr is prompt, deferred, 
or a combination, vary greatly between communities.  
 
Some systems set a maximum or minimum amount of mahr, which vary greatly. Within 
these limits and elsewhere, the amount and nature (if paid in goods) of mahr is normally 
negotiated between the fiancees or their families, depending on personal, cultural and other 
circumstances. If the amount is not decided upon, the court may set an amount on the basis 
of what is common in that area, the mahr of the woman’s sisters or other relatives, her age, 
education level etc. This type of mahr is called mahr ul-mithl (proper or exemplary dower), 
and may be either deferred or prompt.68
2.3 Rules concerning mahr, marriage and divorce 
2.3.1 The Muslim marriage contract and mahr 
Mahr is an essential part of the Muslim marriage contract. In order to understand the 
concept of mahr, we must therefore first take a look at marriage and divorce in Muslim 
laws. Marriage in Muslim law is a civil contract between two individuals, entered into by 
their free will, and is nothing like a sacrament. According to the author of the Hedaya, a 
major work within the Hanafi tradition of South Asia, “evidence is an essential condition of 
marriage”.69 Two or three adult and sane witnesses are required.70 Since the marriage is a 
contract, the non-performance of the obligations of one party may lead to a modification of 
the obligations of the other party, or even the termination of the contract, i.e. divorce.71 It is 
debated whether mahr is a condition for the validity of the marriage (hukm), or a legal 
effect of it (rukn). The tendency is that the Maliki law school, prevalent in Northern Africa 
from Libya to Morocco, sees it as a condition of marriage, while the other law schools 
                                                 
67 WLUML (2003) p.180. 
68 For an overview of some of the variations of practices concerning mahr, see an-Na`īm (2002). 
69 Marghinani (1957) p.26. 
70 Two men, or one man and two women.  
71 Ali (2003). 
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 mainly see it as an effect of the marriage contract; a claim which arises from it.72 In either 
case, mahr is one such obligation,73 which in many countries is required to be written into 
the marriage contract. Since one of the duties of the wife, according to a traditional 
understanding of the law schools, is sexual availability, mahr is by some seen as the sales 
price of the woman’s uterus. The husband is required to provide for the wife. There is no 
notion of property regimes in Muslim laws: each spouse has his own separate property. 
This means that mahr, whether prompt or deferred, remains the woman’s property during 
the entire marriage; a right to mahr may even, in some places, be inherited if the woman 
dies. She may even exercise a kind of lien, provided the property is held by her, and legally 
so.74  
 
On the Indian subcontinent the interpretation of the mahr clause in the marriage contract is 
very much influenced by Common Law. The definition of mahr in Mulla’s textbook on 
Hanafi law, a major source in Pakistani and Indian Muslim family law, is “a sum of money 
or other property which the wife is entitled to receive from the husband in consideration for 
the marriage”. Consideration defined as “the inducement to a contract”,75 the existence of 
which is a requirement for a contract to be valid in Common Law.76 Considering that 
consideration is a concept that only exists in Common Law, one might argue that it is 
unnatural to go too deeply into this discussion, as the terms don’t really translate between 
                                                 
72 Blanc (1995) pp.155-157. This is, however, limited to the cases where the marriage contract says no mahr 
is to be paid, or where the clause concerning mahr is void and this is stated before the marriage, otherwise the 
wife can claim mahr ul-mithl. Linant de Bellefonds (1965-1973) p.202, as quoted in Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh 
(1999) pp.90-91.  
73 Traditionally, many see the wife’s main duties as being obedience and sexual availability, the husband’s as 
fair treatment of the wife, maintenance and dower. This is, of course, under continuous debate and change, 
especially in relation to the legislation in various Muslim countries.  
74 Mulla (1996) p.437 ff. Mir-Hosseini (2000) p.78 describes a case where a woman obtains a court order to 
confiscate a portion of her husband’s property to secure her mahr.  
75 Black (1990). 
76 This is a very complicated matter, see e.g. Cheshire (2007). 
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 the legal systems.77 But it has created a huge debate on the Indian sub-continent. According 
to Pearl, judges in India still have a tendency to focus too much on the contractual aspect of 
mahr, while Pakistani judges “have appropriately captured the essence of the concept”,78 
exemplified by a 1980 judgment from Karachi: “The dower (…) is a right which comes 
into existence with the marriage contract itself except that in case the dower is deferred its 
enforcement is held in abeyance till a certain event, i.e. dissolution of marriage by death or 
divorce, occurs.”79 Pearl and Menski mean the idea of mahr as a consideration for the 
marriage may have arisen as a result of ancient jurists comparing the loss of virginity to the 
loss of a limb, and emphasises that mahr is not consideration, and that subsequently the 
Muslim marriage contract is not a sale.80  
2.3.2 The different types of divorce and mahr 
In a few Muslim countries, such as Tunisia, men and women have the same right to 
divorce, at least formally. In countries where the family law is more influenced by the 
Islamic law schools, men and women have different rights and obligations both in marriage 
and at its dissolution. The consequences of a divorce, and the rights and obligations of the 
couple, depend on the type of divorce: If the husband initiates the divorce, it’s either talaq 
or, if mutually agreed, mubarat. If the wife initiates the divorce, it is mubarat, talaq bi-
tawfid (the husband has delegated his right to talaq to the wife),81  faskh (judicial 
divorce)82 or khul´a (divorce against compensation).83 This compensation is very often the 
                                                 
77 For more about this discussion, see Pearl (1998) p.191. 
78 Ibid. p.191 
79 Anwarul Hassan Siddiqui v. Family Judge in Pearl (1998) p.191. 
80 Pearl (1998) p.180. For more about the Muslim marriage contract, see also e.g. El Alami (1992), Ali (2000) 
p 138 ff, or Bano (2004) p.217 ff. 
81 Carroll (1996).  
82 A faskh divorce can in most Muslim countries be obtained either as a result of fault, e.g. the lack of 
maintenance, or as ”a result of the absence or presence of a condition [in the marriage contract] in one of the 
parties”. Mir-Hosseini (2000) p.40, my brackets.  
83 Balchin (2006) p.68, WLUML (2003) p.273 ff. 
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 renouncement of a deferred mahr, or the return of a prompt mahr to the husband,84 which 
means that a woman loses her right to mahr if she wants divorce without the husband’s 
consent, and if she can’t claim a judicial divorce (faskh) on the grounds specified in 
national law. In practice, women often renounce a deferred mahr when the divorce 
proceedings are difficult, even when they have no legal obligation to do so; it is an 
important bargaining tool, e.g. to obtain the custody of children.85  
2.4 Some views on the nature of mahr 
Doi and many others, including many women, emphasize mahr’s character as a “free gift 
by the husband to the wife, at the time of contracting the marriage,”86 which is a sign of the 
husband’s respect for his wife and her “right to earn, own and possess property 
independently and to enjoy an equitable position on the matrimonial dais”.87 At the same 
time, many, especially those in favour of a strict gender equality policy, see mahr as 
something of a sales price of the woman’s uterus. Mir-Hosseini, a British-Iranian 
anthropologist who has made extensive studies of marriage and divorce in Iran and 
Morocco, quotes a prominent Maliki scholar as follows: “When a woman marries, she sells 
a part of her person. In the market one buys merchandise, in marriage the husband buys the 
genital arvum mulieris. As in any other bargain and sale, only useful and ritually clean 
objects may be given in dower.”88 Since the Malikis see mahr as a condition for the 
marriage contract to be valid, the link between mahr and the husband’s access to the 
woman’s uterus is emphasised. Mir-Hosseini emphasises, however, that “[t]o identify 
certain similarities in the legal structures of marriage and sale contracts is not to suggest 
that Islamic law does conceptualize marriage as a sale”, and that “Muslim jurists have 
                                                 
84 Mir-Hosseini (2000) pp.81-83.  
85 WLUML (2003) pp.179-180, El Razaz (1970). See Mir-Hosseini (2000) p.75 ff. for an example.  
86 Doi (1984), cited in Pearl (1998) p.179. 
87 Wani (1996) p.v.  
88 Ruxton (1916) p.106, as quoted in Mir-Hosseini (2000) p.32. 
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 shown awareness of possible misunderstandings and are careful to enumerate the ways in 
which marriage contracts differ from that of a sale”.89  
2.5 Some functions of mahr 
In addition to being a bargaining tool, mahr may have a variety of functions, depending on 
the situation and whether it’s prompt or deferred. The Swedish scholar Johanna Schiratzki 
sees it as a kind of economic insurance for the woman, in case of divorce.90 A deferred 
mahr is often set to an amount which is beyond the immediate means of the husband. This 
is often used as a manner of trying to prevent him from divorcing her: If he pronounces 
talaq, he has to give her the entire mahr.91 A prompt mahr, however, may prove a barrier 
to a divorce the woman wants, as she most often will have to return her dower, which in 
many cases will have been spent.92 A dower set beyond the husband’s means is sometimes, 
in countries where polygamy is allowed, also supposed to prevent him from taking a 
second wife since he then will have nothing left to give as mahr a second time. In some 
places, especially in Palestinian communities in Israel, women use their mahr to invest or 
trade and secure themselves a degree of economic independence,93 and mahr is sometimes 
seen as a way of evening out the differences in the economic situation of the spouses.94
2.6 Mahr and gender equality  
So, is mahr good or bad for women? There is no simple answer to that question, and the 
debate is still going in Muslim communities all over the world. Concerning the nature of 
mahr, the vast majority of scholars, men and women alike, seem to agree with Mir-
Hosseini that mahr is not a sales price of the woman’s uterus or anything else; Muslim 
                                                 
89 Mir-Hosseini (2000) pp.32-33. 
90 Schiratzki (2001) p.73. 
91 Schacht (1982) p.167, as quoted in Fournier (2007) p.53. For a real life example, see Mir-Hosseini (2000) 
p.75 ff.  
92 Fournier (2007) p.55 ff.  
93 WLUML (2003) p.181. 
94 Oudin (2006) pp.15-16. 
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 marriage is not a sale.95 Muslim feminists are divided; those promoting a strict gender 
equality norm are necessarily against it. In my opinion one has to look at the function mahr 
has in each society, and in each situation. As implied in the CEDAW committee’s 
comments on the Syrian country report in 2007, mahr is an important right for the women, 
and as we saw in part I chapter 6.2.3, the committee’s views upon mahr has developed 
from very negative and formal to a somewhat positive and pragmatic view.96 If the women 
in a given society most often are housewives, mahr is an important source of income, 
especially in case of divorce. But in some situations the link between the claim of mahr and 
the type of divorce may lead couples to try and make the other one make the first move to 
divorce, as this may mean that mahr goes to the person who don’t initiate divorce. Mahr 
may then become an obstruction against a wanted divorce, instead of an insurance against 
an unwanted one.97 If the woman has her own income, mahr becomes less important, and 
may, together with the right to maintenance, sometimes become an unjust burden upon the 
man. It is a right the woman has on the sole basis of her being a woman and marrying. The 
only possible adaptation to economic and other circumstances is the negotiation of the 
terms of the marriage contract including the amount of mahr, which have to take place 
before the marriage contract is signed. Any circumstances at the time of payment of a 
deferred dower are not taken into account.98 Whether mahr is good or bad for women, or 
even an unfair burden upon the man, depends thus entirely on the circumstances in each 
situation. 
2.7 Legal method and the sources of law in Muslim countries 
Family law in Muslim countries today is indeed diverse, and covers a vast range of 
solutions and interpretations of legal concepts and rules derived from Islam and its law 
schools, local custom, and the law of colonial powers such as France and Britain. The 
                                                 
95 The French-Egyptian jurist El Razaz (1970) discusses the matter thoroughly. See also for example Pearl 
(1998) p.179, Nørgaard (2001) p.161, Wani (1996), Nasir (1990) p.43 ff.  
96 http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/375/96/PDF/N0737596.pdf?OpenElement read 10.09.08.  
97 See e.g. Fournier (2007) p.59 ff. 
98 Or rather, he has no legal basis for such a claim.  
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 interpretation of concepts and rules derived from Islamic legal sources99 has always been 
debated, see for example El Razaz (1970), but the works of the scholars of the law schools 
(madhahib) still provide a basis of Muslim family law today – to a greater or lesser extent. 
When the countries became independent, the government had three main options to keep 
Shari´a as a basis for the family law while at the same time not giving too much power to 
the judiciary. To give special Shari´a courts the power to adjudicate upon family matters, 
but little else, to codify the Shari´a,100 or to give laws inspired by the Shari´a, but not 
claiming to be the Shari´a.101 Today the latter solution is the most common. Case law 
sometimes plays an important role, depending on the power structures and legal system in 
each country, but to a lesser extent than codification.102  Although traditional Islamic legal 
reasoning use more of an inductive method, which is also the main approach in Common 
Law, most Muslim countries today use a deductive method, and create general laws more 
than they use induction from case law.103  
 
Since the beginning of the 20th century, criticism of traditional family law increased and led 
to several reforms, aiming among other things to restrict the husband’s right to repudiate 
his wife unilaterally, to develop grounds for judicial dissolution at the wife’s initiative, and 
to restrict the practice of polygamy. A major issue has been to make registration necessary 
                                                 
99 The Qur’an, the Sunna (accounts of things the prophet Muhammads said and did), analogy from these, and 
consensus among legal scholars are considered the most important of these. See e.g. Eggen (2001). 
100 It must be noted that the term shari´a (Ar. ﺔ ﻌﻴ ر ﺸ  ”way” or ”path”, has a vast number of meanings. 
Shari´a in the sense ”Islamic law” consists mainly of family law, a bit of contract law, and a few rules 
concerning penal law. The contents are mainly based on the elaborations done by the four law schools of 
Sunni Islam or, for Shi´a Islam, its one major law school, but vary greatly even within a single law school. 
There is no uniform law that is called the Shari´a. 
101 Vikør (2003) pp. 212 ff.  
102 Pakistan in one country where the courts play a predominant role in determining the contents of the laws 
of that country, see e.g. Ali (2000).  Muslim family law in India seems to be codified only to a small degree, 
see e.g. the French judgment Cour de Cassation, ch.civ.1, 22 novembre 2005. 
103 Lecture at the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights by Khaled Abou El Fadl, professor in Islamic Law at 
the UCLA, on the occasion of his receiving the Human Rights Price of the University of Oslo, November 13 
2007. 
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 for a valid marriage, as the woman is otherwise entirely in the hands of her husband and 
their relatives on both sides.104 Different methods have provided the juristic basis for the 
reforms. Among the most important are takhayyur – picking and choosing from whichever 
law school or doctrine one prefers; extension of the court’s discretion; administrative 
measures anchored in the doctrine of siyasa shar´iyya;105 penal sanctions; “modernistic” 
interpretation of the textual sources (neo-ijtihad);106 and the doctrine of public interest 
(maslaha).107 Feminist rereading of the sources of Islamic law make a supplement to the 
reinterpretation (ijtihad) of the Qur’an, the hadith108 and other sources of Islamic law.109 A 
major argument is that the hadith in practice often have precedence over the Qur’an, 
another is that the hadith chosen as basis for legal rules are more patriarchal than other 
hadith, which are overlooked.110 Its impact on the actual legislation and jurisprudence in 
Muslim countries is varying, depending on the political system and situation.  
                                                 
104 WLUML (2003) pp.134-136.  
105 Governance and administration in accordance with the Shari´a. 
106 The contemporary Sudanese scholar, Abdullahi an-Na´im, is a well-known example. The Tunisian 
prohibition on polygamy, based on the reasoning that Islamic law requires a man to treat all his wives 
equally, and that this is impossible to achieve (Muhammad himself exempted), is perhaps the most well-
known example of legislation.  
107 Vikør (2003). 
108 Stories about the sayings and doings of the prophet Mohammad. 
109 For a brief overview, see Offenhauer (2005) p.27 ff. For examples of reinterpreters and reinterpretations of 
traditional sources of Islamic law, see Ali (2000), Badran (1990), Barlas (2002), Mernissi (1991), and Wadud 
(1999). 
110 Conversation with Dr. Taj Hargey, Islamic scholar and head of the Muslim Educational Centre in Oxford, 
March 6 2008.  
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 3 Private international law111 
3.1 Introduction 
An Indian Muslim couple moves to Europe, and after 20 years a claim for mahr arises in 
their divorce case. A Polish woman and a Lebanese man, both living in France, contract a 
Muslim marriage in Lebanon. When mahr travels to Europe, claims may arise on the 
background of a whole range of situations. Private international law is, as mentioned 
earlier, a kind of formal or “weak” legal pluralism, but the line between formal and 
informal pluralism is a continuum rather than clear cut. The major variables that determine 
whether it’s a private international law case or not, are the personal status of the spouses 
and where the contract containing a clause of mahr was signed. Only a case where two 
citizens of the same European country sign a marriage contract with a clause of mahr, in 
the same European country, has no elements of private international law.112  
 
In this thesis we will focus on cases concerning private international law, and it is therefore 
necessary to give a brief overview of some of the basic principles and rules that exist in the 
European countries concerned: Norway, Sweden, France and England,113 since they’re part 
of the cultural context of the judgments and thus essential to understanding them. Some 
basic principles are the same, but each country has its own set of rules of private 
international law. Due to lack of space I have to simplify matters; the focus is on the main 
concepts and principles that are used in all the European countries concerned, and how 
these are used in the main rules of each country. I will go into some further detail when I 
analyze each judgment in part III.   
 
                                                 
111 In English law, but not in American law, private international law is the same as conflict of laws. (Stone 
(1995) p.1.) I use both terms interchangeably.  
112 See Sayed (2008) pp.188-189. 
113 Since there are differences between different parts of the UK, I have chosen to focus on England. 
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 In matters of private international law, one first has to determine whether the court has 
jurisdiction. This question is not relevant for our purposes.114 Secondly, one has to 
determine which country’s law should be applied. In order to do this, one has to choose 
which set of conflicts laws regulate the matter at hand. Different rules apply depending on 
whether the legal question concerned is qualified as inheritance law, contract law, etc.  
Which set of categories should be used to classify the matter at hand and which rules 
apply? This part of the choice of laws question is called the problem of qualification. The 
interpretation of mahr related to the actual application is necessarily shaped by the process 
of qualification, and thus by the conflict of laws rules, which is why we need to look into 
this matter even though the focus of this thesis in relation to the interpretation and 
application of foreign law is on the use of comparative legal method. Is comparative legal 
method used in the process of qualification as well as in the further interpretation and 
application of the Muslim laws? 
3.2 Qualification 
Qualification115 is the classification of a concept or legal question that determines which 
choice of laws rules to apply. The categories and their contents vary, and do not always 
correspond with the categories in national law. For example in Continental European 
private international law, as well as in Scandinavian law, it is common to separate between 
financial and personal effects of marriage in private international law, while they are often 
both categorized as family law within the national legal system. The former include matters 
related to personal status and the spouses’ daily rights and duties towards each other in 
personal and practical matters, the latter refer to things like rights and duties concerning 
maintenance, and matrimonial property regimes. The division into two separate categories 
is mainly used for international marriages to determine which conflict of laws rule should 
                                                 
114 For more about this, see e.g. Gaarder (2000) on Norwegian law, Bogdan (2004) on Swedish, Dicey (2006) 
on British, or Mayer (1994) on French law. 
115 As usual the Britons do things their own way, and separate between characterization of connecting 
factors, such as domicile and place of celebration, and characterization of issues, for example the meaning 
such concepts as “capacity” and “formal validity”. For our purposes the latter is approximately what in 
France and Scandinavia is called qualification. Stone (1995) p.384. 
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 be used for each claim. The “qualification problem” is which set of categories should be 
used to classify the foreign legal concept, and the three most widely known approaches are 
qualification in terms of the court’s legal system (lex fori); the laws which should be 
applied on the case according to the choice of laws rules (lex causae) – sometimes the laws 
of the court’s own legal system, sometimes those of another country; or autonomously, 
based on comparative study, i.e. comparative legal method.116 The dominant view in the 
England, France, Norway and Sweden is that the lex fori should be used as a basis,117 but 
this creates problems with concepts such as mahr, which are completely foreign to 
domestic law. If a concept doesn’t exist in French law, the technique that has been 
developed in French jurisprudence is to have the French categories as a starting point, but 
enlarge them until they include the foreign concepts that are sufficiently similar. This 
solution has been criticised for being too much of an abstraction, in that one starts with the 
categories of the conflict rules without taking into consideration the actual legal 
consequences of the choice of conflict law, and that the reasons behind the conflict rule for 
each category should alone determine the extent of the rule. For concepts that have no 
similarity at all with French ones, the judge is left to set down the conflict rule which to 
him seems to be the most in harmony with the rest of the system.118  
 
Thue maintains that in cases concerning mahr and other concepts that don’t exist in 
Norwegian law, lex causae should be applied to determine which category of conflict of 
laws rules the court should apply.119 This theory has been much criticised, the Danish 
scholar Svenné Schmidt asks for example: “How can you characterize in accordance with a 
law you don’t know, before you have made the qualification and determined which conflict 
of laws rules is applicable?” A major weakness with this approach is that it’s based on 
                                                 
116 According to Frantzen, no country has codified the process or method of qualification, so the major 
sources are judgments and legal theory. (Frantzen (2002) p.145.) There may be variations from one judgment 
to another in a single country, but normally one method is clearly more accepted than the others. 
117 Bogdan (2004) pp.62-65 and Thue (2002) p.170. 
118 Mayer (1994) pp.118-119. 
119 Thue (2002) p.395. 
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 every legal system determining itself in which cases its laws are applicable. This may 
easily lead to there being several legal systems or none whatsoever that is applicable in a 
particular case.120 Due to the growth of private international law regulations from the EU, 
the comparative method is gaining influence in Europe,121 even though it is criticized for 
being too complicated and creating too much work for the judges. A middle way is what is 
sometimes referred to as the private international law approach. It may be seen as a mixture 
of the lex fori and the comparative approach, in that it takes lex fori as a starting point, but 
classifies the foreign institution or concept according to its functions, and how these may 
be interpreted in relation to the relevant statute in lex fori. The term “marriage” in lex fori is 
for example interpreted in a way that comprises other institutions with mainly the same 
functions in other legal systems, i.e. polygamy, gay marriages etc.  
 
If the matter is qualified as a matter related to the family law, the personal status law of the 
couple is in most cases applied on the case. Contract law matters are as a main rule 
determined by the law that the parties have chosen. The choice must be explicit,122 i.e. in 
writing, but under certain circumstances the choice may be implicit, see the Rome 
convention art. 3.1. In France the choice of matrimonial property regime is qualified under 
obligations law, and the choice may then be implicit.123 If no proof of such a choice is 
presented, the matter is most often regulated by the law of the country to which it has the 
strongest ties. It is not given that mahr is qualified as a matter related to family law; as we 
have seen it has strong contractual elements as well.  
3.3 The choice of laws 
Once the matter at hand is qualified as belonging to a certain category of law, the choice of 
laws rules give one or more connecting factors that determine which country’s laws to be 
applied. According to the Belgian scholar of private international law and Muslim laws in 
                                                 
120 Schmidt (1954) in Frantzen (2002) pp.147-148. 
121 Frantzen (2002) p.145. 
122 The Rome convention of 1980 art. 3.1. See also Moss (2007) p.2 ff.  
123 See e.g. Najm (2006), Annoussamy (1998).  
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 Europe, Marie-Claire Foblets, “[t]he four main factors that, either independently or in 
combination, form the basis of contemporary choice-of-law debate among legal 
practitioners in Europe today are: nationality, domicile, the choice of “the better law” and 
party autonomy.”124 Few courts seem to use the “better law theory”, and it will not be 
discussed any further in this thesis. Nationality and domicile are most often seen as relevant 
factors to determine which law is the person’s personal status law, when this is the law 
referred to by the conflicts rules for a specific category of law. The thought behind the 
concept of personal status law is that some things are seen as so close to one’s identity that 
they should be regulated by the laws of the country to which one has the strongest ties, 
such as marital status and parental obligations.125 Nationality is the easiest to determine, 
although double or triple nationality may cause some difficulty. Some scholars maintain 
that if one or both of the spouses have a double nationality, and one of them is the same as 
the courts’, then lex fori normally should be applied.126 In France, as in most countries on 
the continent, nationality is the determining factor of one’s personal status law. As to 
domicile, it varies what it takes for a person to be seen as domiciled in a country. In 
Norway, one needs to actually reside there plus to have the intention to continue to reside 
there,127 while in Sweden one is considered as domiciled if one “resides there, if the 
residence when taking into account the duration of it and other circumstances must be seen 
as lasting.”128 In England one distinguishes between domicile of origin and domicile of 
choice, both subcategories to the concept of domicile, which is the basis for determining 
the personal status law.129  
3.4 Ordre public or public policy 
If the result of the application of a foreign law is considered contrary to fundamental norms 
and values in the court’s own country, it may refuse to apply the law on the basis of it 
                                                 
124 Foblets (2005) p.300. My italics. 
125 Thue (2002) p.9. 
126 See e.g. Mayer (1994) p.556. 
127 Thue (2002) p.63. 
128 Bogdan (2004) p.149. 
129 Thue (2002) p.65, Stone (1995) p.12 ff.  
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 being against public policy130 or ordre public. It is very vague what ordre public really is; 
in France, according to a Court of Cassation131 lawyer, “ordre public is what the Court of 
Cassation says is ordre public,”132 and in all the countries concerned this is approximately 
the case: What is against ordre public must be determined for each and every case, as it’s 
the result of the rule, not the rule itself, which is the object of evaluation. Thus the Supreme 
Court has the final word in each country to determine the boundaries. It normally takes a 
lot for something to be considered against ordre public, as it would create a lot of both 
practical and political trouble if this exception was applied too often.133 In England the 
state policy elements in the concept of public policy are less emphasised than before, and 
the term public policy is now close to the concept of ordre public used in continental 
law.134 As we saw in part I chapter 6.4, the relationship between ordre public and human 
rights obligations, including the CEDAW, is unclear. The issue raises numerous questions, 
which so far seem to have received little attention, to some degree with the exception of 
France.135
 
What I’ve just described is what sometimes is called “negative ordre public”, to separate it 
from “positive ordre public”, which is now more often called international mandatory 
rules. This is when a domestic rule or regulation is considered mandatory even when the 
choice of laws rules designate the application of a foreign rule which is different.136 When I 
use the term ordre public I refer to the “positive” ordre public described above.  
                                                 
130 The English term is in this context broadly equivalent to the term ordre public.  
131 The highest court in civil matters in France.  
132 Interview with Maître Courjon of the SCP de Chaisemartin et Courjon Jan. 16 2008.  
133 For a detailed study of ordre public in Swedish courts, see Fallah (2002). For more about ordre public in 
other countries see e.g. Gaarder (2000) p.99 ff or Thue (2002) p.176 ff about Norway, Mayer (1994) p.139 ff 
about France, Stone (1995) p.135 ff about England 
134 Thue (2002) p.181. 
135 See part I chapter 6.4 
136 Thue (2002) p.199 ff. 
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 3.5 Marriage contracts and legal effects of marriage in private international law 
In most European legal systems, except Switzerland and the UK, the validity137 of a 
marriage is regulated by each spouse’s national law.138 In the UK the general rule is that 
the validity of a marriage is governed by lex loci celebrationis – the law of the country 
where the marriage was celebrated.139 As to the legal effects of a valid marriage, this is 
another matter altogether. These are in all the European countries studied in this thesis 
except the UK, separated into two categories: financial and personal effects of marriage. 
The contents of each category varies somewhat, but in French, Swedish and Norwegian law 
the right and duty of maintenance is considered a personal effect of marriage,140 although 
in French law this right is governed by a different conflicts rule than other personal 
effects.141 The personal rights and duties arising from a marriage barely exist in Western 
European law today, but there are some exceptions: In France142 the couple has a duty to 
help and support each other. This is different from Muslim laws, where, for example, in 
most countries the wife still has a certain duty to obey her husband.143  
 
The personal and financial effects of marriage are often governed by different conflicts 
rules: In French private international law, personal effects of the marriage and questions 
about marital status and suchlike are all governed by the Civil Code art. 3 s3, while most 
financial effects, including matrimonial property regimes, are seen as obligations law.144 In 
Scandinavian law both are seen as part of family law. The category it’s sorted under has 
consequences for the choice of conflict of law rules. It’s not given which category mahr 
belongs to, and this separation may influence how the term is interpreted. Matrimonial 
                                                 
137 ”Validité matérielle”. 
138 Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh (1999) p.50. 
139 Stone (1995) p.43. 
140 Thue (2002) p.382 ff, Mayer (1994) p.372. 
141 Mayer (1994) p.372. 
142 Code Civil art.212. 
143 See e.g. Nasir (1990) p.81.  
144 Mayer (1994) p.371 ff.  
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 property regimes are an essential part of the financial effects of marriage in French law, 
and they have quite a number to choose from. The choice of property regime is a 
compulsory part of the civil marriage in France (which is compulsory in itself, no other 
marriage performed on French territory is considered valid). The French contrat de 
marriage is different from marriage contracts in other countries in that it often regulates the 
property relations between the spouses in detail, and is considered part of obligations law 
rather than family law. In other jurisdictions matrimonial property regimes are not seen as a 
separate category in terms of law, i.e. in British and in Muslim laws.145 In France the 
couples have to fill out a form which matrimonial property regime they choose if they 
marry in France, or sign a tailor made marriage contract, a contrat de mariage, which 
determines the matrimonial property relations. In private international law, if the couple 
hasn’t signed a contrat de mariage, the court has to search for the parties’ intentions. Only 
if sufficient indications of an implicit choice of matrimonial property regime can’t be 
found, the Hague Convention of 1978 assigns the first joint domicile as the connecting 
factor.146  
 
In British law the term “matrimonial property” is only used in matters concerning private 
international law, but under the category of property law. In England matrimonial property 
regimes are qualified as property law, and if no written agreement is made, the law 
governing the matter is that of the husband’s domicile at the time of marriage;147 real estate 
is governed by lex rei sitae – the law of the place where the real estate is situated.148  
 
In Norway and Sweden the personal effects of marriage are as a main rule governed by lex 
domicilii – the law of the country of domicile. But according to Thue, a foreign rule setting 
forth the duty of a wife to be obedient, or any rule which in personal matters treat husband 
                                                 
145 Thue (2002) pp.382-383, Stone (1995) p.381 ff.  
146 Mayer (1994) pp.503 ff. See also Najm (2006) and Annoussamy (1998). 
147 Stone (1995) pp.381-382. 
148 Thue (2002) pp.392, 396-400. 
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 and wife unequally, would be considered against Norwegian ordre public.149  Some 
scholars maintain that in cases where a claim for maintenance is raised against a person 
living in Norway, the law of the court where the lawsuit is made, lex fori, should be 
used.150 In most cases this means that the law of the wife’s country is not applied, in favour 
of Norwegian law.151 This is the opposite of the Swedish solution. Other scholars maintain 
that if a divorce case is decided by a Norwegian court, the financial settlement should 
probably be governed by Norwegian law.152 In Sweden the main rule, if no written 
agreement is made, is the law of the country where the couple took up residence after 
marriage.153  
4 The European legal systems 
4.1 Introduction 
The last part of the cultural context we need to look into before we move on to the 
judgments themselves, is the European legal systems in a broad perspective: a few basic 
procedural rules and styles of judgments. 
4.2 Some relevant procedural rules in the various European countries 
In both France and England, foreign law is considered a fact, and evidence on foreign law 
may be given by a person who is qualified to do so on account of his knowledge and 
experience of the foreign law, often in the shape of a custom certificate. It is not necessary 
that the person has acted or is entitled to act as a legal practitioner in the country in 
                                                 
149 Ibid. p.384. 
150 Gaarder (2000) p.207.  
151 Thue (2002) p.387. 
152 Lødrup (2001) p.155. 
153 Bogdan (2004) p.200.  
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 question.154 In Norwegian law, foreign law is considered to be law, on mainly the same 
terms as Norwegian law, and the judge should apply foreign law ex officio if required.155
The Common Law procedure is for the main part adversarial, i.e. the two parties are left to 
their own devices to prepare and present the case unaided by the court, although it is to 
some degree undergoing significant changes.156 The other legal systems in this thesis, 
however, have a mainly inquisitorial procedure: the court has a certain responsibility for 
the enlightenment of the case and may also have a duty to apply legal rules ex officio, 
especially in cases where there are certain limits to what the parties can agree upon. One 
should not use these labels without caution, though, as the difference is not as big as it may 
seem, and there are strong elements of an adversarial process in continental legal systems.  
4.3 Styles of judgments 
These procedural rules, together with the legal system necessarily influence the style of 
judgments, which again has an impact of what information it is possible for a foreign law 
student to gather from a judgment The Court of Cassation, the highest French court, only 
adjudicate upon matters of law, and very rarely make final decisions: if a Court of Appeal 
decision is deemed incorrect, the case is sent back to that court, composed by other judges. 
This means that the Court of Cassation judgments are very brief, and focus on the grounds 
of appeal and whether they are upheld or not by the court; very little is said about the facts 
in each case. The English judgments, on the contrary, are influenced by the fact that the 
process is adversarial in that much space is given to the explanations and elaborations of 
the parties’ witnesses and lawyers. Probably due at least in part to the role of precedence in 
Common Law, the courts write in detail both about facts and reasoning. The Norwegian 
and Swedish judgments are quite similar in style, with fairly thorough elaborations of both 
facts and reasoning, but not as much as the English ones, and are more formal and less 
literary in style than those, which means that the personal opinions of the judge are less 
evident.  
                                                 
154 Section 4(1) in the Civil Evidence Act 1972.  
155 Sjåfjell-Hansen (2000) p.13 ff.  
156 Darbyshire (2005) p.329 ff. 
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 Part III. MAHR IN EUROPEAN COURTS 
1 Introduction 
In this section I will present seven private international law cases from Norway, Sweden, 
Britain and France which all concern mahr. The process of interpreting and applying a 
foreign legal concept is complex, and should go through several steps: First the 
qualification and subsequent choice of laws, then, if the foreign law is lex causae, further 
interpretation and, if the result of the rule is not contrary to ordre public, application of the 
foreign law in relation to mahr. I will follow this order in my analysis of the judgments of 
each country, and then compare the practices of the different countries in part IV.  
2 Norway 
2.1 Introduction 
Norway does not have a very long history of immigration, and I’ve only found two cases 
that seem to concern mahr, but from description only, as the terms mahr or sadaq are not 
used at all, and is not claimed in either of the cases. Both cases are from Lagmannsretten, 
the Norwegian equivalent to a Court of Appeal. As we will see, both cases shed a light 
upon the Norwegian approach to Muslim laws and mahr, even if no direct claims for mahr 
are made. After presenting the two cases, I will look into how the courts have handled their 
encounter with Muslim laws, and whether and how they seek to obtain gender justice. 
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 2.2 The judgments 
2.2.1 RG 1983 p.1021 Mr.Q versus Mrs.K 
The first judgment concerns the Muslim marriage contract; whether it implies a choice of 
laws regulating the matrimonial property, or a choice of matrimonial property regime. 
Mr.Q and Mrs.K married in Pakistan in 1975, with the intention of settling in Norway 
afterwards. The first joint domicile was thus in Norway. The parties separated in 1979, and 
the husband claimed that the couple by signing a Pakistani Muslim marriage contract with 
a clause of “dower”, i.e. mahr, had agreed that Pakistani law should regulate the financial 
effects of the marriage, alternatively that the marriage contract was an equivalent to a 
marriage settlement157 stipulating separate estates as the matrimonial property regime plus 
the payment of dower. The wife responded that Norwegian law was applicable on the 
settlement, since Norway was their first common domicile, and that the signed marriage 
contract only implied the parties’ consent to marry and the obligation of dower. She seems 
not to have claimed mahr, as this probably would have meant that she accepted that the 
matrimonial property regime was that of separate estates. The court held that since the first 
and only joint domicile was in Norway, and the matrimonial property in its entirety had 
been acquired during their residence in Norway, Norwegian law was applicable and the 
matrimonial settlement court158 was thus competent. The Pakistani marriage contract was 
not considered a sufficient basis for stating that the couple had chosen Pakistani law to 
regulate their marriage or matrimonial property regime.  
2.2.2 LE-1986-447 Mrs.A versus Mr.B 
Mrs.A and Mr.B married in Pakistan in 1960, and had a daughter that was born in 1962. B 
lived in Oslo since 1975. Since 1985 he has lived on social security benefits. In 1983 he 
married F, who joined him in Norway in 1987. She had no income at the time of the 
judgment. A assumedly lives in the house the couple lived in together in Karachi. Since 
1986 she has accumulated a large debt towards her brother, who has maintained her and 
                                                 
157 No. ektepakt. 
158 Skifteretten. 
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 their daughter D from then on. A claims that there has been no rupture of the relationship; 
that she did not consent to the second marriage, which therefore should be pronounced 
invalid; she also demands that he pays her dower and maintenance since 1986. The wife 
claims that her husband has not paid her dower, but doesn’t claim that he should pay it. Her 
lawyer only claims maintenance, with reference to the Marriage Act section 56(2)159 which 
concerns the duty of maintenance, and the Norwegian Spouses’ Act160 section 3 which sets 
forth the enforceability of this duty. The dower is mentioned only as part of the woman’s 
supposed financial resources. The result, “under doubt”, as the court states, is that the wife 
gets no maintenance, but this is in part due to the husband’s economic situation.  
2.3 Norwegian courts and Muslim laws 
Both cases concern financial settlements after divorce, which according to the Norwegian 
law professor Jo Hov maintains that the parties are free to make agreements during the 
case, and that the court cannot deviate from the claims of the parties, nor can it base its 
decision upon other facts than the parties prove for the court.161 Other scholars maintain 
that the parties in such cases are not free to agree on whatever they like, and that the court 
has a responsibility both for ensuring that the necessary facts are provided, and to apply 
relevant statutes ex officio. But the law says explicitly that the court has a duty to at least 
advise the parties so that the dispute gets as correct a solution as possible, including 
ensuring that the legal claims are clarified, and it may ask the parties to provide 
evidence.162  
 
RG 1983 p.1021 concerns matrimonial property regimes and choice of laws; LE-1986-447 
concerns maintenance. In Norwegian law, the former is seen as a financial effect of 
marriage, the latter as a personal effect. As mentioned in part II chapter 3.5, the main rule 
concerning matrimonial property regimes in Norwegian law is that they are regulated by 
                                                 
159 Lov om indgaaelse og opløsning av egteskap av 31.mai 1918 nr 02 (Ekteskapsloven av 1918). 
160 Lov om ektefellers formuesforhold av 20. mai 1927 nr 01 (Ektefelleloven). 
161 Tvisteloven § 11-4, cfr. Hov (2007) p.268 ff. 
162 Tvisteloven § 11-5.  
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 the law of the first common domicile.163 The rule implies that if the couple had their first 
common domicile in a Muslim country, this country’s laws regulates the matrimonial 
property regime and the matrimonial property in its entirety.164 It is not clear what the 
matrimonial property regime should include in Norwegian private international law, but 
Thue maintains that mahr should be qualified as part of it. There is some confusion as to 
the choice of laws concerning maintenance. According to Thue, the rule changes depending 
on whether the claim is made in the same case as a claim for divorce or not. LE-1986-447 
concerns both dissolution of marriage and maintenance, thus the matter should be solved in 
accordance with the law of the court, here Norwegian law.165
 
In the first case the relevant facts seem to be on the table and the court is reasonably 
thorough in its discussion of the Pakistani Muslim marriage contract (nikah nama) and the 
parties’ intentions in signing it. It is fairly clear that the parties did not choose which laws 
to regulate their matrimonial property in signing this marriage contract. The court does not 
go into Pakistani law to investigate whether a nikah nama in this situation may be an 
equivalent to marriage settlement in Norwegian law, ektepakt, thus determining the 
matrimonial property regime; comparative legal method is not used. The facts and 
arguments provided by the parties and the Norwegian rules concerning burden of proof 
taken into consideration,166 the court’s interpretation of the marriage contract appears to be 
correct in that it doesn’t see it as an expression of the parties’ will as to choice of laws or 
matrimonial property regime. This question will be further discussed in relation to the 
French cases, in which the same questions are raised.167 The court chooses the 
interpretation which seems the most probable, in this case the wife’s version. At the same 
                                                 
163 Thue (2002) p.398. This raises further questions, e.g. concerning when this is obtained, which remain 
unanswered. These are, however, less relevant for our purposes. 
164 Norwegian law follows the principle of unity of the matrimonial property; all property is regulated by the 
same laws. Thue (2002) p.393. 
165 Thue (2002) p.386 ff.  
166 Hov (1999) p.261 ff.  
167 See chapter 4. 
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 time it recognises the legal uncertainty as to choice of law in such matters, thus not 
demanding that the husband pay for expenses. It is uncertain whether this judgment implies 
that mahr is accepted as part of the Muslim Pakistani matrimonial property regime.  
 
The second case is of a somewhat poorer legal quality than the first. There is no mention of 
private international law at all, and Pakistani law is only mentioned when the court states 
that it doesn’t take into consideration whether Mr.B’s marriage with his second wife, 
Mrs.F, was valid according to Pakistani law. Since Mrs.A had been domiciled in Pakistan 
all the time, conflict of law questions should have been raised and addressed. The court 
ended up by chose Norwegian law, which as mentioned above is the correct choice of laws 
when maintenance is claimed in a case concerning divorce, but this seems to be by accident 
rather than by deliberate thought, and both lawyers and judges seem to have made little 
effort in interpreting the wife’s claims and to obtain the relevant facts. Since mahr is not 
claimed, no investigation is made into its functions in Pakistani law. As to Pakistani law, 
the courts don’t even get the relevant statutes, nor do they interview any legal practitioners 
from Pakistan. Comparative legal method was thus not used at all.  
2.4 Muslim laws and gender justice in Norwegian courts 
In neither of the judgments was comparative legal method used, nor did the courts 
explicitly discuss gender justice. Norwegian law was correctly chosen as lex causae, but 
only in the first judgment as a result of deliberate thought. In the second judgment little 
effort seems to have been made to understand both the wife’s claims and her situation. The 
court states that it cannot see that he has paid the promised dower, but doesn’t go any 
further into this issue. The court even states that it has reached its decision under doubt, 
with reference to the difficulties a divorced woman in Karachi has to get an income. This 
may indicate that the court sees the problem of obtaining some kind of gender justice in 
this situation, but it doesn’t really make any effort to clarify the issues at stake. The facts as 
they appear in the judgment are so scarce and unclear that it might have been a good idea to 
postpone the proceedings until the parties had provided further evidence. There’s no 
indication of how the court considers matters relating to gender justice.  
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 In RG 1983 p.1021 the wife claimed, if none of her other claims won through, that the 
application of Pakistani law would be against Norwegian ordre public. The court did not 
address this issue, as it held that the Pakistani marriage contract did not imply a choice of 
Pakistani law to regulate the matrimonial property relations. In LE-1986-447 ordre public 
was not an issue.  
 
In a study from 2000, Beate Sjåfjell-Hansen found that among judges, little is known about 
how to deal with foreign law, and that many, consciously or unconsciously, try to avoid 
using it. At the same time there is consensus among the scholars that foreign law should be 
used ex officio. 168 This judgment is a good illustration of her point: The court has done 
little both with respect to get sufficient facts on the table and with regard examine to the 
international private law issues that arise. In addition to the lack of understanding of 
foreign concepts, legal rules and ways of communicating, one is left with the impression of 
a job badly done by all the professionals involved, which led to the result that the wife did 
not get anything of what she petitioned for. There is no doubt that such a practice runs a 
great risk of leading to arbitrary results for immigrant women who often are the weakest 
party in marriage conflicts. It is a known and accepted fact that the courts “jump over the 
fence where it’s lowest”; this time the court has rather cut a hole in it to get through.  
3 Sweden 
3.1 Introduction 
The main rules concerning choice of laws are most often the same in Sweden as in Norway, 
and what makes the Swedish cases even more interesting for this study is that Muslim laws 
are applied. To my knowledge only two Swedish cases concerning mahr have been 
published, from two different courts of appeal. The most recent counting was done by the 
                                                 
168 Sjåfjell-Hansen (2000) p.3.  
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 Swedish Ph.D. student Mosa Sayed in 2008,169 who in addition mentions four unpublished 
municipal court cases, which I haven’t been able to obtain. Bogdan describes one of these 
in a 2007 article: T 10 083-04 (Svea tingrätt 20 december 2005). In this case Swedish law 
was applied. The claim for mahr to be paid was rejected, but on the basis of lack of 
authority for the husband’s representative who had signed the marriage contract on his 
behalf.170 No claim for mahr has yet been treated by the Swedish Supreme Court.171 As to 
literature on the Swedish judgments, to my knowledge only two scholars have written 
anything about these judgments so far: The “grand old man” of Swedish private 
international law and comparative law, Michael Bogdan, and Mosa Sayed. Both focus on 
the qualification of mahr. In the following section I will present the two court of appeal 
cases, and say a little about the relevant choice of laws rules before we move on to the 
analysis of the process of interpretation of mahr and the gender justice norms in the 
judgments.  
3.2 The judgments 
3.2.1 F.S. versus N.S: T137-92172 and RH 1993:116173  
Mr.F.S and Mrs.N.S. were both Palestinian citizens of Israel. They got married in Israel, 
and lived together there for a few months before Mr.F.S. returned to Sweden, his country of 
residence. Not long after his return, in March 1988,174 Mrs.N.S. arrived in Sweden to join 
her husband. They lived together for about five months in Sweden before the marriage 
irretrievably broke down and she went back to her hometown in Israel. Mr.F.S. petitioned 
                                                 
169 Sayed (2008). 
170 Bogdan (2007) p.180. 
171 August 2008. 
172 Malmö tingsrätt 1992-02-10. I have not been able to obtain a copy of the entire municipal court judgment, 
so my analysis is based upon the parts that are quoted in the court of appeal judgment.  
173 Hovrätten över Skåne och Blekinge.  
174 The remaining facts indicate that there must be a typing error, the judgment says 1989. 
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 for divorce in October 1988. Mrs.N.S. countered this by demanding that he pays a mahr175 
amounting to NIS 11,250176 plus maintenance during the divorce proceedings and for three 
months after the completion of the proceedings were completed.177 She further claimed the 
dispute should be solved according to the Ottoman Family Code from 1917, which is used 
for Muslims in Israel; Mr.F.S. claimed it should be solved according to Swedish law, and 
that mahr is a concept alien to Swedish law and that it in any case is in conflict with the 
Swedish ordre public. The municipal court178 gave the wife the right to mahr, in 
accordance with Israeli Muslim family law, and saw this as not contrary to Swedish ordre 
public, but saw it as a kind of maintenance after divorce, and did not grant her maintenance 
during the ‛idda.179 The court of appeal upheld the judgment on all major points.  
 
It is noteworthy that the claim for mahr in Sweden (11,250 NIS) was lower than the one 
stipulated in the marriage contract (15,000 NIS). This is probably connected to the 
adjudication of the Muslim Israeli court, which ruled that the wife was only entitled to 75% 
of the dower, since what had happened was 25% her fault. According to the Swedish 
travaux préparatoires180 percentage-distribution of fault should be considered against 
Swedish ordre public. The question remains open how the court should have ruled if the 
                                                 
175 Mahr is in this judgment called mohar, the Hebrew term for mahr. O. Spies on mahr in Encyclopaedia of 
Islam online, read 17.06.2008. 
176 In 1993 equivalent to approximately 4,200 USD or 22,500 FRF. 
https://www.highbeam.com/reg/reg1.aspx?origurl=http%3a%2f%2fwww.highbeam%2fdoc%2f1G1-
14676058.html&refid=lsfa_gorp&docid=1G1%3a14676058 read 30.06.2008. 
177 The ‛idda, three menstrual cycles after divorce.  
178 Malmö tingsrätt 1992-02-10. 
179 After the husband petitioned for divorce in Sweden, and before the proceedings were completed, the wife 
had petitioned for and obtained a Muslim Israeli divorce. This raises questions concerning the recognition of 
foreign judgments, but that is beyond the scope of this thesis. For a discussion of this topic see Bogdan (1993) 
pp. 597-598.  
180 Prop. 1973:158 pp.105-106. 
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 wife had claimed the entire sum, and the husband had claimed a reduction based on the 
Muslim Israeli judgment.181   
3.2.2 M.T.M. versus M.A: T952-99182 and RH 2005:66183 
Mr.M.A. had never gone back to Iran since he came to Sweden in 1986, but had kept his 
Iranian citizenship in addition to his Swedish citizenship. He married his cousin, Mrs. 
M.T.M, in July 1998 by giving her mother authority to negotiate and sign the marriage 
contract on his behalf.  The couple spent ten days together on Cyprus in August 1998, and 
then went back to their respective countries. Mrs.M.T.M. was granted leave to go to 
Sweden from Swedish and Iranian authorities in December 1999. According to the 
husband, he started investigations since she postponed the departure without giving any 
reasons, and found that she had a relationship with another man. She went to Sweden 
January 17 1999, and stayed with Mr.M.A.’s sister. He there announced that he wanted to 
divorce her, but she was the one who went to court to claim divorce with payment of mahr. 
At the time of the court of appeal’s judgment, she was still living in Sweden, illegally since 
her residence permit expired June 3 1999.  He claims to be unbound by the mahr clause in 
the marriage contract, or that he has already paid the equivalent in the form of shir baha.184 
He wants the court to use Swedish law in solving the case; she wants the court to use 
Iranian law. The dispute is whether the husband is under the obligation of paying a mahr 
amounting to 500 Bahar Azadi gold coins, the equivalent of which is SEK 250,000.185 The 
                                                 
181 Bogdan (2007) p.177. 
182 Halmstads tingsrätt 2002-10-24. 
183 Hovrätten för Västra Sverige 2004-11-22.  
184 Iranian custom where the groom gives the bride’s mother money to buy furniture etc. for the couple’s new 
residence. See Mir-Hosseini (2000) p.74. 
185 The couple never really lived together, and the judgment does not clearly state whether the marriage was 
consummated, although this is likely since they spent time together on Cyprus after the marriage.  The 
question concerning the payment of mahr in marriages which haven’t been consummated remains, as far as I 
know, open in a Scandinavian context. The French judgment from the Cour d'appel de Douai, ch.7, 8 janvier 
1976 seems to open up of a total refund, but this may depend on the situation. In Muslim laws the wife is 
normally entitled to half the dower in such cases.  
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 court sees Mr.M.A. as bound by the actions of his chosen representative, and that he hasn’t 
proven that he’s already paid, and is thus seen as obliged to pay the full sum of SEK 
250,000 to Mrs.M.T.M. 
3.3 The choice of laws rules 
Swedish private international law distinguishes between two kinds of legal effects of the 
marriage. The personal effects are for example maintenance duties towards each other 
during and after the marriage; the financial effects include for example the matrimonial 
property regime.186 According to the municipal court’s interpretation in RH 2005:66, 
Swedish law187 gives two options for the qualification of a foreign rule stipulating the 
payment of a lump sum from one spouse to the other: Either it’s a kind of maintenance, or 
it is a kind of redistribution of property to even out the differences in the economic 
situation of the spouses. This means that mahr may be seen either as a personal effect of 
the marriage, or a financial one. One consequence of this interpretation of the law is that 
the courts’ options concerning how to interpret mahr are very limited and may exclude a 
qualification as a gift or a contractual obligation.  
 
It is not entirely clear which choice of laws rules should regulate maintenance, which is a 
personal effect of marriage. The only source that the courts in RH 1993:116 found on the 
subject was a Supreme Court judgment, NJA 1986 p.615. This judgment concerned an 
Italian couple, where the husband had moved to Sweden after only a year’s cohabitation in 
Italy. The couple was, according to Swedish law, divorced long ago, but was still married 
in Italy, where divorce became legal only in 1975. The woman was in serious economic 
difficulties, and petitioned for a raise in the amount of maintenance paid to her since the 
divorce. The application of Swedish law would have left her with nothing. The Supreme 
Court seems to base its result on two main arguments: 1) That the nationality principle is 
no longer the main rule in the choice of laws concerning the personal effects of the 
marriage; during the years it has been replaced by the domicile principle, which indicates 
                                                 
186 Bogdan (2004) p.198. The classification in Norwegian law is similar, see e.g. Thue (2002) p.382. 
187 LIMF and its preparatory works: Prop. 1989/90:87 p.35. 
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 that since the couple has different domicile as well as nationalities, that the law of their first 
common domicile should be applied, i.e. Italian law;188 2) That this rule in maintenance 
cases most often will lead to the lex domicilii of the woman being applied, which makes it 
easier for the court to take the “valuations, living conditions and the social benefits in that 
country”189 into consideration. In RH 1993:116 the facts were different from the Italian 
case, and this rule would have lead to the application of Swedish law on the claim for 
mahr. The court explicitly sees the application of Muslim law as a condition for the claim 
for mahr to have any chance of winning through.190 The municipal court appears to take 
the second argument in the Supreme Court judgment as a starting point, thus ending up 
with a new rule: The lex domicilii of the person claiming maintenance should be applied in 
cases concerning maintenance. In our case, mahr is interpreted as a kind of maintenance, 
and is thus governed by the lex domicilii of the woman claiming it, i.e. Israeli Muslim law. 
Unfortunately the case never went to the Supreme Court, so it remains uncertain whether 
this has become a general rule. Bogdan applauds the result in RH 1993:116 and upholds the 
lex domicilii of the one claiming maintenance as the best rule.191  
 
In the 2005 judgment, mahr was qualified as a financial effect of the marriage: a 
redistribution of property to even out the differences in the financial situation of the 
spouses. In Swedish private international law, fiancés or spouses have the right to make 
written agreements concerning the choice of law in matters concerning the financial effects 
of marriage, provided they choose a law which is lex domicilii or lex patriae of at least one 
of the parties at the time of making the agreement.192 Written agreements concerning the 
financial aspects of marriage are valid as long as the agreement is made in accordance with 
the law regulating the financial aspects of marriage at the time it was made. This includes 
                                                 
188 The nationality principle is still considered as regulating the financial effects of the marriage.  
189 RH 1993:116 p.5. 
190 ”För att det skall komma i fråga att pröva yrkandet om utfående av morgongåva materiallt krävs emellertid 
därtill att den muslimska rätten ugör lex causae.” P.4 in the judgment.  
191 Bogdan (1993) p.599.  
192 Lag (1990:272) om internationella frågor rörande makars och sambors förmögenhetsförhållanden § 3. 
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 both the formal and the material aspects of the agreement. Gifts between spouses domiciled 
in Sweden at the time of action must be registered to be valid.193 If there is no valid written 
agreement on the choice of laws regarding matrimonial property regime, the matter should 
be solved in accordance with the law of the country where the couple had their first 
common domicile.194 In RH 2005:66 the couple had not made any written agreements on 
the choice of laws, nor had they obtained a common domicile. The Swedish act regulating 
the financial effects of international marriages, LIMF, does not give any solution to such a 
situation, but its travaux préparatoires195 state that in such cases the law of the country to 
which the case has the strongest connections should be applied. Since both spouses had 
Iranian citizenship and had close relatives in Iran, the municipal court considered Iranian 
law to be lex causae. To this the court of appeal adds, with reference to the preparatory 
works,196 that the judiciary should only exceptionally annul any agreements concerning the 
matrimonial property regime which the spouses had reason to believe valid. It is 
noteworthy that this is mentioned in relation to the choice of laws question, although it 
might formally be considered irrelevant here, and perhaps more related to the question of 
public policy. This may indicate that the Swedish legislator and the court itself are aware of 
the temptation to use the lex fori when, strictly speaking, the foreign law should be applied; 
in any case the result seems to be that Swedish courts are very conscientious when they 
qualify and choose the lex causae.  
3.4 The qualification and further interpretation of mahr in Swedish private 
international law 
3.4.1 The method of approach in the qualification of mahr 
As mentioned, mahr is qualified in different ways in these two judgments. In RH 1993:116 
the court of appeal doesn’t expressly raise the issue of qualification; it upholds the 
municipal court’s qualification of mahr. The municipal court states that  “the morning gift 
                                                 
193 Bogdan (2004) p.201. 
194 ”hemvist”. 
195 Prop. 1989/90:87 pp.43-44. 
196 Ibid. p.46. 
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 [mahr], the amount of which is most often written into the marriage contract, functions as 
insurance for the woman for the continuation of the marriage, since the man immediately 
upon an eventual divorce has to fulfil his obligation [of paying mahr]. In case of divorce 
the morning gift [mahr] instead functions as the wife’s maintenance and her financial 
protection, since (…) no maintenance can be paid”.197 This might indicate that the court 
has used a comparative approach, investigating the functions of mahr. However, the court 
of appeal’s statement that “[t]he morning gift in Muslim law is, at least in practice, seen as 
one of the personal effects [as opposed to financial effects]198 of the marriage,” interpreted 
literally, may give the idea that that the court has investigated how mahr is categorized in 
Muslim Israeli law, thus indicating a qualification lex causae, i.e. Iranian law. But there is 
no mention of such an investigation in the judgment, only the statement that mahr in cases 
of divorce function as “maintenance and financial protection/insurance for the wife, since 
she can’t claim any sort of maintenance.”199 In Bogdan’s opinion, mahr is in reality 
qualified lex fori, “since it was in accordance with Swedish legal concepts that mahr was 
seen as closely related to a spouse’s duty of maintenance”.200 I still think it noteworthy that 
the court’s approach has strong elements of the comparative legal method, with its 
emphasis on how the concept of mahr actually functions, even though it on the basis of 
Johnson (1975) wrongly sees mahr as maintenance. The result is that the court sees mahr 
as one of the personal effects of the marriage, and thus chooses to apply the conflicts rule 
concerning maintenance.  
 
More than ten years later, but with no significant changes in the statutes on this matter, the 
court of appeal in RH 2005:66 qualifies mahr as a redistribution of property to even out the 
                                                 
197 ”Morgongåvan, vars storlek oftast fastställs i äktenskapskontraktet, fungerar för kvinnan som säkerhet för 
äktenskapets bestånd, eftersom mannen vid äktenskapsskillnad omedelbart måste uppfylla sin 
betalningsförpliktelse. Vid en eventuell äktenskapsskillnad kommer morgongåvan istället att fungera som 
hustruns underhåll och hennes finansiella skydd, eftersom något underhållsbidrag (…) inte kan utdömas.” 
The municipal court, quoted on p.3 in RH 1993:116. My italics and brackets. 
198 My brackets. 
199 P.3 in the judgment.  
200 Bogdan (2007) p.182.  
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 differences in the economic situation of the spouses, i.e. a financial effect of marriage. The 
1993 judgment is referred to, so it must be a conscious choice, although there is no 
discussion of this in the 2005 judgment. Again the court of appeal upholds the judgment of 
the municipal court, and we find the most thorough investigation of Iranian law in the 
latter. This time the court has interviewed several witnesses about the contents of Iranian 
law, and how mahr and other concepts in Iranian law function. No Iranian lawyers were 
interviewed, but the person who performed the marriage was.201 A translation of the 
marriage certificate is attached to the judgment, and through the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs the court has obtained a German translation of the Iranian civil code, 
Bergmann/Ferid (1987), a later edition of the book used in the 1993 judgment.202 Mahr is 
qualified in accordance with the Swedish act LIMF203 and its travaux préparatoires, which 
as mentioned in chapter 3.3 gives two options as to the qualification of the payment of a 
lump sum between spouses: Maintenance, or redistribution of property to even out the 
differences in the economic situation of the spouses. As the municipal court stated in the 
1993 judgment, it is not clear how mahr should be qualified. In both the 1993 case and the 
2005 case the marriage was very short, and the marriage contract stipulated a dower paid 
upon demand, i.e. deferred mahr, but in the latter case the sum was much higher: The 
equivalent of 250,000 SEK. The travaux préparatoires state that “maintenance typically is 
censed to ensure the receiver’s continued expensed by replacing or supplementing [his or 
her] income”,204 which cannot be said to be the case in the circumstances of Mr.M.A. and 
Mrs.M.T.M. The court thus opts for the other alternative: redistribution of property. This is 
clearly a qualification based on the lex fori, which doesn’t really investigate the functions 
and rules concerning mahr in Iranian law. The result is a qualification which would have 
made more sense if the marriage contract had stipulated a prompt dower, but in any case 
remains somewhat alien to the concept of mahr in Iranian law.205
                                                 
201 Mr.M.H.N.S. See the municipal court judgment p.9-10 and the court of appeal judgment pp.3 and 6.  
202 The municipal court judgment p.11.   
203 Lagen (1990:272) om vissa internationella frågor rörande makars förmögenhetsförhållanden. 
204 Prop. 1989/90:87 p.35. 
205 See e.g. Mir-Hosseini (2000) and WLUML (2003). 
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One of the reasons for the change in interpretation may be that the general knowledge 
about Islam and Muslim laws in Sweden has developed. The court does indeed seem more 
at ease with the issue. Another reason may be the differences in the foreign statutes. 
Because of the political situation, Israeli Muslims still use the Ottoman Family Code from 
1917, while the Iranian code is not only 60 years younger, but it is in form, if not in 
content, inspired by the French Civil Code and is therefore very systematic and detailed. 
According to the NGO Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML),206 Iranian mahr is 
mostly deferred, but the Iranian Civil Code art. 1082 states that “Immediately after the 
performance of the marriage ceremony the wife becomes the owner of the marriage portion 
and can dispose of it in any way and manner that she may like.”207 As a result of the 
interpretation of the Iranian code, mahr was qualified as a redistribution of property to even 
out the difference between the spouses, that should take place at the entering into a 
marriage, in accordance with LIMF,208 and not as a form of maintenance, since the wife 
according to Iranian law can claim it immediately after the wedding. This is actually the 
general rule concerning mahr, as we saw in part II, although in practice mahr is rarely 
claimed before divorce.  
3.4.2 Legal pluralism in practice: The further interpretation and application of the 
concept of mahr 
How do the courts then proceed to further interpret the foreign law they have found must 
be applied? The courts in RH 1993:116 seem to struggle. The question is posed whether 
mahr can be adjudicated at all by a Swedish court. According to the court of appeal, there 
are different opinions as to the courts’ right to adjudicate at all upon concepts that are 
totally foreign to Swedish law, but it concludes that the dominant point of view is that it 
can, provided it’s not contrary to Swedish ordre public, citing Bogdan (1984) p. 82. It then 
states that mahr is not clearly in conflict with Swedish ordre public, but bases this upon Bo 
                                                 
206 WLUML, 2003 p.180. 
207 http://www.alaviandassociates.com/documents/civilcode.pdf, read 18.06.2008. 
208 Lag (1990:272) om internationella frågor rörande makars och sambors förmögenhetsförhållanden. 
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 Johnson’s book Islamisk rätt from 1975, where the term mahr is translated as morgongåva, 
“morning gift”, a gift from the groom to the bride, traditionally given the morning after the 
wedding night; an old Swedish concept which has only a superficial likeness with mahr. In 
other words, a major source the court chose to use on the foreign law was outdated and of 
poor quality, and was a direct cause for the wife not obtaining maintenance during the 
‛idda, which she according to Muslim Israeli law had a right to. This judgment is from the 
early 90ies, and lots of better sources were available, but the courts chose to use Johnson 
together with an even older source, Bergmann/Ferid: Internationales Ehe- und 
Kindschaftsrecht: “Das Islamische Eherecht” from 1972, which I haven’t been able to get a 
copy of. There is too little information to evaluate the quality of this source, but it doesn’t 
seem to have improved the courts’ understanding of the concept of mahr and Muslim 
maintenance law. It’s impossible to tell to what extent the courts’ views are shaped by the 
translation into “morning gift,” but the fact that this is the basis for the court’s statement 
that it’s not against Swedish ordre public indicates that it’s not insignificant.  The 
consequence, both of the translation and of the remainder of what Johnson and 
Bergmann/Ferid say about mahr, seems to be that the court misses some vital aspects of it. 
E.g. both prompt and deferred mahr have to be paid in each case, according to Johnson, 
and he sees deferred dower as maintenance after divorce, since the wife can’t claim any 
other sort of maintenance.209 Thus not only in terms of qualification, but also in the 
remainder of the interpretation of the concept of mahr, it is reduced to a kind of 
maintenance, but with a hint of the (morning) gift aspect.210 This result is mainly due to the 
weaknesses in the courts’ methods to interpret the foreign law: Old, secondary sources are 
the only supplement to the foreign act, and the courts clearly take Swedish concepts as a 
                                                 
209 Johnson (1975) pp.49-51. 
210 Also noteworthy is that both courts see Shari‛a as unchangeable,210 and refer to Michael Nordberg’s work 
on the development of the Muslim law. This shows that the court, although provided with a copy of the 
Ottoman Family Law of 1917, is unaware of the variations in Islamic law, not to say the development it has 
undergone and still is undergoing.  
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 starting point and try and see where mahr fits into these. Comparative legal method can 
thus not be said to have been applied.211
 
The situation for the court when it comes to interpreting foreign law is perhaps a little 
easier in 2005: the court has some fairly recent and very clearly formulated statutes from 
Iran to deal with, compared to the old Ottoman Family Code that was applied in the 1993 
case. And the court goes straight to the Iranian act, although it still uses a copy of 
Bergmann/Ferid: Internationales Ehe- und Kindschaftsrecht: “Das Islamische Eherecht”, 
this one from 1987. It is noteworthy that the courts still use such old secondary sources on 
Muslim laws, although there is indeed an improvement in the approach. In RH 2005:66 the 
municipal court supplies the written sources with an interview with, among others, the 
Iranian mullah who married the couple, an approach which lessens the risk of making 
mistakes such as the courts did in 1993 concerning the maintenance question. A certain 
degree of comparative legal method can thus be said to have been applied. But the fact that 
the courts call the mullah a “priest” seems to indicate that they still go too far in translating 
foreign terms with “not-really-equivalents” from their own culture.212  
 
The interpretation of mahr is clearly based on the qualification as a redistribution of 
property to even out the differences between the spouses at the time of marrying, but it 
does take up certain contractual elements:  The husband is seen as having entered into the 
marriage and thereby also into the agreement on mahr through a valid authority, and is thus 
seen as bound by an obligation to pay mahr which is very similar to a contractual 
obligation. The basis for this is an interpretation of Iranian law. Although any function of 
mahr beyond evening out the differences in the economic situation is not mentioned, in 
practice the contractual aspects of mahr are to a large extent taken up by the Swedish court. 
This is probably due to the fact that such an evening out of the property relations must be 
                                                 
211 See also part I chapter 7. 
212 ”Exercising the basic prerogatives in matters of education , ritual functions (prayers, marriages, funerals, 
etc.) and judicial functions, the mollās constitute the basis of what has been called, erroneously in the view of 
some, a veritable clergy.” Encyclopaedia of Islam online on mollā, read 27.08.2008. 
 61 
 based on a valid agreement. If the couple has reason to believe that the agreement is valid, 
the court should be very careful to reject it. When the agreement is made in accordance 
with lex loci contractus, Iranian law, the couple has such a reason. The qualification as a 
redistribution of property is also more in line with the original purpose of mahr, see part II 
chapter 2. 
 
To what extent do the courts apply comparative legal method? In these two cases, the 
courts haven’t done very much research into the various functions of mahr in Israeli and 
Iranian law. Major works on the subject, available at the time of the judgments, were not 
consulted.213 The result is that only one function of mahr is picked up in each case, and 
although the 2005 judgment in practice picks up some of the contractual aspects of mahr, 
as mentioned above, this is not due to the courts’ use of comparative legal method. The 
courts seem to have looked briefly into the function of mahr in the specific case, but not to 
any great extent, and only with “Swedish eyes”. And they are hardly to be blamed, given 
the existing instructions from the legislator on the method of qualification: “No matter how 
[the payment of a lump sum] from one spouse to another is labelled, the assessment in each 
and every case of whether it is within the frame of what constitutes the matrimonial 
property relations, should be based on the purpose of the payment and the circumstances 
under which the payment is made.”214 I understand Kötz and Zweigert as seeing the 
function of a legal rule or concept as how it actually works, rather than how the rule is 
intended to function, or how the parties’ acts are intended. This means that the approach 
prescribed by Swedish law is not quite up to the standards set by international comparative 
legal method; its emphasis is more on subjective and circumstantial aspects, while 
comparative legal method puts more emphasis on the function as seen more objectively, 
although both approaches include taking the circumstances in each case into consideration.  
 
                                                 
213 In 1993, Schacht (1982) was, and still is today, a chef d’oeuvre on Muslim laws in general, and in 2005 
Mir-Hosseini (2000) could have provided substantial information on Iranian law.  
214 Prop. 1989/90:87, p.35. See note 187. 
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 To sum up, the courts in 1993 clearly struggled both in the interpretation and the 
application of Muslim law, while in the 2005 case I cannot detect any direct 
misinterpretations of Iranian law, although the qualification remains doubtful. This may in 
part be due to the differences in the quality of the foreign legislations in question, but the 
Swedish courts now seem to have a sounder and more thorough approach towards the 
interpretation of the foreign law.  
3.5 Mahr and gender equality in Swedish courts 
Did the courts take gender equality into consideration? If they did, which gender equality 
norm did they apply? Human rights are not explicitly an issue in either of these cases, the 
CEDAW is not mentioned at all, nor is gender justice. The most obvious way these issues 
could have been raised would have been in relation to ordre public, but this has not 
happened. In the 1993 case mahr in pronounced to not be clearly against Swedish ordre 
public, but on the basis of a misinterpretation of Israeli Muslim law.215 The court does not, 
as prescribed in legal theory, consider whether the result of the rules concerning mahr is 
against Swedish ordre public; it only considers the concept itself. In the 2005 case the 
husband claimed that the wife’s claim for mahr was against ordre public, but the court did 
not discuss this issue at all. What kind of justice does this gender neutral legal discourse 
deliver? How do the courts in both cases consider the gendered social, cultural and 
economic reality of the parties? Do they apply a mechanic concept of equality or taking 
difference into account within an equal worth approach?  
 
As we saw in chapter 3.3, the municipal court in T137-92 created an entirely new rule 
based on considerations concerning gender justice, which was upheld by the court of 
appeal: that the lex domicilii of the person claiming maintenance should be applied in cases 
concerning maintenance. The ratio decidendi were among others that this would enable the 
court to better take into consideration the conditions in the country where the person, most 
often the woman, were domiciled,216 and that in the situation at hand, Swedish law was 
                                                 
215 See ch.3.4.  
216 T137-92 as quoted in RH 1993:116, pp.2-3. 
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 quite unfamiliar for Mrs.N.S. The court held that the couple all in all had stronger ties to 
Israel than Sweden, and thus chose to apply Israeli law. Lacking the municipal court 
judgment in its entirety, and with only brief references to it in the court of appeal judgment, 
it is difficult to say which gender justice norm that lies behind this reasoning. The court 
doesn’t really seem to investigate into the social and cultural conditions in Israel, it just 
assumes that it is better for the woman to have the laws she’s familiar with applied. Nor 
does it discuss the degree of gender justice in any of the two legal systems it has to choose 
between. The court thus appears somewhat mechanical in its effort to provide a degree of 
gender equality.  
 
The result of the 1993 judgment is, at first glance, in the woman’s favour: She obtains her 
dower. The alternative in Swedish law would probably be that she came out with nothing:  
The main rule in both Swedish and Norwegian law is to divide the matrimonial property 
equally, but the marriage has been so short that the couple hasn’t had the time to obtain a 
common property. The principle of unequal division, skjevdeling, applies, especially in 
short marriages like this one: each spouse takes out of the matrimonial property what they 
can prove that they brought into it. In Sweden, after a year’s marriage 20% of the joint 
(netto) property is to be divided equally, 217 and this marriage was shorter than that, 
especially if the basis for the calculation is the time the properties really were joined 
together. By letting her have mahr, she was at least left with a certain amount of money,218 
even though it’s not an enormous sum. But she did not get her maintenance, which she 
most likely would have had a right to in Israel; if the court had applied comparative law 
and investigated a bit further into the matter, this could have been avoided.  
 
The reasoning in the 2005 case seems to be more formalistic also in its approach towards 
the gendered aspects of the case: The courts rather mechanically apply their interpretation 
of the marriage contract and Iranian law, and no mention is made of gender justice issues or 
even the parties’ situation. The parties are strictly held to the Iranian marriage contract and 
                                                 
217 Agell (2003) p.378 and Äktenskapsbalken ch.6.  
218 NIS 11,250. See note 176. 
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 no adjustments are made on base of equity.219 The husband must be said to have been 
rather unwise in making his mother-in-law-to-be his proxy in negotiating the marriage 
contract, and the court holds him responsible for that decision. The result is indeed woman-
friendly: She gets the entire mahr of SEK 250,000. Mahr is qualified as a redistribution of 
property to even out the differences in economic situation, and further seen as a kind of 
contractual obligation the husband has to fulfil. The husband’s economic situation is not 
taken into account, even though this is indeed a large sum and the fact that the couple never 
really lived together. Had mahr only been seen as a way to even out property relations, the 
result might have been different, but the contractual aspects win through in the Swedish 
courts and create this very woman-friendly result. One might wonder what the result would 
have been if the roles had been switched – if the result in this particular case is unfair 
towards anybody it is not the woman. There are lots of sub-currents in this case that only in 
part come to the surface. From the parties’ allegations it seems that the husband has been a 
tool for the wife so she could come to Sweden, where she is obviously most determined to 
stay. But he is still obliged to pay her the entire dower. He does have some responsibility 
for his misfortune, since he made his mother-in-law his proxy, but the equity of the result is 
debatable due to the large amount of money involved. The court never discussed the limits 
of the authority given to his mother-in-law. This case illustrates very well that the 
application of Muslim laws doesn’t always leave the woman short; sometimes it’s the man 
who has to pay.  
                                                 
219 Since Iranian law was applied, the only way this could have happened is probably through the ordre public 
reservation. On a world wide basis the courts rarely have the same opportunity as Scandinavian courts to 
modify contracts.  
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 4 France 
4.1 Introduction 
The French cases distinguish themselves from the cases from other countries in that they 
don’t concern a woman claiming mahr. Mahr rather plays a part as an indicator of the 
parties’ choice of matrimonial property regime. French couples when marrying choose 
freely between several different property regimes, but a written agreement is required, 
either in the form of a contrat de mariage, an individually negotiated contract which often 
regulates the matrimonial property relations in detail,220 or through filling out the formula 
when performing the required civil marriage. The régime legal is applied if no such 
agreements exist. In French private international law, there are several ways the spouses 
may be seen as having chosen a particular country’s laws to regulate their matrimonial 
property relations. First of all, there is the contrat de mariage or what is interpreted as its 
equivalent. If no written expression of the parties’ intentions exists, which is the situation 
in the vast majority of cases, the court has to investigate into the presumed intentions of the 
parties. The first joint domicile is now favoured by the tribunals as the major indicator, 
since it’s fairly easy to apply, and has gradually replaced the localization of the couple’s 
assets as indicator of their will.221  
 
The literature on the adjudication of mahr thus focuses on the choice of matrimonial 
property regimes as well. Only the Lebanese-French scholar and judge Marie-Claude Najm 
discusses the interpretation of the concept mahr quite thoroughly, although David 
Annoussamy, president of the Société de législation comparée Pondichéry,222 also has 
some noteworthy remarks about mahr.  
 
                                                 
220 Bell (1998) p.254. 
221 See Mayer (1994) pp.507-508 and the Hague convention on the law applicable to matrimonial property 
regimes of 14 March 1978. 
222 Pondichéry or Puducherry is a former French colony in India, of which Karikal is one of the provinces. 
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 I have found two private international law cases which concern mahr, one of which has 
been twice in the Court of Cassation. After presenting the cases I will say a little about the 
qualification issues in these judgments. The gender justice aspects are so closely related to 
the choice of laws in the French judgments that I will treat those together before moving on 
to the further interpretation of mahr and the use of comparative legal method.  
4.2 The judgments 
4.2.1 Mrs.K. versus Mr.T. – “the Paris case” 223 
Mrs.K. and Mr.T. had lived together in Paris from 1969. Mrs.K. was a Polish citizen; Mr.T. 
was Lebanese of the Greek Catholic confession.224 Mr.T. was already married to a 
Lebanese woman, whom he long ago had ceased to live with. According to Lebanese law, 
however, his personal status was governed by the Lebanese laws for his religious 
community,225 which in this case meant that he couldn’t get a divorce. The only way the 
couple could marry was if he converted to Islam, and they married in Lebanon according to 
Muslim rites. Then he could take a “second wife” without having to divorce the first one. 
So they did, and the marriage certificate stipulated a deferred dower of 3,000 Lebanese 
pounds.226
 
This case doesn’t concern the wife’s claiming mahr, but rather the choice of property 
regime. Mahr is in the Court of Appeal and in the Court of Cassation seen as an indicator 
of the choice of the regime of separate estates, in French courts assumed to be the regime 
of all Muslim marriages. The Municipal Court pronounced a divorce following the French 
                                                 
223 Cour d'Appel de Paris, 2e ch., no.4, 14 juin 1995 and Cour de Cassation, ch.civ.1, 2 décembre 1997 
224 Family law matters and suchlike are in Lebanon regulated by the law of the confession you (or your 
ancestors) belong to.  
225 Still the case today, and no civil marriage exists.  
226 917,71 USD in 1970. 
http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMTendanceStatPays?codeTheme=2&codeStat=PA.NUS.FC
RF&codePays=LBN&compareMonde=2&definitionMinimum=5&codeTheme2=2&codeStat2=x&langue=fr, 
read 10.07.2008. 
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 régime legal,227 community of after-acquired property, where the wife was accorded the 
right of use to an apartment and a monthly alimony of 6000 FF. In the Court of Appeal the 
husband claimed that the marriage should be annulled as he was married to another woman 
at the time when he married Mrs.K, that the consequences of this should be regulated by 
French law, and that the property regime was the Muslim one of separate estates, as 
indicated by the clause on mahr, and that the liquidation of property should follow 
Lebanese law. The wife claimed a divorce based on the fault of the husband, that the 
division of property should follow French law, an allowance of 720,000 FF and the 
ownership of their marital home. The marriage was declared void on the basis of bigamy, 
using Polish law, Mrs.K. still retaining her Polish citizenship228 at the time of marrying, but 
since both were in good faith, the economic consequences were still valid. Since Mrs.K. 
had signed the Muslim marriage contract, and the French régime legal can only be assumed 
if the couple didn’t agree on a different regime, the matrimonial regime of this marriage is 
considered by the court to be the Muslim regime of separate estates. This case was 
adjudicated by the Court of Appeal of Paris, and I will use the term “the Paris case” when I 
refer to it later on.  
4.2.2 Mr.H. versus Mrs.R. – “the Lyon case” 229 
Mr.H. and Mrs.R., a Muslim couple of Indian origin, married in Karikal, a former French 
colony in India, in 1969. Shortly afterwards they took up residence in France, where they 
divorced in 1990. The issue at stake in this case as well was how the financial settlement 
should be done, focusing on the choice of matrimonial regime. In this case as well the wife 
claimed a division of property following the French régime legal; the husband claimed that 
there was a valid agreement on the adoption of the regime of separate estates: the marriage 
contract from India which contained a clause concerning mahr. The first Court of Appeal 
                                                 
227 Régime de la communauté réduite aux acquis. Code Civil art. 1400 ff, Bell (1998) p.255 and the Paris 
Court of Appeal judgment p.8.  
228 French private international law has nationality as basis for determining a person’s personal status law. 
See part II chapter 3.  
229 Cour d’Appel de Lyon, 1996-01-11, Cour de Cassation, ch.civ.1, 7 avril 1998, Cour d'appel de Lyon, 
ch.civ.1, 2 décembre 2002 and Cour de Cassation, ch.civ.1, 22 novembre 2005. 
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 judgment doesn’t really address the question of mahr, only states that the division of 
property shall happen in accordance with the French régime legal. The Court of Cassation 
says that the Court of Appeal should have investigated whether the payment of mahr 
indicated that a Muslim marriage, nikah, had been contracted, as this would mean that the 
couple had chosen Muslim law to regulate their marriage. According to the Court of 
Cassation, the regime of separate estates is the only one accepted by Muslim law. When the 
Court of Appeal treats the matter again, mahr is then seen as the sales price of the woman, 
but this view as well is annulled by the Court of Cassation. All judgments except for the 
last two were in favour of the wife; the final result was an acceptance of mahr and the 
nikah as indicators of the choice of the Muslim property regime, the husband thus winning 
through with almost all of his claims. I have studied both of the Court of Cassation 
judgments, and the Court of Appeal judgment between the two. According to the husband’s 
lawyer, the last Court of Appeal judgment only confirmed this adjudication, and the 
division of property happened in accordance with the regime of separate estates. I have not 
been able to get a copy of that last judgment, nor the first Court of Appeal judgment, but 
the result was in accordance with the last Court of Cassation judgment: the couple was 
considered to have adopted the regime of separate estates.230  
 
4.3 The qualification of mahr 
As mentioned in part II chapter 3.2, qualification is in French doctrine based on lex fori. 
The main questions here are what the object of qualification is, and whether mahr is 
qualified at all. Najm maintains that both of these Court of Cassation judgments give an 
imprecise definition of mahr and thereby do not really address how the institution of mahr 
should be qualified in relation to the matrimonial property regime or give any thorough 
definition of the concept of mahr.231 It is perhaps more precise to see the Muslim marriage 
contract as the object of qualification, and mahr only as an indicator of the existence of 
such a contract, thus indirectly applying the French concept of contrat de mariage also on 
                                                 
230 Conversation with Maître Courjon January 16 2008.  
231 Najm (2006) p.1367.  
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 the clause of mahr. But the fact that mahr is seen as closely linked to the choice of 
matrimonial property regimes, and thus to the financial effects of marriage, may indicate 
that it is seen as such and not a personal effect of marriage – which would have been 
regulated by the law of personal status.  
 
French law gives full autonomy to the spouses on the choice of matrimonial property 
regimes.232 In private international law this autonomy mainly concerns which country’s 
laws should regulate the matter. Any further choice of property regime is only relevant 
where the law in question gives several options in this matter, which is not the case with 
Muslim law. This means that the choice of laws regulating the matter at hand depends not 
on the interpretation of a French conflicts rule, and thus on a qualification based on French 
legal concepts,233 but on the interpretation of the parties’ intentions. Since there is no claim 
in any of these cases for the payment of mahr, a precise qualification of it in French private 
international law has not yet been necessary. Since it’s seen as part of the marriage contract 
determining the matrimonial property regime, mahr must necessarily be interpreted as a 
financial effect of marriage, and is thus likely to be treated under French conflicts laws on 
obligations. In addition, because individual marriage contracts which regulate in detail the 
property regulations between the spouses are well established in French law, I find it 
unlikely that a claim for mahr will not be enforceable in French courts if the court finds 
that the couple has chosen Muslim law to regulate the financial effects of their marriage, 
but until there is an actual adjudication, the question remains open.234  
 
4.4 The choice of laws and gender justice 
In these French cases the choice of laws rests upon the interpretation of mahr, although, as 
we have seen, not in the way of qualification. So before we look into the further 
                                                 
232 See chapter 4.1. 
233 See part II chapter 3.2. 
234 With the reservation that municipal court judgments are not published.  
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 interpretation of the concept of mahr, we need to look into the role mahr plays in the 
choice of laws.  
 
The first judgment I’ve found concerning mahr in private international law, the Court of 
Appeal of Paris’ judgment from 1995,235 classifies mahr as an indicator of the choice of 
property regime. It simply states that “the existence of a dower excludes the choice of a 
[matrimonial] regime of community of property, and (…) in signing this marriage contract 
Mr.T. and Mrs.K. have expressed their wish to place themselves under the regime of 
separate estates, which is the only regime recognised by Muslim law, with a clause 
concerning dower, and also in accordance with the laws of Lebanon, according to which 
the matrimonial regime is that of separate estates, as well as the custom certificate236 
presented.”237  No reference is made to any sources or reasons behind such a conclusion. 
The Court of Cassation upheld this view by briefly stating that the couple had signed a 
marriage contract “which implied the adoption of the regime of separate estates with a 
dower clause.”238  The main rule in French private international law concerning the 
financial effects of the marriage, as stated earlier, provides that couples may either choose 
which country’s laws should regulate their property relations, or they can design their own 
contract regulating the matter as they wish.239 When the Court of Cassation states that the 
Court of Appeal “has justly deducted the existence of the expression of the parties’ 
intentions as to the choice of their matrimonial property regime,” this seems to indicate that 
                                                 
235 Cour d'Appel de Paris, 2e ch., no.4, 14 juin 1995. 
236 “A document written in French, which derives either from the French consulate or embassy in the foreign 
country, or simply from a lawyer (foreign, or a Frenchman specialized in relations with that country)” which 
should “provide information on the [foreign] laws.” (Mayer (1994) pp.132-133) 
237 ”… l’existence d’une dot est exclusif d’un régime de communauté et (…) en signant ce contrat de mariage 
M.T. et Mme.K. ont exprimé la volonté de se placer sous le régime de la séparation de biens seul reconnu par 
loi musulmane avec clause de dot, conformément d’ailleurs à la législation en vigueur au Liban selon laquelle 
le régime matrimonial est celui de la séparation de biens ainsi qu’en atteste le certificat de coutume délivré.” 
238 ”un contrat emportant l’adoption de la séparation de biens avec clause de dot.”  Cour de Cassation, 
ch.civ.1, 2 décembre 1997. 
239 See chapter 4.1 and part II chapter 3.5. 
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 the Court of Cassation sees the Muslim marriage contract with a clause of mahr to be a 
contract designating directly the matrimonial property regime and not the choice of which 
laws should regulate the property relations. Because mahr is a transfer of property from the 
husband to the wife, which may take place at the time of marriage, it may be seen as a 
redistribution of property between spouses which implies that the estates are separate. But 
to see the Muslim marriage contract or the payment of mahr an explicit choice of property 
regime is to stretch the interpretation rather far; at best it is an indicator of which country’s 
laws should regulate the matter, which must be taken into consideration together with other 
indicators of such. Both courts seem thus to confuse the French concept of contrat de 
mariage and the Muslim marriage contract. That the couple couldn’t marry any other way 
than by performing a Muslim marriage,240 and that Mrs.K. most likely didn’t have any 
thorough knowledge of Muslim laws, including the matrimonial property regime, is not 
taken into consideration. The Court of Appeal seems to reason as follows: The marriage 
contract only stipulates the payment of mahr. The fact that mahr has been paid shows that 
the couple has contracted their marriage under Muslim laws, so if mahr is accepted as not 
being in conflict with the French ordre public, the clause of mahr indicates that the choice 
of property regime is the Muslim one of separate estates.241 It therefore has to adjudicate on 
the nature of mahr. The wife is the one who claims that it’s against French ordre public, 
and argues that French law should be applied, but is not heard by the Court of Cassation. 
 
In the Lyon case, the marriage contract from India only stated that the husband had paid 
mahr and that the wife had received it. With no reference to the Paris case, the first Court 
                                                 
240 I do not know if it would have been possible for Mr.K. to obtain a French divorce and then remarry, but 
his is less relevant. It seems that as far as the couple knew, this was the only way they could marry. 
241 If mahr is an indicator of the intentions of the parties concerning the choice of laws regulating their 
matrimonial property, not just the Court of Cassation but also most or all French scholars take it for granted 
that the matrimonial property regime in Muslim law is separate estates, see e.g. Annoussamy (1998) p.650. 
There is no notion of matrimonial property regimes in Muslim law, but in my opinion it seems too simple to 
state that this means that one should apply an equivalent of the French regime of separate estates. At least one 
cannot see it as such without accepting claims for mahr, which is closely linked to the matrimonial property 
regime. Any further investigation into this matter will, however, fall outside the scope for this thesis.  
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 of Appeal judgment242 quite justly stated that the marriage contract presented was nothing 
more than an act stating the mutual consent of the spouses to marry, “and that this act 
doesn’t constitute a contrat de mariage which permits the establishment of any 
[matrimonial] regime for the property of the spouses-to-be.”243 This is corrected by the 
Court of Cassation, perhaps on the basis of the Paris case, but with no reference to it. It 
says that the Court of Appeal should have investigated whether the mahr clause indicated a 
choice of property regime. The second time, in 2002, In the Lyons case, in the second 
Court of Appeal judgment, the court tries to investigate the nature of mahr, using a 
certificat de coutume, a custom certificate: a written statement from lawyer practicing in 
Karikal in India. Perhaps due to a bad translation, this certificate states that mahr is “the 
sales price that a woman claims for herself when marrying,”244 The court thereupon states 
that this marriage was like a sale, and that the husband had bought his wife, so mahr is 
“obviously against French ordre public, which doesn’t tolerate the sale of human 
beings.”245 This is overruled by the Court of Cassation in the 2005 judgment, which simply 
states that “the act called mahr is a convention establishing the spouses’ consent to marry 
to which the payment of a dower is added, and which is not contrary to French ordre 
public.” 246 This interpretation is annulled in the second Court of Cassation judgment247 on 
the basis that the evidence on the foreign laws has been misinterpreted. The court 
pronounces “the act of mahr” to be “a covenant establishing the couple’s consent to marry, 
which goes together with the payment of a dowry, and is not in conflict with the French 
                                                 
242 Cour d'Appel de Lyon, 11 janvier 1996. 
243 «… le ”contrat de mariage” produit … n’est autre que l’acte de mariage constatant l’accord de volonté des 
époux d’être mari et femme, ”et que cet acte ne constitue pas un contrat de mariage permettant d’établir un 
régime pour les biens des futurs époux.” » As quoted in the appeal case, Cour de Cassation, ch.civ.1, 7 avril 
1998.  
244 Cour d'appel de Lyon, ch.civ.1, 2 décembre 2002 p.3. 
245 Ibid. 
246 « L’acte dit maher est une convention établissant le consentement des époux au mariage, assorti du 
versement d’une dot, sans contrariété à l’ordre public international français. » Cour de Cassation, ch.civ.1, 22 
novembre 2005. 
247 Ibid. 
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 public order.”248 The court doesn’t give any reasons or sources for this interpretation. The 
case was then sent back to the Court of Appeal, which adjudicated in accordance with this 
statement. I have not been able to get a copy of this judgment, but presumably the husband 
got what he wanted: That mahr was seen as an indication that the couple had adopted the 
Muslim matrimonial regime, and not against French ordre public.  
 
In both cases the Muslim marriage contract seems to be interpreted as an equivalent of the 
French contrat de mariage, a freely negotiated document expressing the will of the parties 
concerning their matrimonial property relations, and mahr as an indicator that such a 
contract exists. It is likely that this interpretation is influenced by a Court of Cassation 
judgment concerning a Jewish marriage contract, ketouba, which on somewhat better 
grounds was qualified as a marriage contract equivalent to the French contrat de 
mariage.249 Najm criticises the solution in both the Jewish and the Muslim case, since both 
religions require such contracts for the marriage to be valid. One can therefore not speak 
about a choice or a freely negotiated contract like the French marriage contract, and the 
qualification of these religious marriage contracts as indicators of the parties’ choice of 
matrimonial property regime is thus wrong.250 It would have made more sense to see mahr 
and a Muslim marriage contract as a choice of which country’s laws should regulate the 
matrimonial property relations, although this as well would be to stretch the interpretation 
of the parties’ intentions. Mahr is in itself seen as compulsory from a religious point of 
view, and should therefore not be seen as a an indicator of a free choice such as the Court 
of Cassation interprets it. The Muslim marriage contract is in theory individually negotiated 
and may contain a huge variety of clauses. This means that most European marriage 
contracts, with the addition of a mahr clause, may fill the requirement of a Muslim 
                                                 
248 « l’acte dit « Maher » est une convention établissant le consentement des époux au mariage, assorti du 
versement d’une dot, sans contrariété avec l’ordre public international français. » Cour de Cassation, ch.civ.1, 
22 novembre 2005.  
249 Cour de Cassation, ch.civ.1, 6 juillet 1988. 
250 Najm (2006) p.1370-1371.  
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 marriage contract.251 To see the clause of mahr alone as an indicator of a choice of 
property regime might thus be going too far.  
 
Marie-Claude Najm strongly criticizes all these Court of Cassation judgments for seeing a 
deliberate choice of property regime where there is no such thing.252 This is especially 
evident in the first case, where the Polish-Lebanese couple had only one option to get 
married, which was to perform a Muslim marriage in Lebanon. In both cases the couple 
had lived in France since right after the marriage and until the time of divorce, in both 
cases about 20 years. That the Indian-French couple probably had lived through their entire 
relationship in the idea that the estates were separate, as maintained by Annoussamy, is 
probably to stretch the interpretation of the facts too far. Both couples have lived in France 
during the entire or almost entire marriage, and both women want French law to be applied. 
Being Polish, Mrs.K. had better reason to know French law than Lebanese. The approach 
in both cases is rather formalistic: a mechanical application of the court’s interpretation of 
the marriage contract, which doesn’t take the actual circumstances and negotiation 
opportunities into consideration. Gender justice is not an issue, and the result is 
undoubtedly unfair towards the women.  
 
An alternative way of interpreting mahr and the Muslim marriage contract is presented by 
Marie-Claude Najm: It’s not an explicit expression of the parties’ intentions, i.e. an 
equivalent to the French contrat de mariage, but an indicator of the parties’ implicit 
intentions.253 A Court of Cassation judgment issued the same day as the last one in the 
Lyons case254 opened for other indicators of the parties’ implicit will than the location of 
their assets or first common domicile to be taken into consideration. In the following 
                                                 
251 Many Muslims however, see their home country’s requirements and custom as Islamic law, which may 
influence their choices. 
252 Najm (2006) p.1369 ff.  
253 Ibid. pp.1371-1372. 
254 Cour de Cassation, ch.civ.1, 22 novembre 2005, nº 03-12.224. 
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 section I will take a closer look at the interpretation of foreign law related to mahr in the 
two French cases.  
4.5 The further interpretation of mahr in French private international law 
The Court of Cassation judgments are very brief, and give few indications of the reasoning 
behind them. Because it doesn’t see mahr as an indicator of the choice of laws, but of the 
existence of a marriage contract indicating the matrimonial property regime, foreign law is 
to a small degree interpreted and applied. In addition the Court of Cassation can only 
adjudicate matters of law, not of facts. Foreign law is seen to be more or less of the same 
level as contracts, i.e. something between fact and law. The interpretation of foreign law 
cannot, as a main rule, be overruled by the Court of Cassation.255 The contents of foreign 
law have to be proven by the parties in a case where the parties have the free disposal of 
their rights and litigations.256 Most often this is done by means of a certificat de 
coutume.257 Depending on the content and how they are used, these certificates may be a 
way of applying comparative legal method, but French courts have the reputation, as stated 
by Kötz and Zweigert, of not applying the comparative legal method.258 The use of these 
certificates is in any case much criticized, as the ones not produced by French officials 
most often are adapted to support the litigation of one of the parties.259 The Court of 
Cassation may intervene in some situations, e.g. when the Court of Appeal clearly has 
misinterpreted the foreign rule, and this includes misinterpretations of the proof concerning 
the foreign rule at hand. The Lyon case is a good example of this, although the result may, 
as we have seen, be questioned.  
 
                                                 
255 Mayer (1994) p.128.  
256 Libre disposition des droits en litige. Norwegian fri rådighet over sakens gjenstand. See Mayer (1994) 
p.132. 
257 See note 236. 
258 Zweigert (1998) p.19. 
259 Mayer (1994) p.132.  Mayer prefers the Common Law method, where the authors of the certificates appear 
together before the judge and are questioned on the matter, but sees no room for this approach in the practices 
of French courts.  
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 The main question in all the Lyon judgments is how the Muslim marriage contract 
consisting only of a declaration that mahr is paid and received should be interpreted. While 
the focus in the first cassation is on whether the Muslim marriage contract with a clause of 
mahr should be seen as an expression of the parties’ intentions concerning matrimonial 
property regime, as discussed in section 4.4, in the second it’s on the interpretation of the 
custom certificate. There is little doubt that the interpretation made by the Court of Appeal 
was incorrect.260 The Court of Cassation can only overrule the Court of Appeal in the 
interpretation of foreign law in cases of misinterpretation, but this is not necessarily the 
case with the custom certificates since they are evidence on what the foreign law is. But in 
our case the Court of Appeal had stated, on the basis of the certificate, that mahr was 
against French ordre public, and that is clearly within the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Cassation to adjudicate upon.261  It does however, when adjudicating on what ordre public 
is, replace the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of mahr with its own.262 When seeing mahr 
as an act the Court of Cassation, according to Najm, confuses the part with the whole, a 
single clause with the entire contract.263 Mahr is not a legal act, it’s an asset, which the 
husband is obliged to transfer to his wife as a consequence of the Muslim marriage 
contract, i.e. the object of an act, not the act itself. When the Court of Cassation states that 
mahr “goes together with the payment of a dowry,”264 this is an erroneous statement for 
two reasons: First, mahr is the money or asset paid or transferred similar to a dower, but 
paid by the husband, it doesn’t “go together” with it. Second, it is not the equivalent of the 
French dowry, dot, which is paid by the parents to the couple.265  
 
                                                 
260 Oudin (2006) pp.15-16 and a conversation with the husband’s lawyer, Maître Courjon of the SCP de 
Chaisemartin et Courjon Jan. 16 2008. 
261 Oudin (2006) pp.15-16.  
262 Ibid. pp.15-16.  
263 Najm (2006) p.1367.  
264 ”… est assorti du versement d’une dot”, 2nd page of the 2005 judgment.  
265 Encyclopédie Dalloz (1990) on dot (dowry).  
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 In the Paris case, no investigation seems to have been made into the functions of mahr in 
Lebanese law, i.e. comparative legal method was not applied in this case either. The Court 
of Appeal used Polish and Lebanese law in accordance with the nationality principle in 
French law when adjudicating the validity of the marriage, and the sources were custom 
certificates provided by the Polish Consulate in Paris and the Lebanese Ministry of Justice 
respectively. Najm criticises the custom certificate for “giving imprecise information on the 
inter-communitarian law in Lebanon”,266 but without saying in what way. The Court of 
Appeal used Lebanese law only to determine the validity of the marriage contract, and 
applied French law when determining the financial duties the couple had towards each 
other. This is fairly contradictory, as this implies that the couple had, by signing a Muslim 
marriage contract, chosen the regime of separate estates, but not that Muslim law should 
govern their matrimonial property relations. The court does not give any reasons for this; 
after it had concluded that mahr implies that the couple explicitly has chosen the regime of 
separate estates it started to deal with the question of financial effects of the marriage and 
divorce267 simply by referring to article 270 in the Civil Code – which only concerns 
financial effects of divorce. This contradiction was not appealed and is thus not reversed or 
commented upon by the Court of Cassation, probably because the application of French 
law in this matter was very much to the wife’s advantage. In practice the final result is, in 
any case, a compromise between the claims of the two parties.  
 
To conclude, I have found few traces of any application of comparative legal method in 
any of the cases. The only factor which resembles a comparative approach in any way is 
the use of statements from local practitioners, but the foreign concepts are interpreted 
through their seemingly closest French equivalent, with little or no investigation into the 
differences.  
                                                 
266 Najm (2006) p.1374.  
267 Although the marriage was seen as void, the couple were ruled to have been in good faith concerning its 
validity, and thus, according to French law, the financial effects were as if the marriage had been valid.  
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 4.6 Mahr, comparative legal method and gender equality in French courts 
As we have seen, the French courts are very formalistic in their approach, and use a 
mechanical gender equality norm, based on the assumption that both parties are equal. At 
the same time they don’t apply any comparative legal method, the little investigation which 
is made into the foreign law is always done with French law and legal concepts as a starting 
point: It tries to fit the Muslim norms and concepts into the French norms and concepts, 
seeing the Muslim marriage contract as an equivalent of the French one, which it indeed is 
not. This way it misses the target when adjudicating mahr, which is seen as an expression 
of the spouses’ will concerning choice of property regime, which at best is to stretch the 
interpretation. The woman is the one who loses from this interpretation, as she doesn’t get 
what she would have expected to get after living her entire married life in France. The 
English courts have the reputation of having a completely different approach: pragmatic 
and using comparative legal method to a large extent. In the next section we will see if this 
applies to their adjudication of mahr.   
5 England 
5.1 Introduction 
The two English judgments presented are the only ones I’ve found that are published; to 
my knowledge this is because these are the ones that are seen as basis for the case law 
concerning mahr.268 They are both from the High Court; neither the House of Lords nor the 
Court of Appeal have yet had to adjudicate any claims of mahr to my knowledge. Due to 
the status of judgments in Common Law, these judgments still provide a basis for the case 
law concerning mahr. Any interpretation of a judgment known to be used as precedence is 
necessarily also an interpretation of what the case law derived from it should be, even more 
so than in other legal systems. Although these judgments are several decades old, older 
                                                 
268 Another case is mentioned by Hasan (1998), but without giving any precise reference, nor describing the 
result.  
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 than both the CEDAW and protocol 7 to the ECHR, the literature about them is not 
extensive. The following exploration is done with this in mind, and I have to a larger extent 
than with the other legal systems used literature on legal method including the 
interpretation of judgments.  
 
Although both Shahnaz and Qureshi concern private international law, the literature 
concerning the case law derived from them seems to focus on disputes within the English 
legal system. This is less surprising than one might think, since a certain degree of 
acceptance of legal pluralism is built into the Common Law system, starting with the 
various norms in the different counties within England itself, and further developed during 
the colonial period. Thus the difference between a formal legal pluralism and an informal 
one is more of a continuum than in the other countries we have looked at – or perhaps it is 
more correct to say that the formal legal pluralism is not limited to private international 
law, but also include non-codified norms within Britain.269 In any case, the only scholar 
who tries to give an explicit interpretation of the private international law aspects of any of 
these judgments is not British. In the following section I will start with the private 
international law aspects of the judgments before I take a look at the status of mahr 
between spouses domiciled in England, and finish with an evaluation of the gender equality 
aspects. 
5.2 The judgments 
5.2.1 Shahnaz versus Rizwan [1965] 
Mrs. Shahnaz and Mr. Rizwan married in India in 1955 in accordance with Muslim law, 
but were at the time of litigation residing in England, since when is not mentioned. The 
husband took out divorce in 1959, and the wife subsequently claimed the recovery of 
£1,400 in deferred mahr. The whole case concerns a preliminary issue: Whether the claim 
on mahr is within the jurisdiction of English courts. It’s from the Queen’s Bench division 
of the High Court, which in this case seems to be the court of first – and last – instance. 
                                                 
269 See e.g. Bano (2004) and Balchin (2006). 
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 The wife claimed mahr “on the ground that the claim was a lawful contractual one 
enforcing a proprietary right arising out of a lawful contract of marriage.” The husband 
claimed that “the marriage was polygamous or potentially polygamous and that the English 
courts has no jurisdiction over, or should not extend jurisdiction to, the wife’s claim, since 
the provision in the marriage contract relied on was in consideration of a polygamous or 
potentially polygamous marriage; alternatively that the claim was in the form of 
matrimonial relief; in the further alternative that the claim was unenforceable since the 
contract of marriage and the dower provision was contrary to the policy and good morals of 
English law.”270 And indeed, according to English law at the time, any effect, whether 
personal or financial, of what was seen as a “polygamous marriage” – including 
“potentially polygamous marriages” – was beyond the jurisdiction of English courts.271
 
Since the court only adjudicates upon whether it has jurisdiction or not, the result was not 
that the woman gets mahr, it was that English courts have jurisdiction. The only way to 
reach that decision without overruling the precedence on so-called “polygamous 
marriages” was to qualify it as something other than an effect of marriage, i.e. an obligation 
based on a pre-nuptial agreement. One might say that the entire case is about the 
qualification of mahr, but the court does interpret the concept of mahr more in depth than 
what is strictly necessary for that purpose, as far as I can see. Thus questions such as how 
                                                 
270 Shahnaz v. Rizwan p.390. 
271 For many years, and at the time of Shahnaz and Qureshi, English law regarded marriages contracted under 
a system that permits polygamy as “polygamous” – even if the couple had lived monogamously for 20 years. 
The matter was further confused with the use of the sub-category “potentially polygamous” for de facto 
monogamous marriages. Duties between man and wife, arising from their being so, were, following the 
judgment Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee (1866), considered outside the jurisdiction of English courts. 
“Polygamous” marriages were thus denied matrimonial relief by the English courts, but the marriages were 
considered valid for tax and legitimacy purposes. Today the marriage of a person domiciled in Britain, who 
has married in a country where polygamy is permitted, is normally considered valid for the spouses to be able 
to e.g.. seek matrimonial relief, provided the marriage is de facto monogamous. There are exceptions, but 
none that concern the matter of this thesis. Balchin (2006) pp.7, 43-46. For more information, see Balchin, 
Hyde v Hyde or Poulter (1998) p.47 ff. 
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 mahr should further be interpreted and its relation to British public policy272 are touched 
upon.273  
5.2.2 Qureshi versus Qureshi [1972] 
The husband, a Pakistani citizen, and the wife, an Indian citizen, got married in Britain 
March 9 1966, and had lived there since. The marriage was performed in Britain, at the 
Kensington register office. “This was followed by a further ceremony in accordance with 
Muslim rites; but it is common ground that the register office ceremony constituted a legal 
marriage and that the subsequent religious ceremony had no legal significance.”274 It was 
probably during the religious ceremony mahr was agreed upon, but the judgment doesn’t 
give any direct information on this matter. The marriage didn’t work out very well, and 
they separated in June the same year. The wife obtained a weekly allowance of 
maintenance at the magistrates court on the basis of “persistent cruelty and desertion” by 
the husband. The husband divorced her by sending a letter dated April 27 1967 comprising 
the phrase “I divorce you” three times. Reconciliation was sought through mediation by 
counselor and head of chancery at the London office of the High Commissioner for 
Pakistan, Tabarak Husain, in accordance with Pakistani law, before the divorce was 
pronounced to be absolute 90 days after the wife was notified, on August 1 1967. 
 
The case cited is from the Probate Division of the High Court. The wife’s principal claim is 
that the marriage subsists, and that the husband continues to provide maintenance. 
Alternatively, if the marriage has been validly dissolved, she claims a dower of £788 33s 
5d plus a maintenance of £5 a week. The main question in the case is where the couple was 
domiciled, and thereby which laws should govern the case in determining the validity of 
the divorce, but this is also the second of the two judgments that provide the basis for case 
law on mahr. The divorce was found to be valid, which was rather controversial since it 
                                                 
272 The concept in British law which is the closest to ordre public. See also note 130. 
273 Whether these deliberations should be reckoned as obiter dicta, and the further evaluation of their value as 
precedent is beyond my knowledge to comment upon.  
274  Qureshi v. Qureshi p.186 
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 was a divorce by repudiation that had taken place on British soil. As a result the husband’s 
cross-prayer that the court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claim for mahr had to 
be considered. I will concentrate on the parts of the judgment that concern this matter.  
 
A significant difference between the Shahnaz and the Qureshi judgments is that in Shahnaz 
the wife was excluded from seeking ancillary relief since the marriage was considered 
potentially polygamous, while Qureshi the marriage was considered monogamous, so the 
wife could seek ancillary relief. But since the husband was planning to go back to Pakistan 
the only realistic way for the wife to get any money after the divorce, as the court saw it, 
was to get mahr, as this would be easier to enforce by English courts than any ancillary 
relief.    
5.3 The qualification of mahr in English law 
Aldeeb, a Swiss scholar on Muslim laws in Europe and private international law, maintains 
that the English position towards mahr depends on the legal context in which it appears. If 
mahr is “qualified by a foreign law as a fundamental requirement for the marriage, this law 
will be applied by English courts if it’s considered the lex domicilii of one of the 
spouses”.275 The expression “qualified by a foreign law” seems to imply that the 
qualification is based on lex causae. This is, however, not the main rule in English law, 
which is qualification based on lex fori.276 Aldeeb gives no reference as basis for this 
statement. Whether this is what he means to imply or not, I don’t think there’s any basis in 
Shahnaz for maintaining that qualification of mahr should be or has been done on the basis 
of Muslim laws; on the contrary the court uses English legal terms when trying to qualify 
and further interpret it. There is no explicit qualification of mahr in Qureshi; the court 
seems to build upon Shahnaz in that mahr is seen, without any kind of debate, as within the 
jurisdiction of the English courts.  
 
                                                 
275 Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh (1999) p.93. 
276 Stone (1995) p.385.  
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 In Shahnaz, mahr was seen as consideration for entering into the marriage; it was agreed 
upon “in contemplation of, by reason of and (…) in consideration of a marriage that was 
indeed polygamous.”277 In English law, consideration in defined as “the inducement to 
contract”,278 and no contract is valid unless there is consideration; i.e. one must always 
receive something in return for entering into an obligation. Apparently, in order to go into 
what the court saw as a “polygamous marriage”, the court saw it as natural that the woman 
would want something in return, the “polygamous” marriage being considered as a very 
degrading thing for the woman. The court thus chose to qualify the Marriage contract with 
a clause of mahr as a contract, not unlike a pre-nuptial agreement, and mahr is seen as 
consideration. In Indian law279 mahr is indeed an effect of marriage, and part of the 
marriage contract. This qualification is therefore not entirely correct, and it seems 
influenced by what the court saw as the desired result: That the English courts have 
jurisdiction. According to an English lawyer, the result was not at all what he expected 
from reading the discussion leading up to it.280 The Muslim marriage contract has stronger 
elements of contractual obligations than the Common Law marriage contracts. The 
interpretation of mahr in Shahnaz pulls in more contractual elements than what would have 
been possible if mahr had been seen as part of the marriage contract, so the result, if not the 
reasoning behind it, is not entirely wrong in a comparative legal perspective.281  
                                                 
277 Shahnaz v. Rizwan p.400. 
278 Black (1990) on consideration. 
279 As mentioned earlier, all law schools except for the Maliki school sees mahr as an effect of marriage, and 
not a condition, even though it’s still seen as compulsory.  
280 Conversation with LLM Ezekiel Ward, March 3 2008.  
281 If mahr has not been paid, i.e. in cases concerning mahr mu’akhkhar, Aldeeb is of the opinion that a claim 
for its enforcement probably would be seen as an impediment not known in English law, and the claim would 
probably be rejected with reference to Sottomayor v. De Barros if one of the spouses resides in England and 
the marriage is celebrated there (Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh (1999) p.93). I cannot see that this assumption is 
correct. As we will see in the section 5.6, mahr is considered, under certain conditions, to be enforceable also 
if both spouses are domiciled in England. Thus a rejection of a petition for the enforcement of mahr depends 
not on the personal status of the spouses, but on other conditions. In Sottomayor v. De Barros the lex 
domicilii of one of the spouses was contradictory to the rule in question, and the lex loci celebrationis was in 
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 5.4 The choice of laws 
Since the Shahnaz case is about the preliminary issue of whether the courts have 
jurisdiction, the choice of laws is not really debated. If mahr had been seen as an effect of 
the marriage, it would probably have had to be enforced through matrimonial proceedings 
with the consequence that English law was applied.282 However, the court explicitly 
distanced itself from this view, and chose to see the Muslim marriage contract as a 
contract.283 As a contract the lex causae should be the law the contracting parties expected 
to govern the matter,284 which in this case would be Indian law, but this is not a 
commercial contract, but a pre-nuptial one, thus it is uncertain whether this rule applies. 
There’s not enough information as to the final choice of laws in this case. 
 
Qureshi v Qureshi, however, has an obiter dictum concerning the requirements to obtain an 
English domicile of choice, and thus for choosing English law, which is even used as 
precedence on this matter.285 The actual choice of laws seems closely linked to the claim 
for mahr. The court held that “it is only if the marriage is recognised as dissolved that the 
wife is entitled to dower. Whatever the judgment of this court, the husband will not return 
to the wife. I trust that it will not be thought cynical if I feel that she is really better off with 
a judgment for a considerable sum of money [i.e. mahr], which is likely to be more easily 
enforceable while the husband is in this country, than with a largely meaningless right to be 
recognised locally as his wife.”286 This statement is a strong indicator that one of the 
determining factors for the decision to apply Pakistani law on a talaq pronounced in 
England was that this would enable the court to enforce the wife’s claim for mahr.287
                                                                                                                                                    
agreement with the lex domicilii of the other party. There are several interpretations of this case; for more 
information, see Aldeeb pp.54-56. 
282 Stone (1995) p.67. 
283 Shahnaz v. Rizwan p.400.  
284 Stone (1995) p.229-231. 
285 Ibid. p.20 ff.  
286 Qureshi v. Qureshi p.201; my brackets. 
287 See also Pearl (1998) p.233. 
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 5.5 Legal pluralism in practice: The further interpretation and application of the 
concept of mahr 
Only in Shahnaz v. Rizwan does the court try and interpret the concept of mahr; in Qureshi 
v. Qureshi the nature of mahr and its enforceability in English law is seen as given. In the 
former the court goes much further into the interpretation of the concept of mahr than what 
is necessary for the qualification; it actually interprets the right to mahr in Indian law 
thoroughly by using a variety of concepts from English law. The only sources the court 
refers to for its interpretation of Indian law is the Indian Transfer of Property Act of 1882, 
but the court also refers to counsel as vital sources also on this subject,288 which is not 
surprising due to the adversarial process of English law. Mahr is seen as a right in action, 
which means a right “attainable or recoverable by action”,289 i.e. property one does not 
have in one’s possession, but which can be enforced through legal action, “without taking 
specifically matrimonial proceedings”.290 Based on an interpretation of the Indian Transfer 
of Property Act, the court sees mahr as a “proprietary right”, i.e. something the wife owns, 
which is “assignable”: She has the right to transfer the property to someone else.291 
According to Mulla and Mannan (1996), a major work in the Hanafi tradition on the Indian 
subcontinent, there is a “conflict of opinion whether the widow’s right to hold possession 
[of mahr] is transferable and heritable.”292 The English court is thus not wrong in asserting 
this. 
 
Mahr is also seen as “a right for the protection of which, should the wife or widow gain 
physical possession or control of any property of her spouse, she is entitled to assert a 
lien”.293 Mulla and Mannan see dower as a debt, but an unsecured one. The widow is 
                                                 
288 Shahnaz pp.395-396. 
289 Black (1990) on right in action. 
290 Shahnaz v. Rizwan p.401. 
291 I haven’t been able to get a copy of this act, so these views are based on general works on Hanafi law, 
which is the dominant branch of law on the Indian subcontinent: Marghinani (1957) and Mulla (1996). 
292 Mulla (1996) p.443; my brackets. 
293 Shahnaz v. Rizwan p.401.  
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 entitled to have it satisfied on his death out of his estate, but her right is no greater than that 
of any other unsecured creditor, except that she has a right of retention when she is in 
possession of the deceased husband’s property, on condition of having obtained this 
possession “lawfully and without force or fraud.”294 This is very close to the English 
court’s interpretation, although more precise.  
 
The judge in Shahnaz, Winn J., has understood quite a lot of the concept of mahr: He is 
aware of the difference between prompt and deferred mahr, sees the proprietary aspect of 
it, and his comparing it to lien picks up an important aspect of mahr, although the sources 
remain somewhat unclear. The judgment leaves a very contradictory impression: The court 
upholds the antiquated rule from Hyde v. Hyde that the legal effects of a polygamous or 
potentially polygamous marriage are outside the jurisdiction of the English court, and 
expresses some rather orientalist views on Muslim marriage. On the other hand, the court 
provides a very good interpretation of mahr in a comparative perspective, and appears 
rather perspicacious as to its functions. It is surprising that the court should decide that the 
wife’s claim doesn’t arise from the marriage contract itself, which is a more obvious 
interpretation, a choice that can only be explained by the court’s views on policy – and 
what the result should be. The court elaborates on its views concerning policy as follows: 
“…there being now so many Mohammedans resident in this country, it is better that the 
court should recognise in favour of women who have come here as a result of a 
Mohammedan marriage the right to obtain from their husband what was promised to them 
by enforcing the contract and payment of what was so promised, than that they should be 
bereft of those rights and receive no assistance from the English courts.”  
 
In choosing to interpret mahr as a clause in a contract rather than ancillary relief or 
suchlike, the court actually comes closer to an understanding of the concept of mahr than if 
it had chosen what it saw as the alternative interpretation, which formally would have been 
more correct. The court seems to investigate rather thoroughly into the various functions of 
                                                 
294 Mulla (1996) pp 434-443. 
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 mahr in Indian law as compared to concepts with similar functions in English law, and is 
indeed more focused on the functional aspects than the formalistic ones. The court’s 
approach may be said to be an example of the use of a fair degree of comparative legal 
method, even though this is not said explicitly. Together with a pragmatic approach that 
seeks to obtain the most equitable result, this approach is indeed woman friendly, although 
the same may not necessarily be said of the case law derived from it. 
5.6 The enforceability of mahr within the English legal system 
Concerning the enforceability of a deferred mahr when both spouses are domiciled in 
England, two well-known scholars of Muslim laws in Britain, David Pearl and Werner 
Menski, suggest that mahr might “fall within section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 
1973”,295 i.e. be seen as ancillary relief. Raffia Arshad, a barrister, seems to agree with this 
view, provided the couple has conducted a civil ceremony in addition to signing a Muslim 
marriage contract with a clause of mahr. She sums up the rules based on Shahnaz and 
Qureshi as follows: “If the parties [have] conducted a civil ceremony as well as the 
nikah,296 they will be entitled to pursue an ancillary relief application. In these 
circumstances the nikah contract, which is rather like a pre-nuptial agreement [if containing 
financial provisions], could be used to support a party’s case. (…) [If] the marriage is short, 
any financial provisions within the nikah contract could be used to reflect the intention of 
the parties as would happen if a formal pre-nuptial contract had been drawn up. English 
courts do give consideration to the financial agreement the parties reached before effecting 
the marriage contract and this carries more weight if the marriage is short.”297 But 
according to John Buck, another barrister, mahr is decidedly not ancillary relief, but rather 
a contractual obligation, the enforcement of which may have an impact on any claims for 
ancillary relief. He maintains that “[a]ny decision to award payment of a dowry [sic] in 
                                                 
295 Pearl (1998) p.234.  
296 The Muslim marriage ceremony including the signing of a marriage contract.  
297 Arshad (2007) pp.520-522, my brackets. 
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 contract would necessarily impact upon the outcome of any claim to ancillary relief.298 In 
Qureshi the court considered that any decision to award a payment of dowry would impact 
on the way in which justices exercise their discretion both as to the quantum of 
maintenance payable and the extent to which any arrears299 might be enforceable.”300 He 
continues: “A wife should, therefore, elect whether to enforce a claim to unpaid dowry as a 
contractual right or within an ancillary relief claim. If she is for some reason precluded 
from making an ancillary relief claim, or is concerned any award made might be 
unenforceable, she has no option other than to claim in contract. If, and to the extent that, 
she successfully sues in contract and thereafter brings an ancillary relief claim, any award 
of damages made would, in all likelihood, serve otherwise to reduce her capital claim, 
unless the circumstances of its non-payment were such as to be considered by the family 
court as unconscionable conduct.”301 So if mahr theoretically can be enforced, and Muslim 
marriage contracts with a mahr clause will be taken into consideration, there are many 
obstacles left for a lone Muslim woman to enforce her claim in real life, even without 
taking into consideration the social pressure she’s not unlikely to be subject to.302  
 
It seems likely that another condition for the enforcement of mahr is that the amount is 
specified in the contract. According to Poulter, “Winn J upheld the plaintiff’s claim on the 
ground that it was based on a recognised contractual obligation, enforceable under Islamic 
law by ordinary civil action303 (aside from matrimonial proceedings) and that there was no 
sufficient reason why the same remedy should not be afforded here. However, had the 
amount of dower not been specified in the marriage contract it may be doubted whether the 
                                                 
298 “A pecuniary payment to a party to a marriage in England and Wales, on divorce, nullity or judicial 
separation.” Wikipedia, read 05.11.2008. 
299 Money which is overdue and unpaid. Black (1990). 
300 Buck (2004) p.7, my brackets.  
301 Ibid.  
302 See Foblets (2005), Schmied (1999), Bano (2004) et al.  
303 Civil actions “are such as lie in behalf of persons to enforce their rights or obtain redress of wrongs in their 
relation to individuals” according to the US federal law of civil procedure and Blacks law dictionary (6th 
edition, 1990) 
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 wife would have been successful in her claim. (…) English courts might well feel 
incompetent to make such an assessment.”304 305 It remains to see how a court would 
handle such a claim in practice.  
 
Balchin and Warraich assess the status of pre-nuptial agreements in English law – 
including Muslim marriage contracts with mahr clauses – to be divided as to the legal 
enforceability of them.306 As a general rule they are not considered enforceable, even 
though they are seen as the closest equivalent to matrimonial property regimes in other 
legal systems, but there are some notable exceptions, and the tendency seems to be that 
more pre-nuptial contracts are enforced.307 English law is going through a lot of changes 
concerning the adjudication of financial aspects of marriage these days, one notable 
judgment on this matter, especially in a gender perspective, is White v. White.308  
Referring to Shah-Kazemi (2001), Balchin and Warraich state that “it is clear that the 
uncertain status of Muslim marriage contracts negatively affects women’s access to certain 
property rights arising out of Muslim marriage – specifically mehr (dower).”309 It is also 
evident that the procedural aspects complicate the matter considerably, as one cannot sue 
for a contractual claim and for ancillary relief or any other financial claim based upon 
marriage or divorce within the same case. Mahr seems to be enforceable at least upon 
certain conditions, but the exact contents of these conditions can probably only be 
determined by further adjudication of mahr in English courts.  
                                                 
304 Poulter (1986) pp.42-43. 
305 This statement is at least in part based on the case Phrantzes v. Argenti, in which a Greek girl claimed 
before English courts both to enforce her claim against her father to be provided with a dowry, and to have 
the amount set. The court found that this was beyond their jurisdiction. 
306 Balchin (2006) pp.9-10. 
307 Freeman (2007) p.39-40, Welstead (2006) p.136. 
308 White v. White [2000].  
309 Balchin (2006) p.10. 
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 5.7 Mahr and gender equality in English courts 
As a result of its rather outdated views on Muslim marriage, a remnant from the colonial 
period, the court in Shahnaz interprets mahr as part of something similar to a pre-nuptial 
agreement, made in consideration of the marriage. Muslim marriages are apparently, in the 
court’s view, so degrading to women that they would never enter them without receiving 
something in return. Since there are now so many of these women in England, it would 
probably be against what the court saw as good morals not to enforce what they supposedly 
had been promised in consideration of such marriages. The court therefore chooses to 
promote what it sees as the woman’s interests, at the cost of making the more obvious and 
correct interpretation of mahr, and does exactly what the husband’s lawyer says he cannot 
do: “sever some terms of the [marriage] contract,”310 thus proclaiming petitions for mahr to 
be within the jurisdiction of English courts. The husband claims that the claim is 
“unenforceable by reason of such a contract of marriage and the provision therein [of 
mahr] being contrary to the distinctive policy and good morals of the law of England,”311 
i.e. that mahr is againt English public policy. The court, however, doesn’t “see any 
foundation (…) that that marriage involved any element offensive to the standards of 
decency accepted by the English law”,312 i.e. it can’t find any foundation for the husband’s 
claim. The Muslim marriage contract and mahr is not against English public policy.   
 
Within the framework of Muslim laws, as the court interprets it, the court tries to ensure the 
woman’s rights. Muslim laws give husband and wife different rights and obligations, and 
English law, especially in the 1960ies when the adjudication took place, was to a large 
extent based on the same idea. The court does not withdraw or apply a mechanical gender 
equality norm in the face of Muslim laws; it makes a great effort to give the woman her 
dower, seen as her consideration and compensation for entering into a Muslim marriage, 
applying something approaching an equal worth norm of gender justice.  
 
                                                 
310 Shahnaz p.394, my brackets. 
311 Shahnaz p.395. 
312 Shahnaz p.397. 
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 On behalf of Mrs. Qureshi, and presumably in accordance with her wishes, it is argued that 
“she should not be precluded from herself invoking the jurisdiction of an English divorce 
court, not only to secure the dissolution of her marriage but also to secure an order for 
ancillary relief. She claims that recognition of the talaq and the denial of rights otherwise 
available to her under English law would be unconscionable.”313 Public policy is an issue 
only concerning the recognition of the unilateral repudiation of the wife, not concerning 
mahr. The court, however, considers it “preferable for the courts to proceed generally on 
legal principle, and to leave any necessary modifications called for by public policy to 
other organs of the constitution.”314 It also lists five factors that make it consider that “the 
judicial discretion should not be exercised to refuse recognition to the otherwise applicable 
rule of foreign law”: 1) Case law indicates that this discretion should be used sparingly; 2) 
The marriage will be dissolved in any case, and the court sees no point in postponing this; 
3) The husband intends to return to Pakistan, and the English court considers that Pakistani 
courts are unlikely to enforce any ancillary relief orders from English courts, and that they 
will recognise the talaq as valid; 4) The court is of the opinion that the wife will be “better 
off with a judgment for a considerable sum of money, which is likely to be more easily 
enforceable while the husband is in [England], than with a largely meaningless right to be 
recognised locally as his wife,” and in order to have her dower claim enforced, the court 
considers that the divorce has to be recognised.  5) The rule of foreign law, here the 
Pakistani MFLO,315 which the husband followed in his suit for divorce, “has the authority 
of the holy scriptures of the common faith of himself and the wife.”316 The court chooses to 
disregard the wife’s wishes, and accepts the talaq more or less to enable her to obtain the 
dower, this being, as the court sees it, her only realistic possibility to get any money from 
the husband after the divorce. The court seems to try and take as good care of the rights of 
the wife as it can, in a very practical way, plus to respect the religion and what it sees as 
religious laws for both spouses. Just as in Shahnaz v. Rizwan, the court applies something 
                                                 
313 Shahnaz p.401.  
314 Qureshi v. Qureshi p.199. 
315 Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, valid in most of Pakistan. 
316 Shahnaz p.401. 
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 approaching an equal worth norm of gender justice, giving the woman her rights within the 
limits of the Muslim laws as the English court interprets it.  
6 Summary of the findings 
We have now seen that even though mahr is a completely foreign concept, all the courts in 
this study qualify mahr on the basis of lex fori, i.e. the courts’ own laws and concepts. The 
concept of mahr is not interpreted in any of the Norwegian judgments; in the other 
countries mahr is qualified and further interpreted in a variety of ways: as maintenance, as 
a redistribution of property between the spouses, as common law consideration, and as an 
indicator of the spouses’ choice of matrimonial property regime. Comparative legal method 
is most often not used at all, but the courts in the Swedish 2005 judgment and the English 
Shahnaz judgment use this method at least to a certain degree, although the method itself is 
never mentioned. Gender justice seems to be taken into consideration only in RH 1993:116 
from Sweden and the two English judgments; in the Swedish judgment in a rather 
mechanical gender equality approach, in the English judgments in the shape of the equal 
worth norm or something approaching it. In the majority of the cases mahr has been 
claimed to be against the ordre public or public policy of the European country, but this has 
never won through, except for in the French case Cour d’Appel de Lyon, 11 janvier 1996, 
which was repealed by the Court of Cassation.  
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 Part IV. DISCUSSION: MAHR, COMPARATIVE LEGAL METHOD AND 
GENDER JUSTICE IN EUROPEAN COURTS 
7 Introduction 
Having analyzed the judgments within the context of their legal system, we have now come 
to the stage of comparison. The focus in this thesis is on the courts’ approaches in dealing 
with Muslim laws in a gender justice perspective. I will first take a look at the use or 
absence of use of the comparative legal method, then at the use or absence of use of gender 
justice norms, and then look at the two together. I will finish with saying something about 
the limits of what can be learned from this study, and what I think needs further 
investigation. 
8 Mahr and the comparative legal method in European courts 
8.1 The qualification of mahr  
8.1.1 The rules concerning qualification 
Muslim laws don’t distinguish between personal and financial effects of marriage. Mahr 
has elements of both, plus contractual elements. This explains some of the difficulties 
European courts have when they qualify, interpret and apply the concept of mahr. In the 
Norwegian judgments mahr cannot be said to be qualified at all, and in France it is the 
Muslim marriage contract rather than mahr which is qualified. In France the doctrine is to 
qualify lex fori; this is also the majority view in Norwegian law, but Thue maintains that in 
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 cases concerning mahr and other concepts that don’t exist in Norwegian law, lex causae 
should be applied to determine which category of conflict of laws rules the court should 
apply.317 It is thus not certain what would be the result in Norwegian law. In the remainder 
judgments mahr is qualified lex fori, even though mahr is a foreign concept to all the 
European courts studied.  
 
The only country in this study where the qualification is very clear and discussed by the 
court in explicit terms is Sweden. It seems likely that this is at least in part due to the fact 
that Sweden is the only country which has an act on the matter,318 the travaux 
préparatoires of which319 designate two options for the qualification of the payment of a 
lump sum between spouses. Either it’s a redistribution of property, or it’s maintenance, i.e. 
either a financial or a personal effect of marriage. Both English and French courts rely on 
jurisprudence to determine the contents of the rules concerning qualification, the French 
ones also on the Hague convention on the law applicable to matrimonial property regimes 
of 1978.320 French law doesn’t classify the financial effects of the marriage as part of the 
family law, but of the law of obligations. On the one hand this distinguishes between the 
financial and personal effects of marriage, a distinction which doesn’t exist in Muslim 
laws, and thus emphasises the difference between the legal systems. On the other hand, this 
may allow French law to pick up more of the obligation law aspects of Muslim marriage, 
and is perhaps closer to the notion of Muslim marriage contracts than financial effects of 
marriage are in e.g. Swedish law.  
 
The Swedish solution implies a qualification lex fori with very limited options, which may 
narrow the options of qualification so much down that it may lead to incorrect results and 
provide an erroneous basis for the further interpretation of the foreign concept and laws, 
                                                 
317 Thue (2002) p.395. 
318 Lag (1990:272) om internationella frågor rörande makars och sambors förmögenhetsförhållanden (LIMF). 
319 Prop. 1989/90:87. 
320 The UK is also a party to this convention, but the English judgments came into being long before this 
convention entered into force on September 1 1992. 
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 especially concerning concepts that are very different from those in Swedish law. So while 
clear legislation makes the courts more aware of the qualification process, it can at the 
same time narrow the options for qualification so much down that the court may find itself 
barred from the best approach, e.g. the application of comparative legal method in the case 
of concepts that are entirely foreign to the European legal system. Rules based upon 
principles and jurisprudence may be more flexible, but are more difficult to apply, demand 
a high degree of awareness and knowledge from the courts, and may lead to more 
unpredictable results.  
 
Sayed argues, de lege ferenda, for a new private international law rule in using lex loci 
contractus – the law of the country where mahr was agreed upon – in cases concerning 
mahr.321 His main argument is that this is applicable as a general principle, and thus a 
practical solution. He further maintains that this approach supposedly will be “in line with 
the spouses’ intention on the matter of the applicable law at the time of signing the 
contract”, and that this would “better fulfil the objectives of mahr agreement in every 
specific case”. He admits that this solution may have weaknesses in relation to spouses who 
change residence and stay in Europe for a very long time. The original purpose of mahr, 
which he considers to be “a safeguard within marriage or against divorce”, “may not be 
enforceable (or meaningful) after a long residence in the new country”. He proposes to use 
the ordre public reservation in such cases. One weakness in his reasoning is that mahr has 
many purposes and functions, which vary both with the type of mahr and with other 
circumstances in each case. A redistribution of property is one of them. Another weakness 
is that it is not at all clear that public policy could be used in such cases, as it takes a lot 
more to refuse the enforcement of a foreign rule on this basis. His solution has some 
likeness to the French one, although French courts see mahr rather as an indication of 
which property regime is chosen. As we have seen, this solution is much criticised, the 
most thoroughly – and knowledgably – by Marie-Claude Najm. Her major point is that 
when it comes to laws based upon religion one has to be careful of assuming that there is 
                                                 
321 Sayed (2008) p.207. 
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 an explicit choice of matrimonial regime that can be read out of the choice of marriage 
rites. She proposes that if no clearly formulated, written agreement is made, the law of the 
first common domicile should be applied. Another argument against his solution is that one 
cannot isolate one legal effect of a marriage contract, i.e. mahr, thus the entire contract 
must be considered enforceable, with the reservations of ordre public only. This will create 
a situation similar to the one in countries that apply the nationality principle, where the 
couple may, after decades of residing in Europe, still find themselves bound by the laws of 
the Muslim country they originate from, or even only contracted the marriage in. This 
solution has been criticised in a study by Foblets, on the basis of interviews with a large 
number of Muslim women residing in Belgium, as it is less favourable for the women, and 
she, as well as Najm, is of the opinion that the law of the first common domicile should be 
applied if no written agreement between the spouses is provided, 322 which is the rule set 
forth in the Hague convention on the law applicable to matrimonial property regimes of 14 
March 1978 article 4 and the main rule in Swedish and Norwegian law. 
8.1.2 The consistency of the qualifications of mahr 
Both in France and England, the judgments seem to build upon each other as to the 
qualification of mahr or the Muslim marriage contract, and there is no indication that the 
qualifications are inconsistent. The only exception is the French Court of Appeal in the 
Lyons case which repeatedly wanted to qualify mahr differently from the Paris case, and 
perhaps more correctly, but was overruled by the Court of Cassation. Remarkably enough, 
mahr is qualified differently in the two Swedish judgments, even though the factual 
situations are rather similar. Both marriages were very short, and in both cases the husband 
was resident in Sweden while the wife moved to Sweden from the couple’s country of 
origin. This solution is interesting in that it allows for different qualifications and thus also 
interpretations depending on the situation in each case, and Bogdan proposes that this may 
be a correct way of qualifying mahr: a prompt mahr is seen as a redistribution of property, 
while a deferred mahr is seen as maintenance.323 I do however fear that Bogdan’s 
                                                 
322 Foblets (2005) pp.307-308, Najm (2006) pp.1373-1374.  
323 Bogdan (2007) p.185. 
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 qualification based on the differences between prompt and deferred dower is based upon a 
misconception. He sees prompt mahr as being paid either at the time of marriage or on 
demand, but it is a deferred mahr which has to be paid upon demand, at the latest at the 
dissolution of the marriage by death or divorce. But since a deferred mahr is very rarely 
claimed before the dissolution of marriage, as this is seen as an indication that the marriage 
is not going well,324 this may not cause any problems in practice.  
 
Mahr can have so many functions that it may be a good solution to open up for different 
qualifications and interpretations. This is a way of allowing stronger elements of the 
comparative legal method into the process of qualification while at the same time 
maintaining lex fori as a basis for it. It opens up for taking various functions of the concept 
into consideration, and that the concept may have different functions in different situations. 
The actual method of qualification is then closer to what is sometimes called the private 
international law method, see part II chapter 3.2. A problem then is that the results are 
unpredictable. But then again, as Najm states in her thesis: While an inequitable result is 
most often unpredictable by the parties, since they will not have been able to adapt, the 
contrary is not necessarily the case; an unpredicted result is not always inequitable.325 
Variables that can be relevant for the qualification are the duration of the marriage in 
question, the type of mahr, the size of it, and the financial and other circumstances of the 
couple concerned. The actual phrasing in the laws of the Muslim country in question is 
likely to play an important part, as these are bound to differ, see for example the Swedish 
judgments, and not only on the basis of which law school is predominant in the area, see 
part II chapter 2.7.  
8.2 The use of the comparative legal method in the interpretation of mahr and 
Muslim laws 
Surprisingly enough, it is in the oldest judgments that the courts appear the most thorough 
and capable in applying the comparative legal method. According to Kötz and Zweigert, 
                                                 
324 WLUML (2003) p.181. 
325 Najm (2005) note 242.  
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 the French Court of Cassation “has adopted a style of judgment which precludes any 
reference to considerations of sociology, legal history, policy or comparative law,” while 
the English courts have the reputation of using a completely different approach, applying 
foreign law and comparative legal method to a fair extent.326 My discoveries confirm these 
views. The Norwegian courts don’t really seem to have discovered the comparative legal 
method, while in Sweden things have noticeably improved from 1993 to 2005. In all the 
judgments the degree of misinterpretation of the Muslim laws in question seems to stand in 
direct relation to the lack of use of the comparative legal method.  
8.3 The various interpretations and functions of mahr 
8.3.1 Introduction 
As mentioned, mahr is qualified and interpreted in a variety of ways: as maintenance or a 
personal effect of marriage, as redistribution of property or a financial effect of marriage, 
and as common law consideration for entering into a Muslim marriage contract. In the 
French Court of Cassation judgments it’s seen as an indicator of the choice of matrimonial 
property regime. The functions of mahr and the subsequent interpretation of it in a 
European context depend on the circumstances in each case. In addition the concepts of the 
lex fori shape the interpretation of mahr especially through the qualification process. Since 
comparative legal method is to a small degree applied in the judgments I’ve studied, these 
concepts have a strong influence on the courts’ further interpretation of the Muslim laws in 
question as well. However, some interpretations are more correct than others, and in this 
section I will present and evaluate the various interpretations of mahr in the judgments I’ve 
studied, in relation to the courts’ use of comparative legal method.  
8.3.2 Mahr as maintenance 
As we have seen, it is clear that mahr is not a kind of maintenance in the terms of Muslim 
laws,327 but this does not mean that this interpretation is wrong. The actual function of 
mahr may be a kind of maintenance, when analyzed through the comparative legal method. 
                                                 
326 Zweigert (1998) p.19. 
327 See part II chapter 2.  
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 However, if the qualification of mahr as maintenance is seen as a general principle, this 
may sometimes lead to a loss of rights for Muslim women, as we saw in the first Swedish 
judgment. In Islamic law she has a right to maintenance during the ‛idda, and in many 
Muslim countries the woman has a right to maintenance beyond this.328 It is clear that the 
Swedish judgment is based on a misinterpretation of Muslim Israeli law, and the court 
didn’t use the comparative legal method to investigate the contents of it.  
 
Sayed upholds the example where the wife is a Swedish citizen, and the husband domiciled 
in a Muslim country. According to Swedish jurisprudence, questions concerning 
maintenance are regulated by the personal status law of the person entitled to it. Supposing 
then that the woman is the one with the most wealth and income; is it still possible to talk 
of mahr as a maintenance obligation? In Swedish law, maintenance is seen as aimed to 
meet the receiver’s needs, compensating for a low income or none at all. If this is not the 
case, we cannot, according to Sayed, say that mahr is maintenance in the Swedish sense.329 
And indeed, in Muslim laws mahr is the wife’s right and property no matter how the 
economic circumstances of the spouses are. At the husband’s death, if still not transferred 
to her, it is separated from the husband’s estate before the wife’s share of inheritance is 
calculated. If the complete rules concerning mahr are to be practiced in Europe, the 
outcome may sometimes actually be unfair towards the husband. But this seems to be the 
exception so far.330 Even if mahr can never be seen as maintenance in the sense of Swedish 
domestic law, this does not mean that mahr may not be seen as maintenance in the private 
international law sense, especially if a comparative approach is used. As we saw in chapter 
8.1.2, Bogdan is of the opinion that a deferred mahr should be qualified in Swedish law as 
maintenance. Only a deferred mahr should be qualified as maintenance, but only if that is 
the approximate function it has in that particular case. A condition is then that the husband 
is the one with the most money. Bogdan maintains that the qualification should be based on 
the circumstances at the time when the agreement was signed, and not take later 
                                                 
328 See the Tunisian Code du Statut Personnel. 
329 Sayed (2008) p.202. 
330 See for example Bano (2004) p.251 ff. 
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 developments into account.331 Since the right to and the amount of maintenance can only 
be determined at the time of divorce, this is perhaps not the best solution if mahr is 
qualified as maintenance. If mahr is qualified as a redistribution of property, it may be 
different.  
8.3.3 Mahr as a redistribution of property 
Another Swedish solution was to see mahr as a redistribution of property between the 
spouses.332 Again the correctness of this depends among other things on the economic 
situation of the spouses in each case, and in my opinion it is a requirement that mahr is 
prompt. This is one of the objects of mahr in Muslim laws, dating back to the Qur’an,333 
and must be seen in relation to the absence of matrimonial property regimes in Muslim 
laws; there is no joint matrimonial property, but the husband is required to provide for his 
wife and their children. This way the woman has some property of her own, of which she 
disposes freely. Depending on the circumstances a redistribution of property may also be a 
vital function of mahr in a Muslim legal context, especially where the woman doesn’t take 
paid work outside the home. For a deferred mahr this solution is thus often very good in a 
comparative legal perspective. As to which factors should be taken into consideration, I 
here agree with Bogdan that only the circumstances at the time of signing the agreement 
are relevant; in any case the time lapse between this and the litigation is not likely to be 
long.334 It is again a requirement that the husband is the wealthier of the spouses.  
8.3.4 Mahr as consideration or sales price 
The interpretations of mahr in Shahnaz and in the second Cour d’Appel de Lyon judgment 
have several features in common: Both see Muslim marriage as a very degrading thing for 
                                                 
331 Bogdan (2007) p.185. 
332 RH 2005:66. 
333 Reference 
334 In Scandinavian law a consequence of this interpretation might be that prompt mahr is seen as part of the 
woman’s own property and not part of the matrimonial property, which is divided equally upon divorce. A 
requirement might be that Muslim laws are applied on her right to mahr, but Scandinavian law on the divorce 
settlement, but the entire question merits a much more thorough discussion than space permits me to do here. 
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 the woman, for which mahr is a financial compensation. The French court goes the farthest 
when seeing mahr as “the sales price a woman claims for herself when marrying”,335 but in 
a comparative perspective the function of consideration is not all that different; in reality 
the sales price of a chose will most often be the consideration for one of the parties in a 
sales contract. But there is no requirement that consideration has the same value as the 
counter-performance,336 thus the comparison has its limits. Compared to the function of 
mahr in a Muslim legal system, the correctness of such an interpretation is uncertain. As 
we saw in part II chapter 2 it is still debated in Muslim countries whether mahr is the sales 
price of the woman’s uterus or something similar. While the majority view is that it is not, 
the answer is not given, due to the rights and duties that still follow from marriage in the 
majority of the Muslim countries. Still, this debate concerns rather the symbolic value of 
mahr, not its actual functions. It is thus not a recommendable approach from a comparative 
perspective. In these judgments, this interpretation seems to be based on erroneous 
assumptions about the nature of Muslim marriage in the English case, and on a 
mistranslation of a custom certificate in the French case, and was actually repealed by the 
Court of Cassation on the basis of misinterpretation of the foreign law.  
8.3.5 Mahr as part of a pre-nuptial agreement 
When mahr is qualified as part of a pre-nuptial agreement, which has many of the same 
functions as the French contrat de mariage, it appears to be considered within the parties’ 
autonomy, and it’s the actual contract that is the main object of interpretation. An 
advantage of both interpretations is that they include some of the contractual aspects of 
Muslim marriage contracts, of which mahr is a part. Contrary to the French concept, 
however, a pre-nuptial agreement is not seen as binding in English law, but as one indicator 
among others of the parties’ intentions.337 Another major difference between them is that in 
English law matrimonial property regimes exist mainly in private international law, while 
this is a major feature of French law on marriage. Najm criticises the French judgments for 
                                                 
335 Cour d'appel de Lyon, ch.civ.1, 2 décembre 2002 p.3. 
336 Cheshire (1996) p.73 ff. 
337 See Blenkhorn (2002) concerning the effect of interpreting mahr as a pre-nuptial agreement in US law. 
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 seeing the mahr clause as an explicit choice of matrimonial property regime, i.e. that the 
Muslim marriage contract is an equivalent to the French contrat de mariage, while a better 
interpretation would have been to see it as one of several indicators of the spouses’ implicit 
intentions, i.e. more in line with a pre-nuptial agreement in English law. Perhaps the most 
correct solution is the one expressed by the Norwegian court in RG 1983 p.1021: The 
Muslim marriage contract with a clause of mahr does neither imply an explicit choice of 
matrimonial property regime, nor a choice of laws regulating the matter. Islam requires a 
marriage contract with a clause of mahr for a marriage to be valid, as Najm quite justly 
stated.338 In some Muslim countries civil marriage doesn’t even exist.339 On this matter the 
comparative legal method with its focus on the functions of a concept, and Nielsen’s 
statement about the necessity of not taking the ideological background of the rules into 
consideration,340 exclude an aspect which is vital for the understanding of the Muslim laws 
in question. 
8.3.6 Other possible functions of mahr in European private international law 
There is no doubt that mahr can be qualified and interpreted in other ways than those 
already mentioned, depending among other things on the specific circumstances in each 
case and the European legal system. One of the most interesting features of mahr is that it 
has so many functions depending e.g. on the type of dower, the amount, and other 
circumstances in the specific case. One should therefore, in my opinion, not choose only 
one qualification and interpretation of mahr, as this may lead to erroneous and sometimes 
unfair results. In the following chapters we’ll have further look into that in a gender justice 
perspective.  
                                                 
338 See note 252. 
339 E.g. Lebanon. 
340 See the introduction and note 8.  
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 9 Mahr and gender justice in European courts 
9.1 Mahr, the CEDAW and gender justice in the judgments 
As stated in part I chapter 6.2.3, the CEDAW committee’s views on mahr seems to have 
developed from a rather mechanical gender equality approach which rejected mahr, to an 
equal worth approach accepting mahr as important for women in Muslim countries. This 
may be interpreted as a switch from principles to pragmatism. In the European judgments 
I‘ve studied, the CEDAW is never mentioned even when the adjudication was done after its 
entry into force, nor are any other human rights obligations concerning gender equality. 
While the English courts have a more of an equal worth approach to the gender equality 
issue, the Swedish court in RH 1993:116 is rather mechanical in its approach. This is not so 
surprising for the English judgments from the 1960ies and 1970ies, when the gender 
equality movement still had limited influence on English courts, especially on issues such 
as these, but more so for the Swedish judgment from 1993. Of the two approaches, the 
equal worth approach appears to lead to a more equitable result for the woman. Still, the 
most striking discovery is that so few courts take gender justice into consideration in cases 
concerning mahr; less than half the cases studied. In none of the Norwegian and French 
cases is gender justice an issue, nor in the last Swedish judgment. France has a monistic 
system, which means that the CEDAW was part of French law at the time of adjudication 
of both the Lyons and the Paris case.  
9.2 Mahr and ordre public in the judgments 
In almost all the cases mahr is claimed to be against ordre public, but this is never accepted 
by any of the courts. Very often it is a subsidiary claim, the matter is solved on another 
basis, and none of the courts give any thorough explanation as to why. In RH 1993:116 the 
basis for this conclusion is clearly wrong; the court sees mahr as an equivalent to the 
Swedish concept of morning gift, and on this basis concludes that it is not against ordre 
public. In the French Lyon case, the Court of Cassation in its last judgment also seems to 
base this conclusion on a misinterpretation, as it sees mahr as a convention or an act. In the 
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 talaq judgments341 the French Court of Cassation has stated that the ECHR342 protocol 7 
article 5 on gender equality is part of French ordre public.343 I have found no indication of 
such reasoning in any of the other countries, although it is clear that a gender equality 
principle is part of the ordre public in the European countries in this study. The type of 
gender equality norm and how strictly it should be interpreted in relation to ordre public 
remains uncertain.  
 
All in all, it seems that the courts are more aware of their negative duty in relation to 
gender equality and ordre public, than their positive duty to promote gender equality. The 
exact contents of each and the relationship between them would need a more thorough 
investigation. 
 
With a few exceptions it is the result of the foreign rule that must be contrary to ordre 
public, not the rule itself.344 It is also generally acknowledged that the courts should be 
very restrictive in applying the ordre public reservation, for a variety of reasons.345 In none 
of the judgments in this study has a wife’s obtaining of mahr led to a very inequitable 
result, although the result in RH 2005:66 is strongly in favour of the woman, so it’s not 
surprising that mahr is not considered to be against ordre public. Since mahr is a claim the 
wife has on the sole basis of being a woman, it is perhaps more likely that the result is 
proclaimed against ordre public for being too unfair towards the husband, if the amount is 
high enough compared to the husband’s means. The ordre public reservation remains 
useful, in that it gives the courts a means of testing the result of the foreign law in each 
case, which may include a test of the functionality of mahr in a gender justice perspective. 
Yet both court practice and legal scholarship leaves a lot to be desired as to bridge the 
                                                 
341 Table ronde, Cour de Cassation, February 17 2005. 
342 The European Convention on Human Rights. 
343 See part I chapter 6.4. 
344 Thue (2002) p.182. 
345 Ibid. p.176 ff.  
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 existing gap between the equality and non-discrimination standard on the one hand ordre 
public on the other. 
10 Mahr, comparative law and gender equality 
10.1 Introduction 
In the following section we’ll have a look into questions concerning the interaction of the 
comparative legal method and gender equality approach as a final test of the hypothesis we 
started out with: that the courts must apply comparative legal method in order to provide a 
foundation for making a correct and fair decision, and that they also need to apply a gender 
justice norm of equal worth to obtain an equitable result when they apply Muslim laws. 
How do the comparative law and gender equality approaches interact? What happens if 
none or only one of them is applied? What happens if both are? 
10.2 When neither a comparative nor a gender justice approach are applied 
In none of the French or Norwegian judgments did the courts use the method of 
comparative law or seem to make any effort to promote gender justice. In both of the 
French judgments and in LE-1986-447 the results were that the women were left with 
nothing or very little at divorce, and undoubtedly less than they had reason to expect. In all 
three cases the Muslim laws and concepts in question must be said to have been 
misinterpreted by the European courts. 
 
In RG 1983 p.1021 the question was the same as in the French judgments: whether the 
Muslim marriage contract with a clause on mahr expressed a choice of matrimonial 
property regime or a choice of laws regulating the effects of marriage. The court didn’t 
have to interpret the Muslim laws in question, only the marriage contract, and the court 
seems to have used common sense rather than comparative law method with the result that 
the marriage contract was seen as nothing more than an agreement to marry, in accordance 
with the wife’s claims. Thus in this single case pragmatism and common sense seems to 
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 have done the job of both gender justice awareness and comparative legal method, while in 
all the other cases the result seems to have been rather inequitable towards the women 
concerned.    
10.3 When a gender justice approach alone is applied 
In the Swedish judgment RH 1993:116 the court makes a certain effort to promote gender 
justice, to the point of reinterpreting case law. But the method of comparative law is not 
used when trying to interpret the Muslim laws in question, and as a result not only is the 
nature of mahr misinterpreted, but the woman does not get any maintenance during the 
´idda, the first three months after divorce. In Swedish law it takes time for a joint 
matrimonial estate to be established, before that each takes out of the matrimonial estate 
only what he or she brought into it. If the court had not made an effort to promote gender 
equality, the woman would probably have been left with nothing, since the marriage was so 
short.346 Still, if the court had applied comparative legal method and made a correct 
interpretation of the Muslim laws in question, she would have gotten three months’ 
maintenance in addition to mahr. In this example the result is thus only half favourable for 
the woman when only a gender justice approach is applied, and a somewhat mechanical 
one at that.  
10.4 When a comparative approach alone is applied 
In the other Swedish judgment, RH 2005:66, gender justice is not a topic, but the court 
does to a certain degree apply comparative legal method. This is the only judgment where 
the equity of the result seems to be debatable from the point of view of the husband. He had 
to pay SEK 250,000 to the woman after a few months’ marriage, and the allegations that he 
was being used to obtain a residence permit in Sweden are not addressed by the courts, nor 
are the nature and limits of the authority he have to his proxy. The reasons for this remain 
uncertain; whether the court just wasn’t thorough enough in its interpretation of Iranian 
law, or the lack of gender justice approach in a man’s favour, or something else. As the 
Canadian Professor in Sociology and Equity Studies in Education, Sherene Razack has 
                                                 
346 See part III chapter 3.5. 
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 pointed out, there is a risk of essentialising and stereotyping too much, with the result that 
the Muslim woman is too often classified as a victim, and the Muslim man as an offender, 
leaving no room for nuances and complexity.347 But there is not enough information in this 
judgment to say whether that is what happened in this particular case.  
10.5 When the two are applied in combination  
What happens, then, when the two approaches are applied in combination? There is only 
one judgment in this study where this was done in relation to mahr: Shahnaz v. Rizwan. 
The other English judgment, Qureshi v. Qureshi, is based on this one as to the 
interpretation of mahr and related rules, and can therefore not shed any light upon the 
application of the two approaches together in relation to mahr. Within the boundaries of the 
legal348 and cultural349 context of the judgment, the court makes a significant effort both in 
trying to understand the Indian laws in question and to promote gender justice. Within the 
boundaries of its context, this appears to be the undoubtedly most equitable judgment, 
which is the most correct in result if not in reasoning behind it. But due to the legal 
reasoning and the views on Muslim marriage it is based upon, the equity – and quality – of 
the case law derived from it remains questionable, as we saw in part III chapter 5.6. It is 
surprising that no further case law on the matter is published.   
                                                 
347 Razack (2008). See also Phillips (2007), esp. ch.3.  
348 I.e. Hyde v. Hyde and other case law at the time. 
349 I.e. the 1960ies when orientalism was still a major feature of the world view in Western Europe, see e.g. 
Said (2004).  
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 CONCLUSION 
What can we learn from these judgments? Since they are so few, one must be careful not to 
generalise too much from the discoveries,350 but they may give some indications of how 
the courts may proceed to promote gender equality when they apply Muslim laws. As we 
saw in chapter 8.2 in this part, there seems to be a direct connection between the use of 
comparative legal method and the correctness of the interpretation of the foreign law. The 
Swedish examples showed that narrow options as to the qualification of mahr may lead to 
incorrect interpretations of the Muslim laws concerned, but also that it may be a good 
solution to allow for different qualifications and interpretations of mahr depending on the 
type of mahr, the Muslim laws in question and the circumstances in each case. This 
solution also allows for a wider use of the comparative legal method and, since mahr may 
have such a variety of functions, it may provide more correct results in each case. But as 
we saw with the French judgments and Najm’s criticism of them, the religious aspect is 
vital for the full understanding of a Muslim marriage contract, and the comparative legal 
method with its focus on functionality does not take this into consideration.  
 
As to gender equality, we saw in chapter 9 that the courts seem more aware of their 
negative duties related to ordre public than of their positive duty to provide gender 
equality, and that gender equality most often is not an issue. It also seems that the most 
correct and equitable results are obtained when the courts use both a comparative approach 
                                                 
350 Pearl suggests that the lack of further case law on mahr from Britain may be “to some extent due to 
pressure being placed on Muslim wives, or ex-wives as the case may be, not to approach English courts for 
relief of this kind.” Pearl (1998) p.233. See also Schmied (1999), Foblets (1994) and Bano (2004). In 
Norwegian conflict of laws it’s the couple’s domicile that determines which laws govern the legal effects of 
the marriage. This probably limits the number of cases where Muslim laws concerning mahr should be 
applied, perhaps unless we see it as part of the wife’s property in terms of the Norwegian Marriage Act of 
1991 s66, but this needs further discussion. 
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 and tries actively to promote gender equality in a wide sense with a view to accommodate 
gender difference. This points to the potential of an equal worth standard which is sensitive 
to the social and cultural aspects of the laws in question, without going too far, and we saw 
in part I chapter 6.2.3 that the CEDAW committee’s views on mahr seems to have 
developed from a rather mechanical gender equality approach which rejected mahr, to an 
equal worth approach accepting mahr as important for women in Muslim countries. How 
this can be done in a European context requires further study, together with a number of 
other issues. First, more knowledge is needed concerning the relationship between talaq, 
mahr and other effects of Muslim marriage in relation to European human rights 
obligations and private international law; second, on the implementation of CEDAW in 
each state in relation to dealing with both strong and weak legal pluralism among minority 
groups, formally and substantially; third, on how to deal with the religious aspects of the 
norms in question, also in relation to human rights obligations in the intersection of 
freedom of religion and gender equality.    
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 ANNEX: THE JUDGMENTS 
 
 
INSTANS: Eidsivating lagmannsrett - Dom.  
DATO: 1988-05-27  
PUBLISERT: LE-1986-447  
STIKKORD: Ektefelleloven (1927) § 3 og tvistemålsloven § 366.  
SAMMENDRAG: Skilsmisse, underholdsbidrag.  
SAKSGANG: Dom av 27. mai 1988 i ankesak nr. 447/86, hl.nr. 686/86.  
PARTER: Ankende part: A (Prosessfullmektig: Advokat Helge Lochner, Oslo). Motpart: B 
(Prosessfullmektig: Advokat Kaj R. Bjørnstad, Oslo).  
FORFATTER: Lagdommer Einar M. Olsen, formann. Lagdommer Per Holm. Lagdommer Johannes 
Smit.  
 
       Den 11. juni 1986 avsa Oslo byrett dom med slik domsslutning:  
"1. B og A skilles.  
2. Saksomkostninger idømmes ikke."  
       "C" er feilskrift for A. I rettidig ankeerklæring anførte hennes advokat i Karachi blant annet at 
byrettsdommen ble avsagt uten hennes vitende og "at alle dokumenter som ble fremlagt i den ærede rett av 
hennes mann så vel som av advokat Helge Lochner i hennes navn er uekte, fingerte og falske, og hun vet 
ingenting om disse dokumenter i det hele tatt." Senere anførte advokaten at A først ble oppmerksom på 
ektefellens skilsmissehensikter da hun mottok et brev av 25. juni 1986 fra sin norske advokat.  
       Begge parter har hatt fri sakførsel for lagmannsretten. Ankeforhandling ble holdt 18. mai 1988. Retten 
hørte partsforklaring av B, samt forklaring av tre vitner som alle var nye for lagmannsretten. Det ble 
fremlagt en rekke nye dokumenter. Dokumentasjonen fremgår av rettsboken.  
       På vegne av A nedla advokat Helge Lochner slik påstand:  
"1. A frifinnes for såvel krav om skilsmisse som separasjon.  
2. B dømmes til å betale underholdsbidrag til A fra 1. juli 1986 med kr 1.500 pr. måned.  
3. B dømmes til å betale sakens omkostninger til det offentlige og til A."  
       På vegne av B nedla advokat Kaj R. Bjørnstad slik påstand:  
"1. Prinsipalt: Oslo byretts dom pkt. 1 stadfestes. Subsidiært: Partene separeres.  
2. Prinsipalt: Kravet om underholdsbidrag avvises. Subsidiært: B frifinnes for kravet om 
underholdsbidrag.  
3. A dømmes til å betale saksomkostninger for begge retter til det offentlige."  
       B opplyste i retten at han ikke husker om han giftet seg med A i 1960 eller i 1961. Hun har opplyst at 
det skjedde i 1960, og retten legger dette til grunn. Han er født *.*.1940, hun i 1943. Datteren D med 
 
 kjælenavnet E ble født *.*.1962. Hun er i live. En sønn døde for mange år siden. B har for lagmannsretten 
bestridt at han er far til barna. Den 15. mars 1983 giftet han seg i Karachi med kvinnen F som da var 27 år 
gammel. Med henne fikk han angivelig en sønn som døde i 1986.  
       B har bodd i Oslo siden 19. juni 1975. Fra 16. oktober 1985 fikk han attføringspenger fra Oslo 
trygdekontor. Han oppgir at han fra 1988 er fullt uføretrygdet og får utbetalt ca kr 5.000 pr. måned netto 
etter skatt. Fra og med april 1988 til og med juli 1988 får han kr 500 pr. måned i sosialstøtte. Hans hustru nr. 
2 kom til Oslo i oktober 1987. De lever nå sammen i hans leilighet som angivelig består av 1 rom samt 
kjøkken og bad. Husleien er kr 1.110 pr. måned. Hustru nr. 2 har ingen inntekt. Hun er syk og er dessuten 
gravid.  
       A bor angivelig i partenes tidligere felles bolig i Karachi sammen med datteren E. Hun har opparbeidet 
en større gjeld til sin bror som har underholdt henne og datteren fra juni 1986.  
       Den ankende part, A ved den oppnevnte prosessfullmektig advokat Helge Lochner, har i det vesentlige 
anført:  
       A har ikke vært gift med andre enn B. Det er han som er far til hennes barn. Etter at han reiste til Norge 
for å få bedre betalt arbeid, har han sendt penger til henne, men sluttet med det i midten av 1986. Hun krever 
derfor underholdsbidrag fra 1. juli 1986, jfr. ektefelleloven § 3 og ekteskapsloven § 56 nr. 2.  
       Det har ikke vært noe brudd mellom ektefellene. Hun har ikke samtykket i at han giftet seg for annen 
gang. Han har ikke betalt tilbake medgiften. Bs ekteskap nr. 2 er derfor ugyldig. B har ikke godtgjort at A 
ble gjort kjent med hans ekteskap nr. 2. Et slikt nytt ekteskap betyr ikke nødvendigvis noe brudd mellom de 
første ektefeller.  
       Spørsmålet om bidrag ble ikke reist for byretten fordi saksøkte ikke fikk vite om saksanlegget før etter 
at dommen var avsagt. Bidragskravet kunne da reises for lagmannsretten, jfr. tvistemålsloven § 366 annet 
ledd.  
       Vilkårene for bidrag foreligger, jfr. ekteskapsloven § 56 nr. 2, idet særlige grunner taler for bidrag. Det 
bør gjøres permanent, jfr. kvinnenes stilling i Pakistan. Hun har ikke noe å leve av. Det må tas hensyn til at 
hun har omsorgen for datteren. Det bestrides at datteren er forlovet eller ferdig utdannet.  
       Ankemotparten, B ved den oppnevnte prosessfullmektig, advokat Kaj R. Bjørnstad, har i det vesentlige 
anført:  
       Det ble brudd mellom ektefellene under mannens besøk i Karachi fra desember 1982 til våren 1983. Da 
ble det ekteskaplige samliv hevet. Partene ble enige om å gå fra hverandre, jfr. det fremlagte gavebrev av 12. 
januar 1983, og As samtykkeerklæring av samme dato.  
       Ved gavebrevet fikk A den faktiske disposisjon over en fast eiendom som gir henne leieinntekter ca 5 
000 Rupis pr. måned. Hun har ikke behov for bidrag. B har betalt tilbake medgiften som ikke var 50 000 
Rupis, men 5 000. Hennes utsikter til å forsørge seg selv er ikke blitt forringet. Det er ikke mulig for B å 
betale bidrag, jfr. ekteskapsloven § 56. Han er som nevnt uføretrygdet. Det er lenge siden samlivet opphørte. 
Han har ansvaret for ny ektefelle og venter barn. Ingen særlige grunner taler for å gi A underholdsbidrag.  
       Det brev byretten bygget på er ekte. Likeså samtykkeerklæringen og gavebrevet. A må ha bestemt seg 
for å prøve å få bidrag i ankeinnstansen til tross for at bidragsspørsmålet ikke ble reist for byretten. Endring 
etter tvistemålsloven § 366 annet ledd nr. 2 bør man være forsiktig med å tillate, særlig når det er adgang til 
å ta det nye kravet opp på annen måte og når det som her ikke foreligger noe grunnlag for kravet. Det bør 
avvises.  
       Lagmannsrettens bemerkninger:  
       Det er fremlagt en rekke dokumenter som viser at D (også kalt E) er Bs datter. Retten finner det bevist 
at så er tilfelle. Lagmannsretten kan ikke finne det bevist at den ankende part har samtykket i mannens nye 
ekteskap. Lagmannsretten kan heller ikke finne det bevist at B har betalt A hennes medgift. Han kan ikke 
 
 høres med at han allerede er skilt fra henne, slik som han overraskende hevdet under sin partsforklaring for 
lagmannsretten.  
       Retten tar ikke standpunkt til om Bs ekteskap med F er gyldig etter pakistansk rett. Retten tar heller ikke 
standpunkt til om det fremlagte gavebrev ("Gift Deed") er ekte og gyldig. Videre finner retten det 
unødvendig å ta standpunkt til om brevet av 30. juni 1986, som byretten bygget på, er et falsum. Retten 
bygger på Bs forklaring om at det i desember 1982 kom til brudd mellom ektefellene. De hadde i årevis 
levet langt fra hverandre, bortsett fra noen få besøk. Den 15. mars 1983 lot mannen seg vie til F. Retten ser 
dette som en bekreftelse på at bruddet var endelig. Det medførte hevning av samlivet mellom dem uten at 
det skjedde på lovformelig måte. Samlivet har senere ikke vært gjenopptatt. Den omstendighet at B av og til 
sendte penger også i tiden 1983 til 1986, representerte ikke en gjenopptakelse av samlivet. Lagmannsretten 
finner at betingelsene for å gi skilsmisse foreligger, jfr. ekteskapsloven § 43 annet ledd.  
       Anførslene i ankeerklæringen gjør det sannsynlig at den ankende part først var blitt kjent med 
saksanlegget etter hovedforhandlingen i byretten. Kravet om underholdsbidrag står i sammenheng med 
skilsmissekravet. Lagmannsretten finner at andre prosessregler ikke er til hinder og godtar den endring i 
sakens gjenstand som bestod i at bidragsspørsmålet ble inndratt, jfr. tvistemålsloven § 366 annet ledd nr. 2. 
Ankemotpartens avvisningspåstand tas således ikke til følge.  
       Under tvil er retten kommet til at bidragskravet ikke kan tas til følge. Retten legger til grunn Bs 
opplysning om at han ikke har andre inntekter enn sin uføretrygd. Retten bygger videre på at A oppebærer 
leieinntekter av den i gavebrevet omtalte faste eiendom med ca 2 000 Rupis pr. måned. Beløpet er 
skjønnsmessig ansatt og baserer seg på opplysning fra B om at leieinntekten var 1 500 Rupis pr. måned, 
hvilket han under ankeforhandlingen påsto skyldtes en misforståelse slik at beløpet angivelig var 5 000 
Rupis pr. måned. Retten har ikke fullt ut festet lit til noen av disse utsagn. Den nevnte tvil knytter seg til 
dette og til den omstendighet at en fraskilt kvinnes muligheter for selv å kunne skaffe seg inntekter er 
opplyst å være dårlige i Karachi. Retten har ikke lagt noen vekt på anførselen om at A angivelig har 
økonomisk omsorgsansvar for sin voksne datter.  
       Etter omstendighetene tilkjennes ikke saksomkostninger.  
       Dommen er enstemmig.  
Domsslutning:  
1. Byrettens dom stadfestes.  
2. Wali Mohammad frifinnes for Amina Begums krav om underholdsbidrag.  
3. Saksomkostninger tilkjennes ikke. 
 
 






  
 
Hovrätten över  Skåne och Blekinge  RH 1993:116
        
Målnummer: T137-92 Avdelning:       
Avgörandedatum: 1993-03-04 
Rubrik: Internationella rättsförhållanden. Mål om 
underhållsbidrag till make har prövats enligt 
lagen i det land där den underhållsberättigade har 
hemvist. Ett yrkande om betalning av mohar 
(morgongåva) enligt islamisk rätt har prövats 
utan hinder av att detta utgjort ett s.k. 
typfrämmande rättsinstitut och bifallits utan 
hinder av reglerna om ordre public. 
Lagrum:       
Rättsfall: NJA 1986 s. 615 
        
        
REFERAT       
F.S. var redan före äktenskapets ingående bosatt i Sverige. Han 
återvände därför hit relativt kort tid efter äktenskapets ingående. N.S., 
som behövde uppehållstillstånd, kom till Sverige först den 29 mars 
1989. Parterna bodde tillsammans i Sverige i omkring fem månader. 
Därefter återvände N.S. till sin hemby i Israel. 
F.S. väckte den 26 oktober 1988 talan mot N.S. och yrkade att 
tingsrätten skulle döma till äktenskapsskillnad mellan parterna. N.S. 
bestred yrkandet och invände samtidigt att svensk domstol inte var 
behörig att handlägga äktenskapsmålet. Invändningen lämnades utan 
bifall av såväl tingsrätt som hovrätt. 
Sedan betänketid löpt framställde F.S. på nytt yrkande om att 
tingsrätten skulle döma till äktenskapsskillnad. N.S. medgav yrkandet 
och yrkade för egen del att tingsrätten skulle förplikta F.S. att betala 
underhållsbidrag till henne med 350 NIS, eller motsvarande belopp i 
svensk valuta, i månaden för tiden fr.o.m. den 2 oktober 1988 till tre 
månader efter det att domen på äktenskapsskillnaden vunnit laga kraft. 
Hon yrkade vidare att tingsrätten skulle förplikta F.S. att till henne 
betala 11250 NIS, eller motsvarande belopp i svensk valuta, 
utgörande kvarstående ej utbetald mohar. F.S. bestred yrkandena. 
N.S. gjorde gällande att hennes yrkanden skulle bedömas enligt den 
för muslimer bosatta i Israel tillämpliga lagen. F.S. gjorde å sin sida 
gällande att målet i sin helhet skulle bedömas enligt svensk rätt. Han 
 
 gjorde vidare gällande att yrkandet om mohar inte lagligen kunde 
bifallas eftersom det är ett för svensk rätt främmande rättsinstitut samt 
att det under alla förhållanden skulle strida mot svensk ordre public att 
bifalla yrkandet. 
Malmö tingsrätt (1992-02-10, hovrättsfiskalen Stefan Reimer) dömde 
till äktenskapsskillnad mellan parterna samt förpliktade F.S. att till 
N.S. betala mohar (morgongåva) med 11250 NIS, eller på 
betalningsdagen motsvarande svensk valuta. Däremot ogillades N.S. 
yrkande om underhållsbidrag. 
Tingsrätten konstaterade inledningsvis att F.S. varit bosatt i Sverige i 
mer än ett år och att svensk domsrätt därför förelåg samt att yrkandet 
om äktenskapsskillnad enligt 3 kap. 4 § första stycket lagen (1904:26) 
om vissa internationella rättsförhållanden rörande äktenskap och 
förmynderskap (IÄL) skulle prövas enligt svensk lag. Eftersom 
betänketid löpt hade parterna rätt till äktenskapsskillnad. Tingsrätten 
övergick därefter till att pröva yrkandet om underhållsbidrag och 
anförde bl.a. följande. 
Till en början kan fastställas att det inte föreligger något hinder mot 
att i äktenskapsmålet pröva frågor som rör makarnas ömsesidiga 
rättsförhållanden. Detta följer visserligen inte direkt av IÄL, men i 
förarbetena till de ändringar som företogs i 3 kap. 6 § IÄL 1973 
uttalades bl. a. följande. 
"Utan särskilt stadgande torde det vara klart att domstol i 
äktenskapsmål även skall kunna ta upp frågor beträffande 
äktenskapets rättsverkningar, t. ex. om makarnas inbördes 
underhållsskyldighet och bodelning. Frågan vilken lag som domstolen 
därvid skall tillämpa får avgöras enligt de regler som i allmänhet 
gäller på området." (se Prop. 1973:158 s. 109) 
Frågor om underhåll mellan makar anses vara en av äktenskapets 
rättsverkningar i personligt hänseende. Tidigare gällde här att 
makarnas lex patriae skulle vara bestämmande för vilket lands lag 
som skulle tillämpas. Emellertid fann Högsta domstolen i rättsfallet 
NJA 1986 s. 615 att domicilprincipen bör vara bestämmande för 
lagvalet. I det aktuella fallet tillämpades italiensk rätt. Parterna hade 
såväl skilda medborgarskap som hemvist i olika länder. HD fann att 
då det rörde sig om den inte ovanliga situationen att den ene av de 
förutvarande makarna, i regel mannen, brutit upp och fått hemvist i ett 
nytt land, och skilt sig där, medan den andre bor kvar i det gamla 
hemlandet, talade det förhållandet att makarna under äktenskapet haft 
hemvist i ett land där en av dem alltjämt bor för att det landets lag 
 
 skulle tillämpas i underhållsfrågan. Denna lösning skulle enligt HD 
oftast leda till att underhållsfrågan bedömdes enligt lagen i det land 
där den som begär underhåll, vanligen hustrun, har sin hemvist, vilket 
befanns önskvärt eftersom det skulle öka förutsättningarna för att 
underhållsfrågan skulle kunna bedömas med hänsyn tagen till 
värderingar, levnadsförhållanden och sociala förmåner i det landet (se 
NJA 1986 s. 615, s. 619 y-n). 
I det förevarande målet är båda parter israeliska medborgare men har 
hemvist i skilda stater. De levde tillsammans endast någon månad i 
Israel efter äktenskapets ingående, varefter F.S. återvände till Sverige 
var han redan tidigare hade sitt hemvist. N.S. följde efter så snart 
hennes uppehållstillstånd var beviljat. Parterna levde dock 
tillsammans i Sverige endast under en kortare tidsperiod om omkring 
fem månader. N.S. återvände därefter till sin hemby i Israel var hon 
alltjämt bor. 
I denna situation, som skiljer sig från den i NJA 1986 s. 615, talar 
enligt tingsrätten övervägande skäl för att tillämpa lagen i det land där 
den som begär underhåll har sin hemvist, särskilt som de svenska 
sociala förhållandena måste te sig helt främmande för N.S. F.S. är å 
andra sidan fortfarande israelisk medborgare och har, vilket framgått 
av utredningen, alltjämt släktingar kvar i Israel; däribland sin fader. 
Äktenskapet ingicks i Israel enligt muslimsk rättstradition. Vid en 
samlad bedömning föreligger därför i förevarande mål starkare 
anknytning till Israel än till Sverige. 
En bestämmelse av den innebörden att den underhållsberättigades 
hemvist skulle vara bestämmande för lagvalsfrågan har även 
föreslagits av familjelagssakkunniga i deras slutbetänkande. 
Betänkandets förslag i dessa delar har emellertid ännu inte lett till 
någon lagstiftning (jfr. SOU 1987:18 s. 102-104 och 233). 
För muslimer bosatta i Israel har de religiösa Sharia-domstolarna 
exklusiv jurisdiktion vad gäller frågor rörande personalstatutet (se art. 
52 Palestine Order in Council (1922-1947) jfr. med Law of Procedure 
of the Moslem Religious Courts (25 oktober, 1917). Den gällande 
muslimska rätten som tillämpas av Sharia-domstolarna inom detta 
rättsområde utgörs av 1917 års osmanska familjerättslag (1333 enligt 
osmansk tideräkning). Shariá, den muslimska i sig oföränderliga 
rätten, har sitt ursprung i Koranen. Den osmanska familjerättslagen 
kan sägas vara en kodifiering av delar av den i Koranen 
förekommande familjerätten baserat på ett selektivt urval av de 
tolkningar av denna som olika lagskolor kommit fram till genom 
århundradena (Johnson, Bo; Islamisk rätt, Stockholm 1975 s. 64 ö och 
 
 Bergmann/Ferid; Internationales Ehe- und Kindschaftsrecht, 1972 
"Das Islamische Eherecht" s. 3 x-m. Se även allmänt om den 
muslimska rättens utveckling, Nordberg, Michael; Profetens folk, 
Kristianstad 1988, s. 87-111). 
Tingsrätten fann att det av bestämmelserna i familjerättslagen följde 
att ömsesidiga rättigheter och förpliktelser på grund av äktenskapet 
upphörde vid äktenskapsskillnad, med verkan även för förfluten tid. 
Yrkandet om underhållsbidrag skulle därför ogillas. 
Ifråga om N.S:s yrkande om mohar (morgongåva) gjorde tingsrätten 
följande överväganden. 
Morgongåvan, vars storlek oftast fastställs i äktenskapskontraktet, 
fungerar för kvinnan som säkerhet för äktenskapets bestånd, eftersom 
mannen vid äktenskapsskillnad omedelbart måste uppfylla sin 
betalningsförpliktelse (se 83 § familjerättslagen jfr. Koranen 2:229, 
242). Vid en eventuell äktenskapsskillnad kommer morgongåvan 
istället att fungera som hustruns underhåll och hennes finansiella 
skydd, eftersom något underhållsbidrag i enlighet med vad som ovan 
anförts inte kan utdömas (Johnson aa s. 51 y och Bergmann/Ferid aa s. 
11 f). 
Den första fråga som måste avgöras är om en svensk domstol 
överhuvudtaget kan pröva ett yrkande om utfående av morgongåva. 
Vad gäller behandlingen av s. k. typfrämmande rättsinstitut finns det 
olika meningar inom doktrinen. Enligt den numera förhärskande 
meningen finns det inget som hindrar att svensk domstol vid sin 
tillämpning av utländsk materiell rätt använder sig av sådana; dock 
under förutsättning att det inte strider mot svensk ordre public (jfr. 
Bogdan, Michael; Svensk Internationell privat- och processrätt, 2 
uppl. 1984 s. 82). 
Ett utdömande av morgongåva kan i det förevarande fallet inte anses 
uppenbart strida mot grunderna för den svenska rättsordningen. Något 
hinder med hänsyn till ordre public kan därför inte anses föreligga (jfr. 
Bogdan aa s. 66 x och prop. 1973:158 s. 123 y, varav framgår att det 
är den utländska regelns tillämpning i det enskilda fallet som skall tas 
i beaktande). 
Det förtjänar även att nämnas att morgongåva som institut har 
förekommit i svensk rätt, dock att det här sedermera ersattes av 
reglerna om giftorätt och därför hade en delvis annan funktion. 
 
 För att det skall komma i fråga att pröva yrkandet om utfående av 
morgongåva materiellt krävs emellertid därtill att den muslimska 
rätten utgör lex causae (den för saken tillämpliga lagen). Vilken 
svensk internationellt privaträttslig kollisionsregel som skall tillämpas 
på lagvalsfrågan är osäkert. 
Enligt tingsrättens mening talar dock det förhållandet att morgongåva 
enligt muslimsk rätt, åtminstone i praktiken, ses som en av de 
personliga rättsverkningarna på grund av äktenskapet för att samma 
lagvalsregel som beträffande underhållsfrågan skall analogt tillämpas. 
På grund av det anförda skall muslimsk rätt tillämpas även i denna 
fråga. Tingsrätten fann därefter att yrkandet skulle bifallas. 
Båda parter överklagade tingsrättens dom. N.S. yrkade, efter en 
mindre justering, att hovrätten skulle bifalla hennes yrkande om 
underhållsbidrag. F.S. yrkade att hovrätten skulle ogilla N.S:s yrkande 
om betalning av kvarstående mohar (morgongåva). Parterna bestred 
varandras yrkanden. 
Hovrätten över Skåne och Blekinge (1993-03-04, hovrättslagmannen 
Lars-Göran Engström, hovrättsrådet Lars Elmqvist samt t.f. 
hovrättsassessorn Nils Petter Ekdahl, referent) fastställde tingsrättens 
domslut och anförde: 
Som tingsrätten funnit, är svensk domstol behörig att ta upp frågor om 
underhåll och om utgivande av mohar i samband med talan om 
äktenskapsskillnad. 
Högsta domstolen fann i rättsfallet NJA 1986 s. 615, med frångående 
av den tidigare förhärskande nationalitetsprincipen, att svensk domstol 
vid prövning av fråga om makars inbördes underhållsskyldighet skall 
tillämpa lagen i den stat där makarna senast haft gemensamt hemvist. 
Högsta domstolen anförde som skäl för sitt ställningstagande bl.a. 
följande: "Denna lösning lär oftast leda till att underhållsfrågan prövas 
enligt lagen i det land där den som begär underhållsbidrag, vanligen 
hustrun, har sitt hemvist. Därmed ökar också förutsättningarna för att 
frågan skall kunna bedömas med hänsyn tagen till värderingar, 
levnadsförhållanden och sociala förmåner i det landet, något som i 
och för sig är önskvärt." 
Eftersom makarna S. senast haft gemensamt hemvist i Sverige skulle 
en tillämpning av den av Högsta domstolen fastslagna principen 
innebära att yrkandet om underhållsbidrag skall prövas enligt svensk 
lag. Hovrätten anser emellertid att det finns övervägande skäl att i 
 
 fråga om underhållsbidrag till make i stället tillämpa lagen i det land 
där den underhållsberättigade maken har hemvist. En sådan regel har 
den fördelen att underhållsfrågan i princip alltid bedöms med hänsyn 
tagen till värderingar, levnadsförhållanden och sociala förmåner i det 
landet. Regeln är också lättillämpad och den kan utan olägenhet 
användas även i det fallet då inte någon av makarna längre bor kvar i 
det land där de senast haft gemensamt hemvist (se även SOU 1987:18 
och Pålsson i SvJT 1992 s. 487). 
Av hovrättens ställningstagande följer att israelisk lag skall tillämpas 
på underhållsfrågan. Med hänsyn till vad som framkommit om 
institutet mohar bör samma lagval göras i denna fråga. 
Den omständigheten att mohar är ett s.k. typfrämmande rättsinstitut 
bör inte hindra svensk domstol att tillämpa institutet. 
Den för muslimer bosatta i Israel tillämpliga lagen är 1917 års 
Ottoman Family Law. På de av tingsrätten angivna skälen finner 
hovrätten att N.S:s yrkande om underhållsbidrag inte kan vinna bifall. 
Lika med tingsrätten finner hovrätten vidare att F.S. enligt den 
angivna lagen är skyldig att utge yrkad mohar till N.S. samt att det 
inte kan anses strida mot svensk ordre public att bifalla yrkandet 
härom. 
Till följd av det nu anförda skall tingsrättens domslut fastställas. 
Målnummer T 137/92 
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Hovrätten för Västra Sverige RH 2005:66
        
Målnummer: T4594-02 Avdelning: 6 
Avgörandedatum: 2004-11-22 
Rubrik: Svensk domstols behörighet, tillämplig lag m.m. i fråga 
om äktenskapskontrakt avseende brudpenning (mahr) 
enligt iransk rätt. 
Lagrum: 2 § första stycket 1 och 2, 4 § första stycket, 5 § och 14 
§ lagen (1990:272) om vissa internationella frågor 
rörande makars förmögenhetsförhållanden 
Rättsfall: •  NJA 1973 s. 57 
•  RH 1993:116 
        
        
REFERAT       
M.T.M och M.A. är båda födda i Iran. M.A. kom till Sverige år 1986 och 
blev svensk medborgare i april 1992. Han har inte besökt Iran sedan han 
kom till Sverige. M.T.M. är medborgare i Iran. Den 17 juli 1998 ingick de 
äktenskap i Iran inför vigselförrättare, den iranske prästen M.H.N.S. Denne 
var verksam som notarius publicus i Karaj, en ort utanför Teheran. M.T.M. 
var närvarande personligen. M.A. företräddes av ombud, i enlighet med 
artikel 1071 och artikel 1063 i den iranska civillagen. Hans ombud var 
M.T.M:s mor. Enligt det äktenskapskontrakt som upprättades skall M.A. på 
M.T.M:s begäran utge mahr (bröllopsgåva/brudpenning) i form av bland 
annat 500 Bahar Azadi guldmynt på de villkor som anges i 
äktenskapskontraktet. Parterna är ense om att 500 Bahar Azadi guldmynt 
motsvarar 250 000 svenska kronor. 
Under cirka tio dagar i augusti 1998 vistades parterna tillsammans på 
Cypern. Efter vistelsen på Cypern återvände M.A. till Sverige och M.T.M. 
till Iran. 
Den 3 december 1998 beviljades M.T.M. ett tidsbegränsat uppehållstillstånd 
i Sverige. Tillståndet gällde t.o.m. den 3 juni 1999 och förnyades inte. 
Den 17 februari 1999 kom M.T.M. med flyg till Sverige och bosatte sig hos 
M.A:s syster i Stockholm. Den 20 februari 1999 besökte M.A. henne i 
Stockholm och förklarade att han ville skiljas. 
Den 14 maj 1999 väckte M.T.M. talan mot M.A. om äktenskapsskillnad. 
Hon yrkade också att M.A. skulle förpliktas att till henne betala 250 000 kr i 
 
 mahr i enlighet med parternas äktenskapskontrakt. M.A. medgav yrkandet 
om äktenskapsskillnad men bestred betalningskravet. 
Halmstads tingsrätt meddelade den 13 augusti 1999 deldom på 
äktenskapsskillnad. 
M.T.M. åberopade som grund för yrkandet om betalning att M.A. var 
bunden av ett avtal som hennes mor med stöd av fullmakt slutit för hans 
räkning. Till närmare utveckling av detta anförde hon följande. M.A. 
företräddes vid vigseln av M.T.M:s mor med stöd av en fullmakt som M.A. 
utfärdat. Fullmakten innehåller inte några begränsningar i ombudets 
möjligheter att ingå de avtal som normalt förekommer vid äktenskap. 
Upprättande av ett äktenskapskontrakt är enligt iransk rätt ett krav för giltigt 
äktenskap. Mahr, som också är ett obligatoriskt rekvisit för ett giltigt 
äktenskap, skall enligt artikel 1079 i den iranska civillagen anges i 
äktenskapskontraktet. Mahrs storlek avgörs efter förhandlingar mellan 
parterna (artikel 1080 i den iranska civillagen). I förevarande fall kom 
parterna överens om att bland annat 500 Bahar Azadi guldmynt skulle ingå i 
mahr. Enligt artikel 1082 i den iranska civillagen blir hustrun ägare till mahr 
genast efter vigseln och kan därefter fritt disponera över den. - En kort tid 
efter det att M.T.M. anlänt till Sverige sade M.A. till henne att han inte 
längre ville veta av henne. 
M.A. bestred att han var bunden av ett avtal och anförde följande. Han 
underrättades av sin mor i Iran att hon kände till en kvinna, M.T.M., som 
kunde tänkas lämplig för giftermål. Vissa kontakter förekom mellan M.A. 
och M.T.M. Vid det tillfället var M.T.M. arbetslös och bodde hos sina 
föräldrar. M.A. talade med M.T.M:s far, A.T., om utgivande av shir baha 
(direkt översatt till svenska mjölkpengar). - Enligt upplysningar om 
innehållet i iransk familjerätt som inhämtats från Sveriges ambassad i 
Teheran, är institutet shir baha inte lagreglerat utan är en lokal sedvänja i 
vissa delar av Iran, numera sällsynt men möjligen tillämplig i landsorten. 
Shir baha betalas till brudens mor och är avsett för inköp av möbler till det 
blivande gemensamma hushållet. I Iran är man mycket noga med att 
överenskommelsen om shir baha registreras hos notarius publicus. - Till en 
början begärde A.T. en summa motsvarande 500 000 svenska kronor. Det 
var ett belopp som M.A. omöjligen kunde betala. De kom slutligen överens 
om halva det ursprungligen begärda beloppet och ytterligare 15 000 kr för 
att bekosta M.T.M:s resa till Sverige. M.A. överlät sin bostadsrättslägenhet 
till sin svåger D.R. för 180 000 kr enligt ett avtal undertecknat den 29 
januari 1998 och tog banklån på resten. Han fullgjorde sin 
betalningsskyldighet för shir baha genom fem delbetalningar om vardera 50 
000 kr under juni månad 1998. Pengarna förmedlades av D.R. som via 
penningmäklare förde över pengarna från Sverige till Iran där D.R:s bror 
betalade dessa vidare till A.T. Det var aldrig tal om någon ytterligare 
 
 betalning utöver de 250 000 kr som på ovan beskrivet sätt betalades till 
A.T.; mahr diskuterades överhuvudtaget inte. M.A. kände för övrigt inte till 
mahr och vet därför inte om mahr är en obligatorisk del i 
äktenskapskontraktet. - M.A. var personligen på Irans ambassad i 
Stockholm och införskaffade en fullmakt som han undertecknade och sände 
till M.T.M:s mor. Dagen för giftermålet, den 17 juli 1998, befann sig M.A. i 
Halmstad. Senare på kvällen ringde M.T.M:s mor och berättade att 
äktenskapet var klart. Inte heller vid det tillfället talades det om mahr. Han 
och M.T.M. bestämde att de skulle träffas på Cypern. M.A. bekostade 
M.T.M:s resa till Cypern, uppehället där och de gåvor hon införskaffade för 
att ge till familjen i Iran; sammanlagt betalade han 68 000 kr i samband med 
Cypernvistelsen. De kom överens om att hon skulle komma till Sverige så 
snart hon hade fått utresetillstånd från Iran och uppehållstillstånd i Sverige. I 
november 1998 beviljades hon samtliga tillstånd. Hennes avresa från Iran 
drog emellertid ut på tiden och när han frågade varför fick han endast 
undanflykter till svar. Han bad sin mor göra vissa efterforskningar och hon 
kunde mycket snart meddela att M.T.M hade ett förhållande med en annan 
man i Iran. M.A. bestämde sig då för att upplösa äktenskapet. Han 
införskaffade en ny fullmakt, denna gång avseende skilsmässa, som han 
sände till M.T.M:s mor. Fullmakten är daterad den 15 januari 1999, sålunda 
en månad innan M.T.M. kom till Sverige. M.T.M fick bo hos M.A:s syster. 
Efter någon dag besökte M.A. henne på den adressen och berättade att han 
inte längre önskade vara gift med henne. M.T.M. har enbart utnyttjat honom 
för att komma in i Sverige. - Enligt 4 § lagen (1990:272) om vissa 
internationella frågor rörande makars förmögenhetsförhållanden (nedan 
förkortad LIMF) skall lagen i det land makarna efter giftermålet tog hemvist 
tillämpas. Efter giftermålet tog de hemvist i Sverige. Dessutom befinner sig 
M.T.M. i Sverige och hennes avsikt är att stanna här. Svensk lag skall därför 
tillämpas. - M.A. godtar i och för sig att svensk domstol är behörig att pröva 
frågan om mahr men vid denna prövning skall svensk lag tillämpas, bl.a. 
den svenska avtalslagens regler om fullmakt. - Giftermålet har ingåtts 
genom ombud. Fullmakten för ombudet har endast innefattat behörighet att 
sköta de myndighetskontakter som måste ske i samband med ett giftermål. 
Fullmakten har inte innefattat behörighet att sluta avtal om mahr. Om 
tingsrätten kommer fram till att fullmakten innefattat behörighet att sluta 
avtal om mahr invänder M.A. att ombudet likväl inte haft befogenhet att 
sluta avtal om mahr samt att M.T.M. insåg eller i vart fall borde ha insett 
befogenhetsöverskridandet. - Om tingsrätten skulle finna att han är bunden 
av äktenskapskontraktet invände han att han fullgjort betalning genom de 
fem betalningarna om vardera 50 000 kr till A.T. för shir baha. 
M.T.M. invände följande. M.A. har inte tidigare sagt att svensk lag skulle 
vara tillämplig. Hon har därför utgått från att parterna var överens i 
lagvalsfrågan. Det får anses vara avtalat mellan parterna att iransk lag skall 
tillämpas. - Varken hon eller hennes far A.T. har mottagit några pengar av 
 
 M.A., vare sig i form av mahr eller shir baha. 
M.T.M. åberopade som skriftlig bevisning äktenskapskontraktet och 
fullmakten för M.T.M:s mor (i översättning från farsi). M.A. åberopade som 
skriftlig bevisning fullmakten och sex kvitton på betalning om sammanlagt 
265 000 kr samt avtalet om överlåtelse av bostadsrätten till D.R. 
Som muntlig bevisning åberopade M.T.M. förhör under sanningsförsäkran 
med sig själv samt vittnesförhör med sin far A.T. och prästen M.H.N.S. 
M.A. åberopade förhör under sanningsförsäkran med sig själv samt 
vittnesförhör med sin svåger D.R. och S.I. 
A.T. och M.H.N.S. kunde inte lämna Iran för att komma till 
huvudförhandlingen. Tingsrätten tillät därför att de hördes per telefon. 
M.T.M. var inte personligen närvarande vid huvudförhandlingen. Hon 
uppgav att hon fruktade att polisen skulle gripa henne om hon kom till 
tingsrätten. En huvudförhandling skulle därmed inte ha kunnat komma till 
stånd och hon skulle inte ha fått sin sak prövad. Tingsrätten tillät att hon 
hördes per telefon. 
Halmstads tingsrätt (2002-10-24, rådmannen Bengt Erdmann) förpliktade 
M.A. att till M.T.M. betala 250 000 kr. 
I domskälen anförde tingsrätten följande. 
Äktenskapet mellan M.A. och M.T.M. ingicks i Iran i enlighet med 
muslimsk sed och iranska rättsregler. M.T.M. är iransk medborgare. M.A. är 
både iransk och svensk medborgare. Enligt parternas äktenskapskontrakt 
skall M.A. utge mahr till M.T.M. enligt de regler som gäller i den iranska 
civillagen. 
Genom UD:s försorg har tingsrätt och parter haft tillgång till den iranska 
civillagen i tysk version, Bergmann-Ferid, Internationales Ehe- und 
Kindschaftsgerecht, Frankfurt 1987, VII. Buch: Die Eheschliessung und die 
Ehescheidung artikel 1034 - artikel 1157. 
Mahr saknar motsvarighet i den svenska rättsordningen. Att mahr är ett 
typfrämmande rättsinstitut har i praxis inte ansetts utgöra ett hinder för 
svensk domstol att tillämpa det och ett utdömande av mahr har i visst fall 
inte ansetts strida mot svensk ordre public (se RH 1993:116). M.A. har 
godtagit att svensk domstol prövar M.T.M:s talan. 
M.A. har, med hänvisning till LIMF ansett att svensk lag - och därmed den 
svenska avtalslagens regler om fullmakt - skall tillämpas på frågan om 
 
 utdömande av mahr, eftersom parterna tog hemvist i Sverige efter 
giftermålet. 
M.T.M. har anfört att det får anses vara avtalat mellan parterna att iransk lag 
skall gälla. 
Av 1 § LIMF framgår att lagen skall tillämpas på frågor om makars 
förmögenhetsförhållanden som har anknytning till en främmande stat. 
Begreppet makars förmögenhetsförhållanden definieras inte. I motiven till 
lagen har angetts bl.a. följande. Gränsdragningsproblem kan uppstå när en 
make i samband med skilsmässa skall utge ett engångsbelopp till den andra 
maken enligt bestämmelser i någon utländsk lag. Tvekan kan råda om 
beloppet skall anses som ett engångsunderhåll och följa de internationella 
reglerna om underhåll eller om det avser en sådan utjämning av makarnas 
förmögenhetsförhållanden som skall följa bestämmelserna i LIMF. Oavsett 
vilken beteckning ett engångsbelopp har, bör bedömningen av om det i det 
enskilda fallet ligger inom ramen för det som utgör makars 
förmögenhetsförhållanden göras med ledning av syftet med utbetalningen 
och  omständigheterna under vilka den görs. Det typiska för underhållet är 
att det syftar till att tillgodose mottagarens löpande försörjning genom att 
ersätta eller komplettera en inkomst. En ersättning som hänför sig till 
makarnas förmögenhetsförhållanden syftar däremot i princip till att 
åstadkomma en utjämning mellan makarna enligt grunder där 
försörjningsaspekten typiskt sett är av underordnad betydelse. Den närmare 
gränsdragningen i enskilda fall har överlämnats åt rättstillämpningen. (Prop. 
1989/90:87 s. 35.) 
Enligt artikel 1082 i den iranska civillagen blir mahr kvinnans egendom 
omedelbart efter genomförd äktenskapsceremoni och hon är då berättigad 
att disponera fritt över mahr. Tingsrätten finner med hänsyn till det 
framförda att mahr inte kan jämställas med underhållsbidrag, utan skall 
anses vara en sådan utjämning av makars förmögenhetsförhållanden som 
faller under LIMF:s tillämpningsområde. 
Målet inleddes som ett äktenskapsmål och svensk domsrätt förelåg i 
enlighet med 3 kap. 2 § 4 lagen (1904:26 s. 1) om vissa internationella 
rättsförhållanden rörande äktenskap och förmynderskap, eftersom M.A. har 
hemvist i Sverige. Svensk domsrätt i fråga om utdömande av mahr 
föreligger genom att målet har uppkommit i samband med ett 
äktenskapsmål i Sverige och också genom att M.A. har hemvist i riket, se 2 
§ 1 st. 1 och 2 LIMF. 
Tillämplig lag är enligt 4 § 1 st. LIMF, om makarna inte avtalat annat, lagen 
i det land där de tog hemvist när de gifte sig. 
 
 Av utredningen framgår inte att parterna före eller i samband med 
vigselakten berört frågan om vilket lands lag som skall gälla för deras 
egendomsförhållanden. Med hänsyn till M.A:s inställning i lagvalsfrågan 
kan M.T.M. inte anses ha visat att parterna avtalat om tillämplig lag. 
Tingsrätten har därför att pröva vilket lands lag som skall gälla i målet. (Se 
Michael Bogdan, Svensk internationell privat- och processrätt, femte 
upplagan, Stockholm 1999, s. 43 f; jfr NJA 1973 s. 57). 
Tingsrätten behandlar härefter frågan om M.A. och M.T.M. tog hemvist i 
Sverige när de gifte sig. 
Hemvistbegreppet definieras i 14 § LIMF, vari framgår att den som är bosatt 
i viss stat skall anses ha hemvist där, om bosättningen med hänsyn till 
vistelsens varaktighet och omständigheterna i övrigt får anses stadigvarande. 
Det har framgått att M.T.M. kom till Sverige den 17 februari 1999 och att 
hennes tidsbegränsade uppehållstillstånd som gällde mellan den 3 december 
1998 och den 3 juni 1999 inte har förnyats. Hon har således vistats illegalt i 
Sverige sedan dess. För närvarande föreligger även ett beslut om att M.T.M. 
skall utvisas ur landet. Under förevarande förhållanden finner tingsrätten 
inte att M.T.M:s vistelse i Sverige kan anses stadigvarande. Då makarna 
sålunda aldrig under äktenskapet haft hemvist i samma stat, kan 
lagvalsregeln i 4 § 1 st. LIMF inte tillämpas. Tillämplig lag får därför 
bestämmas med hänsyn till vilken stat makarna har starkast anknytning till. 
(Se prop. 1989/90:87 s. 43 f.) 
M.T.M. är iransk medborgare och äktenskapet ingicks i Iran enligt de seder 
och rättsregler som gäller i Iran. Hennes föräldrar och övrig släkt bor i Iran. 
Hon har alltid bott i Iran och hon har ingen anknytning till Sverige genom 
någon anhörig. Hon har nåtts av beslutet att hon skall utvisas från Sverige. 
M.A., som är både svensk och iransk medborgare, har enligt egen uppgift 
sina föräldrar och övrig släkt i Iran. Vid en samlad bedömning kommer 
tingsrätten fram till att starkast anknytning föreligger till Iran; därmed skall 
iransk rätt tillämpas på frågan om mahr. 
Enligt iransk rätt är det tillåtet att ingå giftermål genom ombud, se artikel 
1071 i den iranska civillagen. I målet är ostridigt att M.A. har upprättat en 
fullmakt för M.T.M:s mor att företräda honom vid äktenskapets ingående 
och att hon för hans räkning träffat avtal med M.T.M. om mahr. Enligt 
äktenskapskontraktet är M.A. skyldig att utge mahr, innefattande bland 
annat ett belopp motsvarande 250 000 kr, till M.T.M. vid anfordran. 
Det är ostridigt i målet att M.A. och M.T.M:s far, A.T., avtalat att M.A. 
skulle betala motsvarande 250 000 kr i anledning av giftermålet. M.A. har 
uppgett att han erlagt beloppet i form av shir baha till A.T. och att frågan om 
 
 mahr aldrig varit på tal mellan dem. M.T.M. har invänt att avtalet gällt mahr 
och att mahr därför angetts till 250 000 kr i äktenskapskontraktet. 
M.T.M. åberopade att M.A. är bunden av avtalet eftersom M.T.M:s mor 
med stöd av en giltig fullmakt har accepterat avtalet för hans räkning. 
Vad avser bundenhet vid avtalet på grund av fullmakt gör tingsrätten 
följande överväganden. 
Numera anses allmänt att ett ombuds möjligheter att binda fullmaktsgivaren 
skall bedömas enligt lagen i det land där ombudet handlat. (Se Michael 
Bogdan, a.a. s. 264 med hänvisningar.) Då fullmakten för M.T.M:s mor 
avsett ett institut som inte förekommer i svensk rätt och då syftet med 
fullmakten varit att giftermålet skulle kunna ingås i Iran enligt iranska 
rättsregler och seder finner tingsrätten inte anledning att göra en annan 
bedömning; iransk rätt skall således tillämpas på invändningarna om 
bristande behörighet respektive befogenhet. 
Fullmakten för M.T.M:s mor har följande lydelse (i svensk översättning) 
såvitt nu är av intresse. "Saken om fullmakt och ombudens befogenheter: 
För äktenskapsmål, kontakt med berörda myndigheter samt kontakt med 
notarius publicus för registrering av äktenskapsmål mellan mig och fru 
M.T.M. - - - Ombuden har rätt att i sin tur ha ställföreträdare." Av förhöret 
med M.H.N.S. framgår att mahr alltid skall utges och skrivas in i 
äktenskapskontraktet. Det får därför förutsättas att det ligger inom ombudets 
behörighet att bestämma om mahr. Ordalydelsen i den fullmakt som M.A. 
utfärdat ger inte stöd för hans påstående att fullmakten varit inskränkt och 
inte omfattat mahr. Han har inte heller visat att ombudets behörighet varit 
begränsad eller att det skulle ha förelegat ett befogenhetsöverskridande. Han 
är därför bunden av det äktenskapskontrakt som M.T.M:s mor ingått för 
hans räkning. 
Tingsrätten fann inte styrkt att M.A. erlagt någon betalning. 
M.A. överklagade domen och yrkade att hovrätten skulle ogilla M.T.M:s 
talan. 
M.T.M. bestred ändring. 
Parterna  åberopade i hovrätten samma grunder som vid tingsrätten. 
M.A. åberopade samma bevisning som vid tingsrätten varvid han dock 
åberopade förhören från tingsrätten genom banduppspelning. 
 
 M.T.M. åberopade bandinspelning av förhöret med sig själv vid tingsrätten. 
Hovrätten för Västra Sverige (2004-11-22, hovrättslagmannen Kjell 
Björnberg, hovrättsrådet Gunilla Smith, referent, och kammarrättsassessorn 
Ulrika Svanholm) fastställde tingsrättens domslut på följande skäl. 
Av äktenskapskontraktets lydelse framgår att M.A. genom ombud åtagit sig 
att betala det begärda beloppet som mahr till M.T.M. 
M.A. har till utveckling av sin inställning om att svensk lag skall tillämpas 
rörande parternas förmögenhetsförhållanden anfört att han är svensk 
medborgare och bosatt i Sverige sedan tjugo år samt att det aldrig varit 
parternas avsikt annat än att stadigvarande bo i Sverige. 
M.T.M. har invänt att parterna aldrig under äktenskapet haft hemvist i 
samma stat, att den stat de har starkast anknytning till är Iran samt att tre 
dagar efter att hon anlänt till Sverige förklarade M.A. att han ville skiljas 
varför det inte varit hans avsikt att de skulle stadigvarande bo i Sverige. 
Hovrätten gör i fråga om svensk domsrätt i målet samma bedömning som 
tingsrätten. 
I likhet med tingsrätten finner hovrätten att mahr skall anses vara en sådan 
utjämning av makars förmögenhetsförhållanden som faller under LIMF. 
En rättshandling mellan makar avseende deras förmögenhetsförhållanden är 
enligt 5 § första stycket LIMF giltig, om den stämmer överens med den lag 
som är tillämplig på makarnas förmögenhetsförhållanden när handlingen 
företas. 
Den huvudsakliga frågan i målet rör huruvida det i äktenskapskontraktet 
intagna åtagandet att utge mahr skall frånkännas rättsverkan på grund av 
utgången i fråga om hemvist och därmed tillämplig lag. Enligt uttalande i 
förarbetena till 5 § LIMF skall dock paragrafen inte tolkas motsatsvis. En 
rättshandling kan således tänkas vara giltig även i andra fall, eftersom man 
bör vara återhållsam med att underkänna rättshandlingar som makar med 
fog har utgått från skall gälla (se prop. 1989/90:87 s. 46). Med hänsyn till 
vad som upptagits i tingsrättens dom om parternas anknytning till Iran, där 
båda parterna har medborgarskap, och hur äktenskapet ingåtts finner 
hovrätten att iransk rätt skall tillämpas i fråga om mahr i målet. 
När det gäller fråga om M.A. på grund av den fullmakt han utfärdat för 
M.T.M:s mor är bunden av det avtal om mahr instämmer hovrätten i 
tingsrättens bedömning att iransk rätt skall tillämpas på invändningarna om 
bristande behörighet respektive befogenhet. På av tingsrätten anförda skäl 
 
 finner hovrätten att det inte finns stöd för att fullmakten varit inskränkt på 
sådant sätt att den inte omfattat mahr samt inte heller att ombudets 
behörighet varit begränsad. M.A. har själv sagt att han inför äktenskapet 
träffade en överenskommelse med M.T.M:s far om ett belopp - shir baha - 
som slutligen bestämdes till exakt det belopp som M.T.M. begär i form av 
mahr. I likhet med tingsrätten finner hovrätten att det inte förelegat ett 
befogenhetsöverskridande. M.A. är sålunda bunden av det 
äktenskapskontrakt som M.T.M:s mor ingått för hans räkning. 
M.A. har inte visat att han fullgjort betalning och tingsrättens domslut skall 
därför fastställas. 
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REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE 
  
AU NOM DU PEUPLE FRANCAIS 
  
Sur les deux moyens, réunis et pris en leurs diverses branches : 
  
Attendu que Mme X..., de nationalité polonaise, mariée au Liban avec M. Y..., de nationalité libanaise, fait 
grief à l’arrêt attaqué (Paris, 14 juin 1995), qui a prononcé la nullité du mariage avec putativité, d’avoir jugé 
que le régime matrimonial des époux était celui de la séparation de biens du droit musulman alors qu’un tel 
choix n’existait pas, ce régime étant imposé aux époux par la loi libanaise et que le consentement de 
l’épouse était entaché d’erreur ; qu’il est encore reproché à la cour d’appel d’avoir fixé le montant de la 
prestation compensatoire due par M. Y... sans répondre aux conclusions faisant état des manoeuvres de M. 
Y... pour organiser son insolvabilité ; 
  
Mais attendu que la cour d’appel a relevé que les époux avaient signé, lors de leur mariage au Liban, un 
contrat emportant adoption de la séparation de biens avec clause de dot, conformément à la loi musulmane, 
et que les deux époux avaient échangé en français les formules légales d’acceptation et de consentement 
réciproques ; que les juges du second degré en ont justement déduit l’existence d’une volonté expresse des 
époux quant à la détermination de leur régime matrimonial ; 
  
Et attendu que la cour d’appel a souverainement fixé le montant de la prestation compensatoire, sans avoir à 
répondre dans le détail à l’argumentation présentée sur ce point par Mme X... ; 
  
Que l’arrêt attaqué est légalement justifié ; 
  
PAR CES MOTIFS : 
  
REJETTE le pourvoi. 
 
   
  
  
Publication :Bulletin 1997 I N° 337 p. 230   
Décision attaquée :Cour d’appel de Paris, 1995-06-14   
Titrages et résumés : CONFLIT DE LOIS - Régimes matrimoniaux - Contrat de mariage - Loi applicable - 
Loi d’autonomie - Détermination - Critères - Volonté expresse des époux . 
  
 Le régime matrimonial étant soumis à la loi d’autonomie, justifie légalement sa décision de soumettre les 
intérêts pécuniaires d’époux de nationalité différente, mariés au Liban, au régime de droit musulman de 
séparation de biens avec clause de dot, la cour d’appel qui retient une manifestation de volonté expresse des 
époux pour le choix de ce régime, caractérisée par la signature d’un contrat et l’échange, dans leur langue 
commune, le français, des formules légales d’acceptation et de consentement. 
  
 REGIMES MATRIMONIAUX - Contrat de mariage - Conflit de lois - Loi applicable - Loi d’autonomie - 
Détermination - Critères - Volonté expresse des époux 
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Avocat : la SCP de Chaisemartin et Courjon. 
 
REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE 
 
AU NOM DU PEUPLE FRANCAIS 
 
Sur le moyen unique, pris en sa première branche : 
Vu l'article 3 du Code civil ; 
Attendu que, pour juger que le régime matrimonial des époux X...-Y... était le régime légal du droit français, 
déterminé par l'établissement en France du premier domicile matrimonial, l'arrêt attaqué énonce que le " 
contrat de mariage " produit, établi en Inde en 1969, n'est autre que l'acte de mariage constatant l'accord de 
volonté des époux d'être mari et femme, " et que cet acte ne constitue pas un contrat de mariage permettant 
d'établir un régime pour les biens des futurs époux " ; 
 
Attendu qu'en se déterminant ainsi, sans rechercher si les stipulations de cet acte, qui mentionnait, outre le 
consentement des époux au mariage, un contrat de mariage comportant le versement, par le mari, d'une 
somme dénommée " maher ", avec l'indication de la célébration d'un mariage " dit nickah " selon le rite 
hanéfite, n'emportaient pas adoption, par les époux, d'un régime matrimonial particulier, la cour d'appel n'a 
pas donné de base légale à sa décision ; 
 
PAR CES MOTIFS, et sans qu'il y ait lieu de statuer sur les autres branches du moyen : 
 
CASSE ET ANNULE, dans toutes ses dispositions, l'arrêt rendu le 11 janvier 1996, entre les parties, par la 
cour d'appel de Lyon ; remet, en conséquence, la cause et les parties dans l'état où elles se trouvaient avant 
ledit arrêt et, pour être fait droit, les renvoie devant la cour d'appel de Lyon, autrement composée. 
 
  
 
Publication : Bulletin 1998 I N° 140 p. 94 
Décision attaquée : Cour d'appel de Lyon, 1996-01-11  
Titrages et résumés CONFLIT DE LOIS - Régimes matrimoniaux - Régime légal - Détermination - 
Recherche de la volonté présumée des époux - Conditions - Défaut de choix exprès par les conjoints - 
Insertion des conventions matrimoniales dans l'acte de mariage dressé à l'étranger. 
 
Manque de base légale l'arrêt qui décide que le régime matrimonial d'époux mariés à l'étranger était le 
régime légal français, en raison de l'établissement en France du premier domicile matrimonial, sans 
rechercher si les stipulations de l'acte de mariage, établi en Inde et qui mentionnait la conclusion d'un " 
contrat de mariage " et la célébration d'une union dite " nickah " selon le rite hanafite, n'emportaient pas 
adoption, par les époux, d'un régime matrimonial particulier. 
 
 
Précédents jurisprudentiels : A RAPPROCHER : Chambre civile 1, 1988-07-06, Bulletin 1988, I, n° 224, p. 
157 (cassation), et l'arrêt cité. 
 
Codes cités : Code civil 3. 
 
 
  
COUR D’APPEL DE LYON  
PREMIERE CHAMBRE CIVILE  
ARRET DU 02 DECEMBRE 2002  
APPELANT :  
Monsieur Abdoul HAMIDOU 32 Route de Malagnou  
1211 GENEVE (Suisse)  
représenté par la SCP BAUFUME-SOURBE, avoues el la Cour  
assisté de Me FOREST, avocat  
INTIMEE :  
Madame Myriam RAZACK 431 Rue des Abattoirs Résidence 
Clos des Abeilles 01170 GEX  
représentée par Me GUILLAUME, avoue à la Cour  
assistée de Me ARNOUX-GENETELLI, avocat  
 
 COMPOSITION DE LA COUR lors des débats et du délibéré :  
MONSIEUR LORIFERNE, président, suppléant monsieur le premier président, désigne à 
cet effet par ordonnance du 18 juin 2002, MONSIEUR AZOULAY, président,  
MONSIEUR GERVESIE, conseiller,  
MADAME BAYLE, conseiller,  
MADAME MORIN conseiller,  
en présence pendant les débats de madame KROLAK, greffier.  
INSTRUCTION CLÔTURÉE LE : 22 AVRIL 2002  
DEBATS : En audience solennelle et publique du LUND I 7 
OCTOBRE 2002  
ARRET: contradictoire  
prononce à l'audience solennelle et publique du 2 DECEMBRE 2002 par monsieur 
LORIFERNE, président, en présence de madame KROLAK, greffier, qui ont signe la minute.  
FATIS ET PROCEDURE  
Monsieur Abdoul HAMIDOU et Madame Myriam RAZACK se sont maries le 4 aout 1969 a 
KARIKAL (Inde), et leur divorce a été prononce le 19 novembre 1990 par le Tribunal de Grande Instance de 
BOURG-EN-BRESSE.  
Les opérations de liquidation du régime matrimonial ont donne lieu à difficultés, Monsieur 
HAMIDOU invoquant l'existence d'un régime séparatiste de droit musulman résultant d'un acte intitule "contrat 
de mariage" du 4 aout 1969.  
Par jugement du 13 décembre 1993 le Tribunal de BOURG-EN-BRESSE a dit que le mariage des 
époux HAMIDOU-RAZACK est soumis quant aux biens au régime légal français de communauté des artic1es 
1400 et suivants du Code Civil, et a renvoyé les parties devant le notaire, condamnant en outre Monsieur 
HAMIDOU a payer 3.000 francs au titre de l'article 700 du Nouveau Code de procédure civile.  
L'arrêt confirmatif de la Cour d' Appel de LYON du 11 janvier 1996 a été cassé par arrêt de la Cour 
de Cassation du 7 avril 1998 qui a renvoyé la cause et les parties devant la Cour de LYON autrement composée.  
Devant la formation de renvoi, Monsieur HAMIDOU sollicite la réformation du jugement rendu 
par le Tribunal de Grande Instance de BOURG-EN-BRESSE.  
 
  
Il expose que dans le contrat de mariage rédigé par l'officier d'état-civil, il est indique que les époux 
ont dec1aré observer le rite "HANAFITE", et que le mariage contracte ressortit du droit musulman puisqu'il s'agit 
d'un mariage "niccah".  
Il soutient que les époux ont c1airement manifeste leur volonté de leur attachement pour le régime 
séparatiste de droit musulman, qu'ils ne sont pas soumis au régime légal français de communauté, qu'ils sont 
restés mariés sous le régime de la séparation de bien et que c'est le régime légal français de séparation des biens 
qui s'appliquera aux biens acquis en France.  
Madame RAZACK revendique l'application du régime français de communauté légale.  
Elle estime que Monsieur HAMIDOU a entendu se soumettre sans réserve à la loi française en ne 
faisant pas valoir lors de son divorce   l'application de la loi musulmane et en ne faisant pas transcrire l'existence 
d 'un contrat préalable, sur les registres consulaires français.  
Elle indique également que l'acte de "CALIANA CADOUTTAME" n'est pas conforme àl'artic1e 
1387 du Code Civil puisqu'il contient le paiement par le mari d'une somme à titre de "maher", lequel constitue le 
prix de vente que la femme fait de sa personne en se mariant, ce qui est contraire à l'ordre public français.  
Elle réc1ame 25.000 francs au titre de l'article 700 du Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile.  
 
MOTIFS DE LA DECISION  
Attendu que le mariage des époux HAMIDOU-RAZACK a été célébré le 4 aout 1969 par le Cazi 
de KARlKAL (Inde) lequel a dresse un acte intitule "contrat de mariage" dans lequel le rédacteur, après avoir 
constate la présence des futurs époux, indique avoir été requis d'un commun accord de rédiger le contrat de 
mariage dont la teneur suit:  
"L'époux a dec1aré avoir donné à l'épouse 3.000 roupies à titre de Maher.  
 
L'épouse a accepté et a dec1aré avoir pris possession dudit Maher".  
Que le Cazi précise ensuite qu'après lecture et signature du contrat, il a célébré le mariage dit 
"Niccah" ;  
Attendu qu'il en résulte que l'acte en cause comporte, outre le consentement des époux au mariage, 
la rédaction d'un contrat de mariage préalable ;  
Attendu que le contrat de mariage se réduit à une c1ause dite de "Maher" ;  
Attendu qu'il résulte du certificat de coutume établi par Monsieur SELVASHANMUGNAM, 
avocat et notaire à PONDICHERY, que d'après la loi musulmane indienne, le Mahr ou Maher est "la somme qui 
devient payable par le mari à la femme au moment du mariage suivant un accord entre les parties ou suivant 
l'opération de la loi" et qu'il est " le prix de la vente que la femme fait de sa personne en se mariant"; 
 
 Attendu que cette c1ause signifie donc c1airement que le mari achète son épouse, le mariage étant 
assimilé à une vente;  
Attendu que s'agissant des biens, la loi française contenue dans l'artic1e 1387 du Co de Civil, 
autorise les époux à faire les conventions qu'ils jugent à propos, pourvu qu'elles ne soient pas contraire aux 
bonnes mœurs et aux dispositions d'ordre public;  
Attendu que la c1ause de Maher est de toute évidence contraire à l'ordre public français qui ne 
saurait tolérer la vente des êtres humains. Qu'elle est la clause unique et déterminante du contrat de mariage signe 
par les parties ;  
Que dans ces conditions le régime matrimonial particulier adopte par les époux HAMIDOU-
RAZACK ne peut recevoir application en France ;  
Attendu que les époux HAMIDOU sont de nationalité française, qu'ils ont fait transcrire leur 
mariage sur les registres consulaires français sans apporter aucune précision quant à l'existence d'un contrat de 
mariage et qu'ils ont fixé leur résidence en France ;  
Qu'ils ont ensuite fait des acquisitions immobilières en France en se déclarant maries sous le régime 
de la communauté légale ;  
Qu'à défaut de choix d'un régime particulier applicable en France, seul le régime légal français peut 
recevoir application pour la liquidation de leur situation matrimoniale en France ;  
Que le jugement sera ainsi confirmé ;  
Attendu que compte tenu des circonstances de l'espèce, il n'y a pas lieu de faire application des 
dispositions de l'article 700 du Nouveau Code de procédure civile au delà des sommes allouées par le Tribunal;  
P AR CES MOTIFS,  
LA COUR,  
Vu l'arrêt de la Cour de Cassation du 7 avri11998,  
Confirme le jugement rendu par le Tribunal de Grande Instance de BOURG-EN-BRESSE le 13 
décembre 1993,  
Déboute les parties de leurs autres demandes,  
Dit que Monsieur HAMIDOU supportera les dépens des deux procédures d'appel, avec distraction 
au profit de Maitre GUILLAUME, avoue, pour les dépens du présent arrêt. 
 
LE PRESIDENT  
 
  
 
Cour de Cassation  
Chambre civile 1  
Audience publique du 22 novembre 2005 Cassation. 
  
N° de pourvoi : 03-14961 
  
Publié au bulletin  
  
Président : M. Ancel. 
Rapporteur : Mme Pascal. 
Avocats : la SCP de Chaisemartin et Courjon, la SCP Tiffreau. 
  
  
REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE 
  
AU NOM DU PEUPLE FRANCAIS 
  
AU NOM DU PEUPLE FRANCAIS 
  
LA COUR DE CASSATION, PREMIERE CHAMBRE CIVILE, a rendu l’arrêt suivant : 
  
  
Sur le moyen unique, pris en sa première branche : 
 
Vu l’article 3 du Code civil ; 
  
Attendu que M. X... et Mme Y... ont contracté un mariage nickah selon le rite hanéfite devant le Cazi de 
Karikal (Inde) ; 
  
qu’ils se sont installés en France ; que, par jugement du 19 novembre 1990, le tribunal de grande instance de 
Bourg-en-Bresse a prononcé le divorce des époux et ordonné la liquidation de leurs intérêts patrimoniaux ; 
que des difficultés ont surgi, M. X... revendiquant un régime de séparation de biens et Mme Y... se prévalant 
de la communauté légale du droit français ; que, par jugement du 13 décembre 1993, le tribunal de grande 
instance a dit le mariage soumis au régime légal français de communauté ; que l’arrêt confirmatif de la cour 
d’appel de Lyon du 11 janvier 1996 a été cassé par un arrêt du 7 avril 1998 (pourvoi n° W 96-13.973 bull. I 
n° 140) ; 
  
Attendu que, pour dire le mariage soumis au régime de la communauté légale de droit français, l’arrêt 
attaqué retient que l’acte de mariage comporte un contrat de mariage préalable, que ce contrat se réduit à une 
clause unique et déterminante dite de “maher” et que selon le certificat de coutume versé aux débats le 
“maher” est “le prix de vente que la femme fait de sa personne en se mariant” de sorte que la clause est 
contraire à l’ordre public français qui ne saurait tolérer la vente des êtres humains ; 
  
 
 Attendu cependant que l’acte dit “Maher” est une convention établissant le consentement des époux au 
mariage, assorti du versement d’une dot, sans contrariété à l’ordre public international français, de sorte que 
la cour d’appel a violé le texte susvisé ; 
  
PAR CES MOTIFS et sans qu’il y ait lieu de statuer sur les autres branches : 
   
CASSE ET ANNULE, dans toutes ses dispositions, l’arrêt rendu le 2 décembre 2002, entre les parties, par la 
cour d’appel de Lyon ; 
  
remet, en conséquence, la cause et les parties dans l’état où elles se trouvaient avant ledit arrêt et, pour être 
fait droit, les renvoie devant la cour d’appel de Lyon, autrement composée ; 
  
Condamne Mme Y... aux dépens ; 
  
Vu l’article 700 du nouveau Code de procédure civile, rejette les demandes ; 
  
Dit que sur les diligences du procureur général près la Cour de Cassation, le présent arrêt sera transmis pour 
être transcrit en marge ou à la suite de l’arrêt cassé ; 
  
Ainsi fait et jugé par la Cour de Cassation, Première chambre civile, et prononcé par le président en son 
audience publique du vingt-deux novembre deux mille cinq. 
   
  
Publication :Bulletin 2005 I N° 430 p. 360   
Décision attaquée :Cour d’appel de Lyon, 2002-12-02   
Titrages et résumés : CONFLIT DE LOIS - Régimes matrimoniaux - Contrat de mariage - Clause de “ 
Maher “ - Définition - Convention établissant le consentement des époux au mariage assorti du versement 
d’une dot - Portée. 
   
L’acte de “ Maher “ qui est une convention établissant le consentement des époux au mariage, assorti du 
versement d’une dot, n’est pas contraire à l’ordre public international français.  
CONFLIT DE LOIS - Régimes matrimoniaux - Contrat de mariage - Clause de “ Maher “ - Conformité à 
l’ordre public international français - Portée 
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*390 Shahnaz v. Rizwan. 
[1964] 3 W.L.R. 759 
 
Queens Bench Division 
 
QBD 
 
Winn J. 
 
1964 June 9. 
 
 Husband and Wife--Marriage--Polygamous system--Dower--Marriage in India-- Polygamous--Marriage contract providing dower 
payable to wife on divorce--Right enforceable by civil action under Mohammedan law--Parties divorced--Whether dower 
recoverable in English courts--Whether matrimonial relief--Whether policy of law contravened. 
 
 Conflict of Laws--Jurisdiction--Contract--Marriage--Right to dower arising out of polygamous marriage contract--Whether 
enforceable by English courts. 
 
 The parties were married in India on January 21, 1955, in accordance with the provisions of Mohammedan law. The marriage 
was evidenced by a certificate which was recorded by the local authority. The marriage contract, evidenced by the certificate, 
provided that the wife was to have deferred "mehar" or dower, payable to her in the event of the husband's death or a divorce. 
Under Mohammedan law such right to dower, once it had accrued as payable, was enforceable by civil action and was regarded as 
an assignable proprietary right, for the protection of which the wife was entitled to a lien over any property of her spouse of which 
she had possession or control. 
 
 In an action by the wife after the valid dissolution of the marriage, claiming the amount of the dower on the ground that the claim 
was a lawful contractual one enforcing a proprietary right arising out of a lawful contract of marriage, the husband claimed that 
the marriage was polygamous or potentially polygamous and that the English courts had no jurisdiction over, or *391 should not 
extend jurisdiction to, the wife's claim, since the provision in the marriage contract relied on was in consideration of a polygamous 
or potentially polygamous marriage; alternatively that the claim was in the form of matrimonial relief; in the further alternative 
that the claim was unenforceable since the contract of marriage and the dower provision was contrary to the policy and good 
morals of English law. 
 
 On the trial of the issues raised by the defence as a preliminary issue:- 
 
Held: 
 
     (1) that, a polygamous or potentially polygamous marriage which was lawful by the personal law of the parties and by the lex 
loci celebrationis was not regarded as an unlawful marriage under English law, although the English courts would not enforce 
such a marriage or any right arising specifically by virtue of the marriage relationship between the parties. 
 
 Sinha Peerage Claim[1946] 1 All E.R. 348n. and Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee(1866) L.R 1 P. & D. 130 applied.  
     (2) But that the right which the plaintiff wife was seeking to enforce was a right in personam, arising, not out of the 
relationship of husband and wife, but from a contract entered into in contemplation and in consideration of the marriage and was 
therefore not a matrimonial right which the court would refuse to enforce.  
     (3) That the fact that no such claim had hitherto been recognised by the English courts was no sufficient reason why the court 
should not accept jurisdiction; and that, accordingly, the pleas in the defence were insufficient to exclude the action from the 
jurisdiction of the court. 
 
Phrantzes v. Argenti[1960] 2 Q.B. 19; [1960] 2 W.L.R. 521; [1960] 1 All E.R. 778 applied. 
 
  
Per curiam: As a matter of policy, in view of the large number of Mohammedans resident in England, the law should rather lend 
its aid to women who come here as a result of a Mohammedan marriage by enforcing the husband's contractual promise than leave 
them without recourse to legal assistance (post, pp. 401G - 402A). 
 
 PRELIMINARY ISSUE. 
 
 The plaintiff, Amir-un-Nisa Shahnaz, claimed the recovery of £1,400 from the defendant, Mohammad Abdul Naeem Rizwan. By 
her statement of claim she alleged that she and the defendant were married in Hyderabad, Deccan, India, in accordance with 
Mohammedan law; that the marriage was evidenced by "Siyaha" or certificate recorded with the "Qazi" or local authority, and the 
marriage contract as so evidenced provided that the wife was to have deferred "Mehar" in the sum of 21,000 osmania Hali Sicca 
and five Sirkh Dinars; that the personal law of both parties was Mohammedan law and under such law the wife had a right to be 
paid the deferred "Mehar" on the dissolution of her marriage by divorce. It was further *392 alleged that by a document in writing 
signed by the defendant husband and dated November 16, 1959, the husband had divorced the wife and that the effect in 
Mohammedan law was to dissolve the marriage by divorce. 
 
 By his defence, the defendant pleaded that he was domiciled in England; that since the marriage was a polygamous or potentially 
polygamous marriage the courts of England had no jurisdiction or, alternatively, should not extend jurisdiction to the plaintiff 
wife's claim by reason of the fact that the provision in the marriage contract relied upon was in consideration of a polygamous or 
potentially polygamous marriage; and/or alternatively, that, in any event the relief sought was in the form of matrimonial relief. 
Further, or in the further alternative. the defendant pleaded that if it was held that the court had jurisdiction to entertain the 
plaintiff's claim, which was denied, he would contend that the claim was unenforceable by reason of such a contract of marriage 
and the provision therein being contrary to the distinctive policy and good morals of the law of England. The plaintiff delivered a 
reply in which she denied that the relief sought was in the form of matrimonial relief, or that the court was being asked to exercise 
any form of matrimonial jurisdiction; further, that even if the marriage was polygamous or potentially so it was recognised in 
England as a valid marriage; that her claim was a contractual one; that she was enforcing a lawful proprietary right which arose 
out of a lawful contract of marriage, and the court had jurisdiction and ought to exercise it, and that her claim was not 
unenforceable, nor was it in any way contrary to the distinctive policy and good morals of England. 
 
 By an order of Master Jacob dated February 12, 1964, the issues raised by the statement of claim, defence and reply were ordered 
to be tried as a preliminary issue. 
 
E. H. Laughton-Scott for the husband. The basic point is whether or not the law will recognise a contract giving rise to a claim in 
our courts for mehar. The type of marriage is vital, since although for certain purposes the law will recognise a polygamous or 
potentially polygamous marriage, it will refuse to give ancillary relief. It is necessary to look at the limits of recognition of a 
polygamous or potentially polygamous marriage. A person who has gone through a polygamous marriage and then through a 
ceremony of marriage here is committing bigamy: Baindail (orse. Lawson) v. Baindail. [FN1] The courts pay regard to *393 
questions of status and succession even if they arise under a polygamous marriage, but they will not entertain a suit for divorce in 
a polygamous or potentially polygamous marriage: Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee. [FN2] That decision was applied in 
Ohochuku v. Ohochuku [FN3] where a Nigerian polygamous marriage was in fact dissolved but as a result of certain statutory 
provisions. In the present case the wife is seeking to enforce the matrimonial duties of the husband. In Risk (orse. Yerburgh) v. 
Risk [FN4] it was again held that a wife could not enforce her rights under a marriage where the contract specified that the 
husband might have more than one wife. A similar decision was reached in Sowa v. Sowa. [FN5] The action for the mehar asks 
for the enforcement of a right which is inextricably connected with the polygamous marriage: Baindail (orse. Lawson) v. Baindail. 
[FN6] In Cheni (orse. Rodriguez) v. Cheni [FN7] there was a marriage which was polygamous but became monogamous. Here 
there is a distinction as the marriage is polygamous or potentially so. This marriage was also validly dissolved according to the lex 
domicilii: Warrender v. Warrender. [FN8] 
 
FN1 [1946] P. 122; 62 T.L.R. 263; [1916] 1 All E.R. 342, C.A. 
 
FN2 (1886) L.R. 1 P. & D. 130. 
 
FN3 [1960] 1 W.L.R. 183; [1960] 1 All E.R. 253. 
 
  
FN4 [1951] P. 50; 66 T.L.R. (Pt. 2) 918; [1950] 2 All E.R. 973. 
 
FN5 [1961] P. 70; [1961] 2 W.L.R. 313; [1961] 1 All E.R. 687, C.A. 
 
FN6 [1946] P. 122; 62 T.L.R. 263; [1946] 1 All E.R. 342, C.A. 
 
FN7 [1963] 2 W.L.R. 17; [1962] 3 All E.R. 873. 
 
FN8 (1835) 2 Cl. & Fin. 488, H.L. 
 
David Kemp for the wife. This is a claim for a proprietary right which was created by the personal law of both parties. English law 
will enforce such a right unless the authorities explicity provide otherwise: Phrantzes v. Argenti. [FN9] The authorities cited by 
the husband were limited by Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee, [FN10] that is, they were all cases before the matrimonial courts, in 
which the parties were seeking matrimonial relief under English law in the Divorce Division - Risk (orse. Yerburgh) v. Risk 
[FN11] where "this " court was specifically referred to. Here this is not so. In the present case the right is more direct than that 
sought in Phrantzes v. Argenti, [FN12] and it is more of a proprietary right than the plaintiff had in that case. Further, the right to 
mehar or dower has an element akin to lien. The reason why such a right is proprietary is that it arises from the contract of 
marriage but is not primarily an obligation dependent solely on the marriage, and it is assignable. In any event, the *394 courts 
have recognised as valid a polygamous marriage for most purposes: see Dicey, Conflict of Law, rule 37, for instances which are 
exactly on all fours with the present case. For example, a valid polygamous marriage entitles a person to a decree of nullity: Srini 
Vasan (orse Clayton) v. Srini Vasan [FN13] and Baindail (orse. Lawson) v. Baindail [FN14]; and also legitimation and succession 
by children can be decided by the courts: Sinha Peerage Claim [FN15]; and succession by spouses: Coleman v. Shang. [FN16] In 
Russ (orse. Geffers) v. Russ (Russ orse. De Waele Intervening) [FN17] a divorce by Talak was recognised in England as validly 
dissolving a marriage. The argument that this contract arises out of polygamous marriage and being incidental to it is 
unenforceable is inconsistent with the recent case of Lee v. Lau. [FN18] This right to mehar has been held to be assignable, and 
this shows definitely it is a right in the nature of property: Hasan Khan v. Muhammad Nairain Husain. [FN19] If the jurisdiction 
exists but is at the court's discretion, discretion ought, in this particular instance, to be exercised in favour of the wife. It is 
submitted that it is not a matter of discretion. The plaintiff has the right to enforce her claim. 
 
FN9 [1960] 2 Q.B. 19; [1960] 2 W.L.R. 521; [1960] 1 All E.R. 778. 
 
FN10 (1866) L.R. 1 P. & D. 130. 
 
FN11 [1951] P. 50; 66 T.L.R. (Pt. 2) 918; [1950] 2 All E.R 973. 
 
FN12 [1960] 2 Q.B. 19; [1960] 2 W.L.R. 521; [1960] 1 All E.R. 778. 
 
FN13 [1946] P. 67; 61 T.L.R. 415; [1945] 2 All E.R. 21. 
 
FN14 [1946] P. 122; 62 T.L.R. 263; [1946] 1 All E.R. 342, C.A. 
 
FN15 [1946] 1 All E.R. 348. 
 
FN16 [1961] A.C. 481; [1961] 2 W.L.R. 562; [1961] 2 All E.R. 406, P.C. 
 
FN17 [1963] P. 87; [1962] 2 W.L.R. 708; [1962] 1 All E.R. 649. 
 
FN18 [1964] 3 W.L.R. 750; [1964] 2 All E.R. 248. 
 
FN19 (1932) LIV Indian L.Reps. (Allahabad series) 499. 
 
  
Laughton-Scott in reply. English courts refuse to recognise a multiplicity of wives but will give effect to the lex domicilii: they do 
not give rights in consequence of the marriage or divorce. The wife comes to this court with a marriage which would not be 
recognised here, and so the court should not enforce a term of the contract. What the wife wishes to do is to sever some terms of 
the contract, which is impossible. It is not a mere proprietary right, as the evidence shows that this right exists only in close 
connection with a polygamous marriage. It is a part of the totality of the wife's rights. There is no difference in jurisdiction 
between the various divisions of the court. The action ought not to be allowed; if any doubt exists it ought not to be encouraged. If 
there is any discretion, there is a mass of evidence to be taken in India and accordingly the discretion ought not to be exercised in 
the wife's favour. 
 
*395 WINN J. 
 
 This claim is brought by the plaintiff for recovery of a sum of some £1,400 said by the statement of claim indorsed upon the writ 
to be payable to her by the defendant by force of a contract of marriage, which is pleaded in the statement of claim. The marriage 
(which I will refer to in a moment) is pleaded as having been evidenced by a marriage certificate, and is said to have been 
recorded by the local authority or Qazi. That paragraph of the statement of claim then pleads and relies upon a marriage contract 
contained in or evidenced by the marriage certificate or Siyaha, and it is alleged that that contract provided that the plaintiff was to 
have from the defendant deferred "Mehar " (which seems also to be spelled sometimes "Mahr"), for which word the word "dower" 
is a rough translation, and the amount of it is alleged as the equivalent of the £1,400 mentioned. By the amended defence various 
issues are raised which are irrelevant for the purposes of this judgment, but it was thereby pleaded as follows: "In the alternative 
the defendant will contend that since the said marriage" - that is a reference to a marriage admittedly entered into by the parties to 
the action on January 21, 1955, in Hyderabad in the Deccan - "was a polygamous or potentially polygamous marriage the courts 
of England have no jurisdiction or alternatively should not extend jurisdiction to the plaintiff's claim by reason of the fact that the 
provision in the said contract of marriage relied upon was in consideration of a polygamous or potentially polygamous marriage 
and/or alternatively in any event that the relief sought by the plaintiff is a form of matrimonial relief." Later it was pleaded: 
"Further or in the further alternative if it be held that the court has jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's said claim (which is 
denied) the defendant will contend that the same is unenforceable by reason of such a contract of marriage and the said provision 
being contrary to the distinctive policy and good morals of the law of this country." 
 
 By an order of Master Jacob dated February 12, 1964, it was ordered that, by way of preliminary issues, the questions or issues 
raised by those paragraphs should be tried in the Special List. 
 
 There was an amended reply - which traversed and put in issue those pleas in the defence; it was specifically contended that the 
plaintiff in the action is making a claim which is a contractual claim and enforcing a lawful proprietary right arising out of a 
lawful contract of marriage. 
 
 So far as the researches of counsel have gone - and I am quite *396 satisfied that they have been thorough and patient - this 
problem is res integra. I would like to take the opportunity of expressing my sincere indebtedness and gratitude to both counsel for 
the great help that they have given to the court. The lucidity and - having regard to the difficulty of the matter - the brevity with 
which they have presented their respective contentions is most creditable; it is worthy of comment that their skilled services have 
been made available to these parties through legal aid. 
 
 I have to determine this matter as one of first impression, with such assistance as can be derived from certain cases which have 
been brought to my attention; it is quite plain that in none of those cases do I find a decision directly governing my decision. 
 
 It seems to me that, in approaching the problem, it is essential at the outset to distinguish between an unlawful marriage and a 
marriage which the courts of this country will not regard as a marriage in the sense in which the English court conceives of 
marriage, that is to say, tested by comparison with the concept of marriage proper entertained by the English court. The very firm 
impression has been made upon my mind by the arguments of counsel and the cases brought to my attention that our court has 
never treated a marriage as unlawful merely because it is potentially, or indeed contemporaneously with its celebration, a 
polygamous marriage; provided of course, that the marriage is a marriage lawful by the personal law of the parties and the lex loci 
celebrationis. There are a number of instances - which it would be otiose to enumerate, save for the purpose of putting it upon 
record that I have given attention to them - where the courts of this country have given effect to consequences of a polygamous 
 
 marriage, using that word in a vague and wide meaning; for example, to a change of status brought about by such a marriage, and 
indeed to declare the legitimacy of children and the right of succession of children born of such a marriage, a polygamous 
marriage. Lord Maugham said in Sinha Peerage Claim [FN20]: "It cannot, I think, be doubted now (notwithstanding some earlier 
dicta by eminent judges) that a Hindu marriage between persons domiciled in India is recognised in our court, that the issue are 
regarded as legitimate, and that such issue can succeed to property in this country" [FN21]- subject to an exception or possible 
exception. 
 
FN20 [1946] 1 All E.R. 348. 
 
FN21 Ibid. 349. 
 
 The change of status effect of a polygamous marriage is further illustrated by the decision or decisions, first, that a polygamous 
marriage constitutes a bar to a subsequent monogamous *397 marriage in England or, probably, elsewhere, and so entitles the 
second wife to a decree of nullity on the ground that the ceremony through which she went was bigamous. I read from the passage 
in Dicey, 7th ed. (1959), p. 279, and the authority for that passage is Srini Vasan (orse. Clayton) v. Srini Vasan, [FN22] and 
another case, reported in the same volume, Baindail (orse. Lawson) v. Baindail, [FN23] a Court of Appeal decision. In the latter 
case Lord Greene put the matter in a pithy way by reducing it to the simple question: Was the husband or was he not, a married 
man at the date of the English ceremony? That question he thought must be answered by reference to the law of the husband's 
domicile at the date of the polygamous ceremony. 
 
FN22 [1946] P. 67; 61 T.L.R. 415; [1945] 2 All E.R. 21. 
 
FN23 [1946] P. 122; 62 T.L.R. 263; [1946] 1 All E.R. 342, C.A. 
 
 Dicey, basing himself upon those decisions - and upon a further decision that bigamy could be committed by a man whose status 
had been so changed - expressed his rule 37 in these terms: "A marriage which is polygamous under rule 34, but not invalid under 
35 or 36, will be recognised in England as a valid marriage unless there is some strong reason to the contrary." 
 
 I think it follows that I am bound to recognise the marriage between the parties to this action as a lawful marriage upon the 
admissions which are contained in the pleadings. Nor do I see any foundation in any of the decided cases that have been brought 
to my notice for any judicial ruling that that marriage involved any element offensive to the standards of decency accepted by the 
English law. Equally, on the other hand, it is clear that I must not, whether or not I am to be regarded today as sitting as a 
matrimonial court, enforce that marriage or any right which arises specifically by virtue of the marriage relationship between the 
parties to which it gave rise. 
 
 Before I consider explicitly the extremely important decision in Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee, [FN24] I would desire to say, 
appreciating that it is only a loose paraphrase of the effect of that decision and certain later decisions (to which reference must be 
made) of the Divorce Division of this court, it does seem to me that what the courts have held, and always have held, is that 
neither a husband nor a wife can be granted by the English court any right which inheres in the person seeking the assistance of 
the court specifically in the character of a husband or of a wife; and, by parity of reasoning, neither party coming to the court can 
enforce against the other any obligation which arises from, and *398 specifically from, the capacity of the other party as wife or 
husband. It is quite clear that no order for restitution of conjugal rights, no order for divorce or nullity, will be made by the English 
court in favour of a person who, coming to it for help, has to say "I seek this assistance as husband" - "as wife" - "by force of this 
marriage, which is a polygamous marriage." The reason, I think, is one of policy, of morality as conceived first in the mid-19th 
century but surviving into modern times, that nothing should be done to blur the distinction between Christian marriage - marriage 
properly understood and the concept of such proper marriage - and, on the other hand, polygamous associations more resembling 
concubinage or slavery. Lord Penzance in Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee, [FN25] said in much better language - language much 
more carefully chosen and much more eloquent - than the words which I have just used that that was the approach which he 
thought the English court was bound to adopt. That was a case which related to a Mormon marriage involving incidents of 
polygamy. Lord Penzance said [FN26]: "The position or status of 'husband' and 'wife' is a recognised one throughout 
Christendom: the laws of all Christian nations throw about that status a variety of legal incidents during the lives of the parties, 
and induce definite rights upon their offspring." A little later he said: "I conceive that marriage, as understood in Christendom, 
may for this purpose be defined as the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others"; he drew 
 
 a contrast between the associations of the sexes under arrangements approved by the local law in Turkey and other countries. He 
pointed out that here, but not there, "personal violence, open concubinage, or debauchery in face of the wife, her degradation in 
her home from social equality with the husband, and her displacement as the head of his household, are ... matrimonial offences, 
for they violate the vows of wedlock." But, having laid down in such terms and phrases the proper approach of the English court 
to the requirements of the moral law that no jurisdiction should be accepted to enforce directly or indirectly in any way the 
obligations arising out of a polygamous marriage, the judge ordinary said, at the end of his judgment [FN27]: "... this decision is 
confined to that object. This court does not profess to decide upon the rights of succession or legitimacy which it might be proper 
to accord to the issue of polygamous unions, nor upon the rights of obligations in *399 relation to third persons which people 
living under the sanction of such unions may have created for themselves. All that is intended to be here decided is that as 
between each other they are not entitled to the remedies, the adjudication, or the relief of the matrimonial law of England." 
 
FN24 (1866) L.R. 1 P. & D. 130. 
 
FN25 L.R. 1 P. & D. 130. 
 
FN26 Ibid. 133. 
 
FN27 Ibid. 138. 
 
 In various subsequent cases the court has had to deal in one way or other with situations an element in which was that there had 
been a polygamous marriage. I have already referred to several of those. It is right that I should make it clear that I have not 
overlooked the decision of Barnard J. in Risk (orse. Yerburgh) v. Risk, [FN28] in which he held that a petitioner cannot come to 
this court either to enforce rights under, or seek relief from, a polygamous marriage. 
 
FN28 [1951] P. 50; 66 T.L.R. (Pt. 2) 918; [1950] 2 All E.R. 973. 
 
 Again, the concept of the court was clearly expressed in Sowa v. Sowa, [FN29] where it was held that a polygamous marriage 
does not come within the word "marriage," nor do the parties to it come within the words "wife, " "married woman," or "husband" 
for the purposes of the Matrimonial Causes Acts or the Summary Jurisdiction Acts. 
 
FN29 [1961] P. 70; [1961] 2 W.L.R. 313; [1961] 1 All E.R. 687, C.A. 
 
 As I think, it is clearly the law that this court cannot give to a person the rights which are the property of a wife or a husband, as 
such, specifically by force of a marriage which is polygamous. 
 
 I do not propose to refer to any more authorities, except two of recent date. Cheni (orse. Rodriguez) v. Cheni [FN30] was a case 
decided by Lord Merriman P., where it was held, inter alia, that, since the marriage which there was in question, although 
originally polygamous, had become, in the course of time and as a result of certain events, monogamous by the proper law of the 
marriage, the court had jurisdiction to hear a matrimonial suit, and further that the marriage between the parties would be 
recognised as valid since it was so recognised by the court of the domicile at the time when it was entered into. The President said 
that, provided the marriage had become monogamous by the time the court had to deal with it and the rights of the parties to it, the 
court would recognise and give effect to its changed character as a monogamous marriage. That seems to imply to me that the 
court does not regard as so inherently illegal and offensive a marriage which is potentially polygamous that it will for all time, 
*400 even though thereafter it be changed, refuse to give effect to rights of the parties to the marriage. 
 
FN30 [1963] 2 W.L.R. 17; [1962] 3 All E.R. 873. 
 
 Before Cairns J. in March of this year there came a case which related to a marriage in Hong Kong, Lee v. Lau. [FN31] He, too, 
had regard to the marriage as a valid marriage, and thought it right, noting the change in the attitude of the courts in recent times 
so that they now "leaned in favour of enabling a petitioner who was domiciled in England to obtain a declaration of his status 
without having to go abroad," to grant a declaration that the contract of divorce was valid in respect of that marriage, dissolving it, 
albeit it was a polygamous marriage. But the report is not complete, and it is perhaps not satisfactory to rest particularly upon that 
 
 case. 
 
FN31 [1964] 3 W.L.R. 750; [1964] 2 All E.R. 248. 
 
 Fundamentally, it seems to me that the problem here is whether matrimonial relief is being sought; whether the court is being 
asked to enforce a right or obligation which arose in favour of the plaintiff in the action, and was imposed upon the defendant in 
the action, as wife and husband respectively, and in their specific capacity of wife and husband respectively. I have come to the 
conclusion that that is not the right way to view this claim made in the action. I prefer the opposed view that what is being sought 
to be enforced here is a contract entered into in contemplation of, by reason of, and - as has been said in at least one decided case, 
though I doubt if it be very accurate - in consideration of a marriage which was indeed polygamous. It may well be - and I think 
on the evidence I ought to hold that it is the case - that seldom would such a marriage be entered into in India, at the date, at any 
rate, when this marriage was entered into, unless such a contract as is here sued upon were made by the bridegroom. It does seem 
that sometimes, though rarely, marriages are contracted by Mohammedan law without the obligation to provide dower being 
undertaken by the husband, but those cases are rare. It happens, too, rather more often it seems, that sometimes the amount of the 
dower is not fixed before the marriage ceremony is performed; in which cases there is jurisdiction in the courts of the place of 
marriage to fix an amount for dower. But, in the vast majority of cases, as a condition of the marriage - it may be in many cases as 
a condition of the consent of the families or relatives to the marriage - a bridegroom promises, and promises contractually, to 
provide dower. That dower may be of two kinds, and usually is of both of the two kinds, that is to say, prompt dower (to which the 
wife is entitled *401 on demand at any time), and deferred dower, which is the kind of dower which is in question here. That 
deferred dower becomes payable to her in the event of the husband's death or upon a divorce, whether she be the party divorcing 
(which is a very rare thing for a woman to do or be able to do) or the party divorced (which happens often and easily, and is the 
event against which in particular the dower is intended to protect her). 
 
 It is quite clear on the evidence that the right to dower, once it has accrued as payable, is a right in action, enforceable by a civil 
action without taking specifically matrimonial proceedings, regarded by Mohammedan law as a proprietary right assignable under 
section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, of the Indian Code, and is a right for the support or protection of which, should the 
wife or widow gain physical possession or control of any property of her spouse, she is entitled to assert a lien. In my judgment, it 
is quite different in essence from maintenance as understood in English or in Mohammedan law. This right is far more closely to 
be compared with a right of property than a matrimonial right or obligation, and I think that, upon the true analysis of it, it is a 
right ex contractu, which, whilst it can in the nature of things only arise in connection with a marriage by Mohammedan law 
(which is ex hypothesi polygamous), is not a matrimonial right. It is not a right derived from the marriage but is a right in 
personam, enforceable by the wife or widow against the husband or his heirs. 
 
 It has been said that the court should not extend jurisdiction to entertain such a claim as the present. I have in mind what was said 
by Lord Parker C.J. in a case relating to the Greek law of dower, Phrantzes v. Argenti, [FN32] to the effect that it was not 
sufficient reason to refuse to exercise jurisdiction that the wife's claim did not come within one or other of the definite rules 
enumerated by Dicey. The relevant parts of the judgment in Phrantzes v. Argenti, [FN33] including in particular the quotation 
from the judgment of Judge Cardozo in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, [FN34] are sufficient guide to the conclusion 
that it is no sufficient reason why I should not accept jurisdiction in this case that it is res integra, that no such claim has hitherto 
been entertained by the English courts. As a matter of policy, I would incline to the view that, there being now so many 
Mohammedans resident in this country, it is better that the court should recognise *402 in favour of women who have come here 
as a result of a Mohammedan marriage the right to obtain from their husband what was promised to them by enforcing the 
contract and payment of what was so promised, than that they should be bereft of those rights and receive no assistance from the 
English courts. 
 
FN32 [1960] 2 Q.B. 19; [1960] 2 W.L.R. 521; [1960] 1 All E.R. 778. 
 
FN33 [1960] 2 Q.B. 19; [1960] 2 W.L.R. 521; [1960] 1 All E.R. 778. 
 
FN34 (1918) 224 N.Y. 99. 
 
 For those reasons, I think that the answer upon the issues must be that the pleas in the defence are not sufficient in law to exclude 
this action from the court's jurisdiction. 
 
  
Representation 
 
Solicitors: Sanderson, Lee, Morgan, Price & Co.; Gregory, Rowcliffe & Co. for Ritsons, Bolton. 
Order accordingly. Costs reserved to trial of action. ([Reported by TIMOTHY RYLAND, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.] ) 
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Sir Jocelyn Simon P. 
 
1970 June 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30; July 1, 2, 3, 6, 9; Oct. 30 
 
 Husband and Wife--Divorce--Foreign decree, validity--Talaq divorce--Husband domiciled in Pakistan--Marriage celebrated in 
England--Both spouses resident in England--Jurisdiction of court to make declaration on validity of talaq-- Whether talaq valid in 
English law--Whether non--forensic character of talaq relevant--Jurisdiction to adjudicate on dower rights--Court's discretion in 
recognising foreign decree--R.S.C., Ord. 15, r. 16
 
 In 1966, the parties, who were Muslims, were married at an English register office. The register office ceremony was followed by 
a Muslim ceremony, in connection with which sadaqa, a type of dower, was arranged, whereby the husband promised to pay to the 
wife on demand at any time (by agreement), or (perforce) on the dissolution of the marriage by divorce or death, the sum of 9,000 
Pakistani rupees (about £788). The parties continued thereafter to reside in England. On April 27, 1967, the husband, who claimed 
to be domiciled in Pakistan, sent a letter to the wife containing the sentence "I divorce you " three times, in compliance with the 
ancient Islamic law of talaq. In accordance with modern procedural modifications of that ancient law, effected by Pakistani law, 
that letter was followed by a hearing at the London office of the High Commissioner for Pakistan, to explore the possibilities of a 
reconciliation between the parties, following which, upon the expiry of 90 days from the date of the letter of talaq, and 
reconciliation having proved impracticable, the divorce was pronounced absolute on August 1, 1967. 
 
 The wife petitioned the court for a declaration that the marriage still subsisted and for maintenance and, alternatively, if the 
marriage had been validly dissolved, that she was entitled to dower in the sum of £788. The husband cross-prayed for a 
declaration that the divorce by talaq was valid, contending that the claim for maintenance was not maintainable in a petition for a 
declaration and that the court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claim for dower:- 
 
Held: 
 
     (1) that the court had power to make a declaration under R.S.C., Ord. 15, r. 16 in such circumstances as would have given the 
English ecclesiastical courts in their totality before 1857 jurisdiction to accord matrimonial relief, namely if both parties were, at 
the date of the commencement of proceedings resident in England; accordingly, as the parties were resident in England at the 
commencement of and throughout the proceedings the court had jurisdiction to make the declarations (post, p. 194D); that section 
43 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 empowered the court to adjudicate upon the wife's claim to 
dower (post, pp. 194H-195C) but that it had no jurisdiction to order maintenance for the wife (post, p. 194E-F). 
 
Garthwaite v. Garthwaite [1964] P. 356, C.A. applied. 
 
*174 (2) That the husband having established a Pakistani domicile (post, pp. 191A, 193G), the marriage had been validly 
dissolved, either on August 1, 1967, by ancient (or substantive) Islamic law as procedurally modified by Pakistani law or, 
alternatively, on April 27, 1967, by ancient Islamic law not so modified (post, p. 197G).  
     (3) That no rule of English law precluded the recognition of talaq by reason of its non-forensic character, the absence of 
judicial intervention being irrelevant if the purported divorce was effective by the law of the domicile, and it should be recognised 
as such unless the result would be offensive to the conscience of the English court (post, p. 199F-G). 
 
Sasson v. Sasson [1924] A.C. 1007, P.C., Har-Shefi v. Har-Shefi [1953] P. 161, C.A.; Har-Shefi v. Har-Shefi (No. 2) [1953] P. 
 
 220 and Russ (orse. Geffers) v. Russ (Russ orse. De Waele intervening, [1964] P. 315, C.A. followed. 
 
Per curiam. In so far as Rex v. Hammersmith Superintendent Registrar of Marriages, Ex parte Mir-Anwaruddin [1917] 1 K.B. 
634, C.A. may appear to be laying down the contrary, it is not to be followed (post, p. 198C-D).  
     (4) That the court's residual discretion to refuse to recognise a foreign divorce effective by the law of the domicile if to do so 
would offend the conscience of the court was to be most sparingly exercised (post, p. 201D); and, in the circumstances of the 
present case it should not be exercised to refuse recognition of the talaq divorce, so that there would be judgment for the husband 
on his prayer for a declaration that the talaq divorce was valid and for the wife for £788 by way of dower. 
 
 Dictum of Scarman J. in Varanand v. Varanand (1964) 108 S.J. 693 applied. 
 
Per curiam. Where a legislative authority by an enactment setting up a tribunal or other body envisages rules to be made 
governing the procedure of such tribunal or body, and no such rules are made, the tribunal or body is not necessarily thereby 
disabled from performing its function. In such case the tribunal or body acts effectively provided it acts in accordance with natural 
justice and to promote the objective with which it was set up (post, p. 196F-G). 
 
 Where an act is required to be done within a time to be prescribed by rules, and there are no rules prescribing time, it is sufficient 
if the act required is done within a reasonable time (post, p. 196G-H). 
 
 The following cases are referred to in the judgment: 
 
 Aikman v. Aikman (1861) 3 Macq. 854; 4 L.T. 374, H.L.(Sc.). 
 
 Anderson v. Laneuville (1854) 9 Moo.P.C.C. 325, P.C.. 
 
 Bruce v. Bruce (1790) 2 Bos. &; P. 229n, H.L.(Sc.). 
 
Cheni (orse. Rodriguez) v. Cheni [1965] P. 85; [1963] 2 W.L.R. 17; [1962] 3 All E.R. 873. 
 
 D'Etchegoyen v. D'Etchegoyen (1888) 13 P.D. 132. 
 
 Doucet v. Geoghegan (1878) 9 Ch.D. 441, C.A.. 
 
Drexel v. Drexel [1916] 1 Ch. 251. 
 
 Flynn, decd., In re [1968] 1 W.L.R. 103; [1968] 1 All E.R. 49. 
 
 Fremlin v. Fremlin (1913) 16 C.L.R. 212. 
 
 Gardezi v. Yusuf, P.L.D. 1963 Sup.Ct. 51. 
 
Garthwaite v. Garthwaite [1964] P. 356; [1964] 2 W.L.R. 1108; [1964] 2 All E.R. 233, C.A.. 
 
 Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay & Co. [1915] 2 K.B. 536, C.A.. 
 
*175 Gulbenkian v. Gulbenkian [1937] 4 All E.R. 618. 
 
Har-Shefi v. Har-Shefi [1953] P. 161; [1953] 2 W.L.R. 690; [1953] 1 All E.R. 783, C.A.. 
 
Har-Shefi v. Har-Shefi (No. 2) [1953] P. 220; [1953] 3 W.L.R. 200; [1953] 2 All E.R. 373. 
 
  
 Hart v. Hart (1881) 18 Ch.D. 670. 
 
 Harvey (orse. Farnie) v. Farnie (1882) 8 App.Cas. 43, H.L.(Sc.). 
 
 Jatoi v. Jatoi, P.L.D. 1967 Sup.Ct. 580. 
 
 Lauderdale Peerage, The (1885) 10 App.Cas. 692, H.L.(Sc.). 
 
 Mandel v. Mandel [1955] V.L.R. 51; [1955] A.L.R. 379. 
 
Marsh v. Marsh [1945] A.C. 271, P.C.. 
 
Montreal Street Railway Co. v. Normandin [1917] A.C. 170, P.C.. 
 
Rex v. Hammersmith Superintendent Registrar of Marriages, Ex parte Mir-Anwaruddin [1917] 1 K.B. 634, C.A.. 
 
Ross v. Ellison (or Ross) [1930] A.C. 1, H.L.(Sc.). 
 
Russ (orse. Geffers) v. Russ (Russ orse. De Waele intervening) [1964] P. 315; [1962] 3 W.L.R. 930; [1962] 3 All E.R. 193, C.A.. 
 
Sasson v. Sasson [1924] A.C. 1007, P.C.. 
 
Varanand v. Varanand (1964) 108 S.J. 693. 
 
 Wahl v. Attorney-General (1932) 147 L.T. 382, H.L.(E.). 
 
Wood v. Wood [1957] P. 254; [1957] 2 W.L.R. 826; [1957] 2 All E.R. 14, C.A.. 
 
Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. [1944] K.B. 718; [1944] 2 All E.R. 293, C.A.; [1946] A.C. 163; [1946] 1 All E.R. 98, 
H.L.(E.). 
 
 The following additional cases were cited in argument: 
 
Abate v. Abate (orse. Cauvin) [1961] P. 29; [1961] 2 W.L.R. 221; [1961] 1 All E.R. 569. 
 
Aldrich v. Attorney-General (Rogers intervening) [1968] P. 281; [1968] 2 W.L.R. 413; [1968] 1 All E.R. 345. 
 
Ali v. Ali [1968] P. 564; [1966] 2 W.L.R. 620; [1966] 1 All E.R. 664. 
 
Annesley, In re, [1926] Ch. 692. 
 
 Attorney-General v. Yule and Mercantile Bank of India (1931) 145 L.T. 9, C.A.. 
 
 Bailet v. Bailet (1901) 84 L.T. 272. 
 
Bryce v. Bryce [1933] P. 83. 
 
 Capdevielle, In re (1864) 2 H. &; C. 985. 
 
  
Casdagli v. Casdagli [1919] A.C. 145, H.L.(E.). 
 
 Castrique v. Imrie (1870) L.R. 4 H.L. 414, H.L.(E.). 
 
Chung Chi Cheung v. The King [1939] A.C. 160; [1938] 4 All E.R. 786, P.C.. 
 
Craignish, In re [1892] 3 Ch. 180, C.A.. 
 
 Crookenden v. Fuller (1859) 1 Sw. &; Tr. 441. 
 
De Gasquet lames (Countess) v. Mecklenburg-Schwerin (Duke) [1914] P. 53. 
 
Dogliani v. Crispin (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 301, H.L.(E.). 
 
Fuld, decd. (No. 3), In the Estate of [1968] P. 675; [1966] 2 W.L.R. 717; [1965] 3 All E.R. 776. 
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 SUIT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT. 
 
 The wife petitioned under R.S.C., Ord. 15, r. 16, and Ord. 112, r. 3, (1) for a declaration that her marriage to the respondent 
husband subsisted and that her status was that of a married woman and (2) that she might be granted such sums by way of 
 
 maintenance as might be just or that she *177 might continue to receive the sum of £5 a week from the husband as ordered by the 
magistrates' court on December 9, 1966. In the alternative, she prayed that, if the court were of opinion that the marriage had been 
validly dissolved, (1) that she was entitled to recover dower in the sum of £788 13s. 5d., and (2) that she was entitled to 
maintenance in the sum of £5 a week as ordered by the court on August 11, 1967. The husband cross-prayed for a declaration that 
the marriage had been validly dissolved by talaq and alleged that the claim for maintenance was not maintainable in a petition for 
a declaration of the subsistence of a marriage and as to the wife's status as a married woman. He further alleged that the dower was 
payable (if at all) only on the dissolution of the marriage or upon his death and denied that the wife was entitled to include a 
prayer for its recovery in her petition, alleging that the dower (as to recovery of which he made no admission) was not a 
matrimonial relief within the meaning of the English law, but that the wife's right (if any) to dower (if any) was ex contractu and, 
as such, not a cause of action (if at all) maintainable in the Divorce Division. 
 
 The facts are stated in the judgment of Sir Jocelyn Simon P. 
 
Joseph Jackson Q.C. and A. B. Ewbank for the Queen's Proctor as amicus curiae. As to domicile the questions arise: (i) where was 
each party domiciled before the marriage?; (ii) where were they both domiciled after the marriage?; (iii) where were they both 
domiciled at the time of the talaq? (iv) where were they both domiciled after the talaq? 
 
 It might be that the law of an after-acquired domicile would recognise the talaq as validly dissolving the marriage. Thus, for 
example, the husband might have re-acquired, since the talaq, his Indian domicile, and India might recognise talaq. 
 
 There is the possibility that the husband acquired a Pakistani domicile of choice, abandoned it, and then wished to re-acquire it. 
The abandonment might have coincided with the acquisition of an English domicile of choice or the re-acquisition of the 
husband's Indian domicile, but he could not reacquire a Pakistani domicile of choice without actually returning there. 
 
 Domicile is a matter not only of private interest but also of public concern; Bryce v. Bryce [1933] P. 83, per Lord Merrivale P. at 
p. 84. It follows that domicile is determined by applying the relevant principles of English law. The fact that the husband's 
solicitors or Pakistani officials or courts regard him as domiciled in Pakistan, as stated in his passport and in the talaq itself, is by 
no means conclusive. [Reference was made to In re Martin [1900] P. 211 and In re Annesley [1926] Ch. 692.] 
 
 A man may change his domicile as often as he pleases: Udny v. Udny (1869) L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. 441, per Lord Hatherley L.C. at 
p. 450. But it is not possible to have more than one domicile at one and the same time: Garthwaite v. Garthwaite [1964] P. 356, 
per Willmer L.J. at p. 379. Domicile is the legal consequence of a state of facts. The existence of the relevant facts determines a 
person's domicile. He or she must have a domicile at every moment whilst living: Garthwaite v. Garthwaite,per Diplock L.J. at p. 
393; Saccharin Corporation Ltd. v. Chemische Fabrik von Heyden Aktiengesellschaft [1911] 2 K.B. 516, per Farwell L.J. at p. 
527, and In re Craignish [1892] 3 Ch. 180, per Chitty J. at p. 192. 
 
*178 It was said authoritatively over a century ago that it is impossible to lay down an absolute definition of domicile: Whicker v. 
Hume (1858) 7 H.L.Cas. 124, per Lord Cranworth at pp. 157, 159, 160. See also Henderson v. Henderson [1967] P. 77, per Sir 
Jocelyn Simon P. at p. 79; In the Estate of Fuld, decd. (No. 3) [1968] P. 675, per Scarman J. at p. 682; and Attorney-General v. 
Yule and Mercantile Bank of India (1931) 145 L.T. 9. 
 
 A domicile of choice is acquired by the fact of being in a new territory and the intention to stay there. Both fact and intention 
require considerable explanation, especially the latter. 
 
 If it is assumed that the husband acquired a domicile of choice in Pakistan, the question is whether he has retained that domicile 
of choice or acquired a fresh domicile of choice in England or abandoned his domicile of choice without acquiring a fresh 
domicile, thereby re-acquiring his Indian domicile of origin. He could not re-acquire his Pakistani domicile of choice, if he had 
lost it, without actually returning to Pakistan. 
 
 It is difficult to define the term "domicile of choice." In Lord v. Colvin (1859) 4 Drew 366, Sir Richard Kindersley V.-C. said at 
p. 376 that a man who "voluntarily fixed the habitation of himself and his family, not for a mere special and temporary purpose, 
but with a present intention of making it his permanent home" thereby acquired a new domicile. In Casdagli v. Casdagli [1919] 
 
 A.C. 145, Lord Dunedin said at p. 173: "Intention may be (and in most cases is) gathered from what a person does, not merely 
from what he says." See also McMullen v. Wadsworth (1889) 14 App.Cas. 631; Crookenden v. Fuller (1859) 1 Sw. & Tr. 441; 
Bryce v. Bryce [1933] P. 83, Hodgson v. De Beauchesne (1858) 12 Moo. P.C.C. 285; In re Craignish [1892] 3 Ch. 180 and 
Moorhouse v. Lord (1863) 10 H.L.Cas. 272. 
 
 While there is no end to the evidence that may be adduced to ascertain domicile, too much detail may stultify: per Megarry J. in 
In re Flynn, decd. [1968] 1 W.L.R. 103. 
 
 "A domicile of choice may be acquired even though there is no deliberate decision to acquire it: see Gulbenkian v. Gulbenkian 
[1937] 4 All E.R. 618 and D'Etchegoyen v. D'Etchegoyen (1888) 13 P.D. 132. 
 
 "A mere 'floating intention' to return to the country of origin at some future period is not sufficient for the retention of domicile if 
the propositus has settled in some other territory subject to a distinctive system of law with the intention of remaining there for an 
indefinite time": Henderson v. Henderson [1967] P. 77, per Sir Jocelyn Simon P. at p. 79, citing Stanley v. Bernes (1830) 3 Hag. 
Ecc. 373; Aikman v. Aikman (1861) 3 Macq. 854; Bruce v. Bruce (1790) 2 Bos. 229n.; Doucet v. Geoghegan (1878) 9 Ch.D. 441; 
and Anderson v. Laneuville (1854) 9 Moo.P.C.C. 325. See also In re Capdevielle (1864) 2 H. & C. 985; Fremlin v. Fremlin (1913) 
16 C.L.R. 212 and Schwebel v. Ungar (ar Schwebel) (1964) 48 D.L.R. (2d) 644. 
 
 If a person has a genuine intention to return to a country in which he was, his residing for an indefinite time in another country 
only makes him "ordinarily resident" there: Hopkins v. Hopkins [1951] P. 116. Acquiring a house and establishing a business may 
be evidence of the acquisition of a domicile of choice: Stevenson v. Masson (1873) L.R. 17 Eq. 78. [Reference was made to 
Johnstone v. Beattie (1843) 10 Cl. & Fin. 42.] Change *179 of nationality is a factor to be considered but is not conclusive: Wahl 
v. Attorney-General (1932) 147 L.T. 382. The quality of residence, as opposed to its length, may afford the necessary inference of 
a change of domicile: Ramsay v. Liverpool Royal Infirmary [1930] A.C. 588. See also Haque v. Haque (1962) 108 C.L.R. 230. 
 
 As to marriage the question is: what kind of marriage is the court considering? An ordinary, regular monogamous marriage was 
created by the civil ceremony. The religious ceremony was a nullity. [Reference was made to Jatoi v. Jatoi, P.L.D. 1967 Sup.Ct. 
580; Reg. v. Bham [1966] 1 Q.B. 159; Thynne v. Thynne [1955] P. 272 and Merker v. Merker [1963] P. 283.] 
 
 What is the effect in English law of the first ceremony if, by the laws of the domicile of one or both parties, it is not an effective 
ceremony? Is this a question of form or essentials? Does public policy play a part? See Gray (orse. Formosa) v. Formosa [1963] P. 
259. 
 
 Can a monogamous marriage celebrated in England be dissolved by talaq? It is too late to contend save in the House of Lords - 
that a Christian marriage celebrated in England cannot, in the eyes of English law, ever be dissolved by talaq, "notwithstanding 
that the law of the parties' domicile permits it": see Russ (orse. Geffers) v. Russ (Russ orse. De Waele intervening) [1964] P. 315; 
per Donovan L.J. at p. 331. 
 
 Does it affect the matter that the talaq was effected at the embassy in England? This raises the question where, in contemplation 
of law, the divorce took place. By a fiction of extra-territoriality, marriages celebrated at foreign embassies are sometimes said to 
be celebrated in the dominions of the sovereign represented: see Ruding v. Smith (1821) 2 Hag.Con. 371; Pertreis v. Tondear 
(1790) 1 Hag.Con. 136; Reg. v. Bham [1966] 1 Q.B. 159; Bailet v. Bailet (1901) 84 L.T. 272; Khan (orse. Worresck) v. Khan 
(1959) 21 D.L.R. (2d) 171; Varanand v. Varanand (1964) 108 S.J. 693; and Mandel v. Mandel [1955] V.L.R. 51. The court has to 
consider whether it is dealing with extra-territoriality or with immunities: Chung Chi Cheung v. The King [1939] A.C. 160. The 
doctrine of extra-territoriality is, as stated in Khan's case, 21 D.L.R.(2d) 171, "a fiction": see British Year Book of International 
Law 1926, pp. 126, 127, and 1948, pp. 236-240; Restatement of American Law, 2nd ed. (1965), pp. 241-243; 1950 International 
Court of Justice Reports, pp. 274-275; Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases, No. 166, pp. 385-386; McNair, 
International Law Opinions, pp. 85-88; and Oppenheimer's International Law, 8th ed. (1955), vol. 1, pp. 790-805. 
 
 Suppose the embassy were not the proper place to effect talaq, from the English point of view, would the result be that the talaq 
was effected out of court in England? If so, is it valid or invalid? See Har-Shefi v. Har-Shefi (No. 2) [1953] P. 220, Mandel v. 
Mandel [1955] V.L.R. 51; Varanand v. Varanand (1964) 108 S.J. 693. 
 
  
 As to the extent of jurisdiction to make declaratory judgments, this is not a nullity suit and R.S.C., Ord. 15, r. 16, applies. The 
basis of jurisdiction may vary with the basic nature of the relief sought. Har-Shefi v. Har-Shefi [1953] P. 161, was a nullity case. 
Garthwaite v. Garthwaite [1964] P. 356 was a restitution case. The present case may be both; a *180 restitution case by the wife 
and a nullity (and even a jactitation) case by the husband. 
 
 Doubts as to the effect of Har-Shefi v. Har-Shefi, [1953] P. 161 and Garthwaite v. Garthwaite [1964] P. 356 were raised by 
Ormrod J. in Aldrich v. Attorney-General (Rogers intervening) [1968] P. 281. 
 
 One should look first at section 21 of the Judicature Act 1925, and section 39 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1965. 
 
 Can only British subjects seek a declaration of validity of marriage? Are the parties, in English law, British subjects? The effect 
of the India (Consequential Provisions) Act 1949 and the Pakistan (Consequential Provisions) Act 1956 is that the position of 
India and Pakistan is unaffected by their becoming republics, so far as the British Nationality Act 1948 is concerned. Hence both 
the husband and the wife are British subjects. If they are domiciled in England they can rely on section 39 of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1965. If they are not domiciled in England and there is no personal estate within the meaning of section 39, can the 
court make a declaration on the validity of the marriage? Can it be said that the wife's petition constitutes a restitution suit and the 
husband's a nullity and jactitation suit? If so, then in the words of Sir Jocelyn Simon P. in Lepre v. Lepre[1965] P. 52, 57: "... 
determination of the validity of a foreign judgment is a necessary step in proceeding to adjudication on a matter within the 
jurisdiction of the court ... and the court has jurisdiction under (Ord. 15, r. 16) to make a declaration on such validity." 
 
 Is the jurisdiction discretionary? See Garthwaite v. Garthwaite [1964] P. 356; De Gasquet James (Countess) v. Mecklenburg-
Schwerin (Duke) [1914] P. 53; Igra v. Igra [1951] P. 404; Abate v. Abate (orse. Cauvin) [1961] P. 29; Padolecchia v. Padolecchia 
(orse. Leis) [1968] P. 314; Khan (orse. Worresck) v. Khan (1959) 21 D.L.R. (2d) 171 and Mandel v. Mandel [1955] V.L.R. 51. 
Can the court "look behind" the talaq to see if it was properly performed? 
 
 We do not inquire whether a "competent foreign court has exercised its jurisdiction improperly, provided that no substantial 
injustice according to our notions has been committed": per Viscount Haldane, in Salvesen (or von Lorang) v. Austrian Property 
Administrator [1927] A.C. 641, 659. See also Pemberton v. Hughes [1899] 1 Ch. 781; Merker v. Merker [1963] P. 283; Castrique 
v. Imrie (1870) L.R. 4 H.L. 414 and Doglioni v. Crispin (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 301. 
 
 Even if the husband is domiciled in England, should this court recognise talaq because it is recognised in India or Pakistan and 
the parties have a substantial connection with India or Pakistan? The parties may have no substantial connection with Pakistan 
now: see Indyka v. Indyka [1969] 1 A.C. 33. 
 
 Does this court have a residual discretion to refuse recognition of foreign decrees and, if so, should it refuse to recognise this 
talaq? "It may well be that in exercising what has been called a residual discretion to refuse to follow the law of the domicile, the 
English court might reasonably take the view that, since in this country a divorce can be pronounced only after a judicial hearing, 
our courts will not countenance any attempt to obtain within their jurisdiction a divorce by any other means, such as by a 
unilateral declaration": per Davies L.J. in Russ (orse. Geffers)v. Russ (Russ orse. De Waele intervening) [1964] P. 315*181 , 335. 
See also In re Langley's Settlement Trusts [1962] Ch. 541 and Cheni (orse. Rodriguez) v. Cheni [1965] P. 85. 
 
 The court might take the view that even though it has a discretion to recognise the talaq, it will refuse to recognise it, not because 
it is divorce by unilateral declaration in England but because the parties by their conduct have shown an intention to govern their 
matrimonial relations by the law of England and to exclude such divorce procedure, regardless of the acquisition by them of an 
English domicile. 
 
 If the court recognises the talaq as validly dissolving the marriage, does the existing magistrates' court order survive? It does: see 
Wood v. Wood[1957] P. 254, per Lord Evershed M.R. at p. 284. 
 
 Finally there is the question whether this court can adjudicate upon the wife's claim to dower contained in her petition. See 
McGowan v. Middleton (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 464; Salt v. Cooper (1880) 16 Ch.D. 544; Reg. v. Gyngall [1893] 2 Q.B. 232; In re L. 
 
 (An Infant) [1968] P. 119; In re K. (Infants) [1965] A.C. 201 and Shalmaz v. Rizwan [1965] 1 Q.B. 390. 
 
Philip L. W. Owen Q.C. and A. M. Azhar for the wife. The husband was born in 1933 in Hyderabad. In 1948, the State of 
Hyderabad became part of India. Accordingly, the husband's domicile then became Indian. In 1957, he acquired a domicile of 
choice in Pakistan. The question is whether, by 1966, he had lost that domicile and had acquired an English domicile. He had 
because: (1) a domicile of choice is less retentive than a domicile of origin and therefore less evidence is required to satisfy the 
court that a domicile of choice has been lost than is the case with a domicile of origin; (2) a change of domicile may be inferred 
from conduct, without proof of any mental element having been operative in producing the change; (3) if a person leaves the 
country in which he has acquired a domicile of choice and takes up residence in another country, his doing so may lead to an 
inference that he has abandoned his former domicile. The formation of an express animus non revertendi in relation to the country 
that has been left is unnecessary. [Reference was made to Wahl v. Attorney-General (1932) 147 L.T. 382.] 
 
 The argument of the Queen's Proctor on the jurisdictional points is adopted. The fact that the parties are resident in England is 
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court to grant the wife the relief sought. The claim for dower takes the case out of the 
category of "bare declaration" cases. [Reference was made to Shahnaz v. Rizwan [1965] 1 Q.B. 390; Ali v. Ali [1968] P. 564; 
Jatoi v. Jatoi, P.L.D. 1967 Sup.Ct. 580 and section 43 of the Judicature Act 1925.] English contract law should be applied to the 
document relating to dower. Dower can be claimed in the Divorce Division. 
 
 It is against public policy for our law to recognise talaq. Talaq should also be refused recognition on the ground that it is unjust. 
Rex v. Hammersmith Superintendent Registrar of Marriages, Ex parte Mir-Anwaruddin [1917] 1 K.B. 634 is still good law and is 
binding on this court. 
 
Bruce Holroyd Pearce Q.C. and A. M. Abbas for the husband. To establish the abandonment of a domicile both factum and 
animus are necessary. This also applies to the acquisition of a domicile of choice. *182 Both parties are pawns in the English legal 
system. The fact that a party is legally aided, being extraneous, should be disregarded. Both parties are Muslims. Their marriage 
was a Muslim marriage between Muslim citizens. There is no justification for refusing to recognise their status according to the 
law of their domicile. A woman entering a Muslim marriage knows that one of the hazards of so doing is that she may be one of 
four wives. She also knows that she is liable to be divorced unilaterally. 
 
 Whilst the wife is resident in the United Kingdom, the court will give her the protection which goes with her status, so long as she 
enjoys that status by her personal law. The determination of the marriage does not put an end to the magistrates' order: Wood v. 
Wood [1957] P. 254. Whilst the wife resides in England she has the benefit of the laws of Christendom. She should not be entitled 
to the benefit of the laws of Christendom after the marriage has been determined. She should not be able to choose the best law. 
The husband will, in the near future, either go to the U.S.A. and then to Pakistan, or he will go straight to Pakistan. The 
magistrates' order would be unenforceable either in the U.S.A. or Pakistan. 
 
 If the wife received dower and stayed in the United Kingdom, there would be no reason why the court should exercise its 
discretion against recognising the talaq. 
 
Jackson Q.C. replied. 
 
Cur. adv. vult. 
 
October 30. SIR JOCELYN SIMON P. 
 
 read the following judgment. The main issue in this case concerns whether this court should accord recognition to a 
pronouncement of divorce, known as a talaq, made in this country in 1967, and purporting to dissolve a marriage celebrated in this 
country in 1966 between two persons of the Muslim faith resident in England, the husband being a citizen of Pakistan and the wife 
a citizen of India. 
 
 By what has been called the "ancient" (or "substantive") Islamic law, marriages have a limited polygamous potential. But it has 
been common ground that the marriage in the instant case, having taken place in England, where monogamy is the rule, must be 
 
 regarded as monogamous for the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of this court. 
 
 Though there were sectarian differences irrelevant to the instant case, by ancient Islamic law a marriage between Muslims could 
be terminated by the husband pronouncing three times words which can be translated as "I divorce you." This is the talaq. It will 
be apparent that it has affinities with the "bill of divorcement" mentioned in the Authorised Version of the Book of Deuteronomy, 
chapter 24, verse 1, the modern modification of which (the Jewish divorce by "ghet") has received judicial consideration. 
 
 Both of the rules of ancient Islamic law I have mentioned - that of limited polygamy and that of divorce by talaq - are considered 
by Muslims to be of scriptural, and therefore of divine, authority. But, so far as Pakistan is concerned, the ancient Islamic law has 
received statutory modification of a procedural nature for the greater protection of wives. The interaction of the ancient Islamic 
law and the modern statutory modification *183 was one of the issues in this case; and I must describe the statutory modification 
before the factual history of this case can be understood. 
 
Pakistani legislation 
 
 The principal legislation is the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), which came into force on July 15, 1961 (see the 
edition of the Ordinance by Shaukat Mahmood, 5th edition (1968), which must, however, be used with caution since it contains 
some significant misprints). 
 
 By section 1 (2) the Ordinance "extends to the whole of Pakistan, and applies to all Muslim citizens of Pakistan, wherever they 
may be." Section 2 is an important definition section:  
     "(a) 'arbitration council' means a body consisting of the chairman and a representative of each of the parties to a matter dealt 
within this ordinance: [Provided that where any party fails to nominate a representative within the prescribed time, the body 
formed without such representative shall be the arbitration council]."  
 In the original ordinance the word "chairman" was followed by the words "of the union council" (i.e., the local authority): but 
these words were deleted by an amendment of 1961 and the words I have placed in square brackets were added.  
     "(b) 'chairman' means the chairman of the union council or a person appointed by the [Central Government in the Cantonment 
areas, or by the Provincial Government in other areas,] or by an officer authorised in that behalf by any such Government, to 
discharge the function of chairman under this ordinance."  
 The words in square brackets were substituted in 1964 for the words "Central or a Provincial Government."  
     "(c) 'prescribed' means prescribed by rules made under section 11." 
 
 By section 3 (1), "the provisions of this ordinance shall have effect notwithstanding any law, custom or usage ..." Section 5 deals 
with registration of marriages. Section 6, while not proscribing polygamy, stipulates for certain procedural requirements. 
 
 Section 7, dealing with talaq, is crucial to the decision of this case. The relevant subsections read as follows:  
     "(1) Any man who wishes to divorce his wife shall, as soon as may be after the pronouncement of talaq in any form 
whatsoever, give the chairman notice in writing of his having done so, and shall supply a copy thereof to the wife ...  
     "(3) ... a talaq unless revoked earlier, expressly or otherwise, shall not be effective until the expiration of 90 days from the day 
on which the notice under subsection (1) is delivered to the chairman.  
     "(4) Within 30 days of the receipt of notice under subsection (1) the chairman shall constitute an arbitration council for the 
purpose of bringing about a reconciliation between the parties, and the arbitration council shall take all steps necessary to bring 
about such reconciliation." 
 
*184 Section 9, dealing with maintenance, provides that a wife who is inadequately or inequitably maintained may, in addition to 
any other legal remedy available to her, apply to the chairman, who shall constitute an arbitration council to determine the matter. 
 
 Section 10 deals with "dower"; but although I shall be concerned with "dower" its provisions are not relevant to any issue in the 
present case. 
 
 Section 11 enacts a power to make rules, as follows:  
     "(1) The [Central Government in respect of the cantonment areas and the Provincial Government in respect of other areas] may 
 
 make rules to carry into effect the purposes of this Ordinance ...  
     "(3) Rules made under this section shall be published in the official Gazette and shall thereupon have effect as if enacted in this 
Ordinance." 
 
 Two sets of rules were promulgated under the Ordinance, one for East Pakistan and the other for West Pakistan, published in their 
respective official gazettes on July 20, 1961. They do not differ materially; though it is agreed that it is the West Pakistan Muslim 
Family Law Rules which (in so far as they are relevant at all) govern the present case. Rule 3 deals with the arbitration council. It 
provides (inter alia) that the union council which shall have jurisdiction in the case of a notice of talaq under section 7 (1) of the 
Ordinance shall, if the wife was not residing in any part of West Pakistan, be the union council of the union or town where the 
person pronouncing the talaq is permanently residing in West Pakistan. Rule 5 (3) provides that, subject to the provisions of sub-
rule (4), proceedings before an arbitration council shall not be vitiated by reason of a vacancy in the arbitration council, whether 
on account of failure of any person to nominate a representative or otherwise. Sub-rule (4) provides that where a vacancy arises 
otherwise than through a failure to make a nomination, the chairman shall require a fresh nomination. Sub-rule (6) provides that 
all decisions of the arbitration council shall be taken by majority, and where no decision can be so taken, the decision of the 
chairman shall be the decision of the arbitration council. Rub 6 deals with "the prescribed time." It provides:  
     "(1) Within seven days of receiving ... a notice under subsection (1) of section 7, the chairman shall, by order in writing, call 
upon each of the parties to nominate his or her representative, and each such party shall, within seven days of receiving the order, 
nominate in writing a representative and deliver the nomination to the chairman or send it to him by registered post. (2) Where a 
representative nominated by a party is, by reason of illness or otherwise, unable to attend the meeting of the arbitration council, or 
wilfully absents himself from such meeting, or has lost the confidence of the party, the party may, with the previous permission in 
writing of the chairman, revoke the nomination and make, within such time as the chairman may allow, a fresh nomination: 
[Provided that where a party on whom the order is to be served is residing outside Pakistan, the order may be served on such party 
through the consular officer of Pakistan in or for the country where such party is residing.]" 
 
*185 On November 17, 1961, the following notice appeared in the "Gazette of Pakistan," the notice itself bearing the date 
November 8, 1961:  
     "In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (b) of section 2 of the  Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 (VIII of 1961) the 
Central Government is pleased to authorise the Director General (Administration), Ministry of External Affairs, to appoint officers 
of Pakistan missions abroad to discharge the functions of chairman under the aforesaid Ordinance."  
 Exhibit R 2 has been accepted as showing that the Director General (Administration), Ministry of External Affairs, purported to 
appoint heads of chancery in Pakistan missions abroad to discharge the functions of chairman under section 2 of the Ordinance. 
 
The factual background 
 
 The wife and the husband, and their present solicitors, respectively Mr. Boyle and Mr. Thorne, gave evidence on which I rely in 
setting out the facts. I preferred the evidence of the husband to that of the wife where they differed. There was little variance 
between the evidence of Mr. Boyle and that of Mr. Thorne, but I thought that the latter's recollection was more vivid, and I accept 
his evidence as a touchstone to test the validity of all other oral evidence. 
 
 The husband, Mohammad Abdul Hai Qureshi, and the wife, then Ayesha Asghari, were born in Hyderabad in respectively 1933 
and 1937. Hyderabad was then a princely state situated in the centre of the Indian sub-continent. Its royal house and ruling class 
were Muslim, though the bulk of the population was Hindu. Both the wife and the husband have at all times been Muslims. In 
1947 India and Pakistan became separate states independent of the British Crown: Hyderabad (emancipated from British 
paramountcy) was surrounded by Indian territory. In 1948 Hyderabad was invaded by India, its royal house deposed, and the state 
itself incorporated in India: this is the episode which is ironically referred to in the correspondence as "the police action." 
 
 In 1955 the husband qualified as a medical practitioner in Hyderabad; and took a job as medical officer in the government of 
Hyderabad. In February 1957 he went to Pakistan, taking a post as medical officer at the airport at Karachi. Two of his sisters had 
preceded him to Pakistan, one brother accompanied him and another went later. In October 1957 the husband assumed Pakistani 
nationality (which he has retained ever since), formally renouncing Indian citizenship and surrendering his Indian passport. On 
June 28, 1958, he came to England, his purpose being to qualify as a Fellow of the Royal College of Surgeons, a qualification 
which would have greatly improved his prospects in Pakistan. He took a number of hospital appointments in England under the 
National Health Service, and made a number of attempts over the years to qualify as F.R.C.S., though unsuccessfully. 
 
  
 Before leaving Hyderabad the husband had apparently become very friendly with the wife and thereafter correspondence by letter 
took place between them: exhibit P 3 contains English translations of letters written in Urdu by the husband to the wife and to her 
brother in the United States *186 from 1960 onwards: reliance was placed on them on the issue of domicile. I think it was towards 
the end of 1963 that the wife and the husband became formally engaged to marry. The husband was still in England, the wife still 
in Hyderabad. At all material times she was an Indian citizen. On March 9, 1966, she arrived in England for the purpose of 
marriage with the husband. On March 19, 1966, the wife and the husband went through a ceremony of marriage at the Kensington 
register office. This was followed by a further ceremony in accordance with Muslim rites; but it is common ground that the 
register office ceremony constituted a legal marriage and that the subsequent religious ceremony had no legal significance. 
However, I think it was in connection with the religious ceremony that a "sadaqa" was arranged between the parties. Sadaqa has 
been conveniently referred to as "dower" (which is what it is called in the Ordinance), though it does not correspond to the 
concept of dower in former English law. The particular type of sadaqa in the instant case amounted to a promise by the husband 
on behalf of himself and his estate to pay to the wife the sum of 9,000 rupees (Pakistani) (equivalent to£788 13s. 5d. in sterling) 
either (by agreement) on demand at any time or (perforce) on the dissolution of the marriage by divorce or death. 
 
 At the time of the marriage the husband was working as a casualty officer at Farnham Hospital. After the marriage the wife and 
husband lived together in one room at 3 Eggars Hill, Aldershot; but this was only envisaged as temporary accommodation; the 
husband had paid a deposit on and arranged a mortgage for a newly built house in Farnborough. However, though both parties 
have lived in England ever since their marriage, they never lived together elsewhere than at 3 Eggars Hill, and occasionally at an 
address in London where the husband went during weekend duties. The marriage was not a happy one. The principal cause of 
contention was that the husband wished the wife to assume Pakistani nationality and take a Pakistani passport, whereas the wife 
wished to retain her Indian nationality and passport. In consequence of their dissensions they separated in June 1966. 
 
 On October 29, 1966, the wife took out a summons before the Aldershot magistrates, complaining of persistent cruelty and 
desertion, and asking for a separation and maintenance order. Her complaints were heard by the magistrates on November 18 and 
December 9, 1966. The issues were contested; both parties were legally represented, the wife by Mr. Boyle. According to the 
agreed notes of evidence the husband said:  
     "My wife knew I intended to go to Pakistan when I got my fellowship and she agreed to this arrangement ... I negotiated for the 
house in this country for my use for two or three years before I returned to Pakistan ... I did not know that my wife would not live 
in Pakistan but I took it for granted that she would do so."  
 The wife said in evidence: "My husband had a Pakistani passport, I had an Indian passport. My passport expired in 1966. My 
husband suggested that I should have a Pakistani passport like him. He wanted to go back to Pakistan. " (The importance of this 
evidence is that it was given at a time when there was no sort of issue as to the husband's domicile.) On December 9, 1966, the 
magistrates held that both of the wife's complaints *187 were proved. They made a separation order; and ordered the husband to 
pay the wife £5 a week by way of maintenance. There was no appeal from this decision and for some months the husband paid to 
the wife the maintenance ordered by the magistrates. 
 
 On April 27, 1967, the husband wrote to the wife a letter which was settled by counsel. It is in the following terms:  
     "This is to inform you that as irreconcilable differences have arisen between you and myself I have formed an irrevocable 
intention to divorce you and I am divorcing you under the Pakistani law applicable to me, myself being a Muslim and a citizen of 
Pakistan domiciled in Pakistan. I divorce you; I divorce you; I divorce you. Please take notice that this act of mine, which is 
irrevocable, dissolves the marriage between you and myself solemnised at Kensington registry (sic) office in England, and it also 
puts an end to the relationship between you and myself which might have been created by the form or ceremony of marriage 
which I went through with you at 37 Collingham Place, London, S.W.5 before the Imam of the East London Mosque, 448, 
Commercial Road, London E.1 on the 19th day of March, 1966. From today I am not your husband and you are not my wife. 
Under provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 (of Pakistan) I am serving a copy of this divorce instrument upon 
His Excellency The High Commissioner for Pakistan in U.K. of 35 Lowndes Square, London S.W.1. For your information I am 
enclosing herewith an extract from the said Ordinance relating to the divorce." 
 
 Having himself received a copy of this letter, Mr. Tabarak Husain, counsellor and head of chancery at the London office of the 
High Commissioner for Pakistan, wrote to the wife on May 3, 1967, a letter in the following terms:  
     "Please find herewith a copy of the notice of divorce submitted to this office in accordance with the provision of the Muslim 
Family Laws Ordinance 1961 of Pakistan. Now the said Ordinance also empowers the undersigned to constitute an arbitration 
 
 council consisting of one representative from you and the other party. You are, therefore, requested to appear before the 
undersigned with such representative on May 26, 1967, at 11.30 a.m. at the Pakistan High Commission office."  
 The date of the meeting was subsequently, by general agreement, changed to May 25. 
 
 On that date a meeting took place at the High Commission office. Mr. Husain presided. The wife was accompanied by Mr. Boyle; 
the husband by Mr. Thorne, who was at that time in articles in the office of the solicitor who had represented the husband before 
the magistrates. Mr. Thorne has at all material times been a personal friend of the husband. Mr. Husain made it clear that he 
regarded himself as chairman of an arbitration council under the Ordinance and that Mr. Boyle and Mr. Thorne were in attendance 
as the spouses' "representatives," not as solicitors (Mr. Thorne was not yet in fact at that time a solicitor). Mr. *188 Boyle 
protested to the jurisdiction - perhaps not formally, but at least in the sense that he drew attention to the fact that his client had 
secured a matrimonial order from the Aldershot justices on December 9, 1966, which, he claimed, governed the matrimonial 
situation. He indicated, and the wife confirmed, that she was willing to be reconciled to the husband. Mr. Husain was apparently 
of opinion that a reconciliation might be possible and he adjourned the meeting to July 12. But on May 30, 1967, Mr. Thorne 
wrote to the wife's solicitors a letter which contains the following passage:  
     "Our client is firmly of the opinion that his wife's statement that she wishes for a reconciliation is without foundation and he 
does not, himself, seek such a reconciliation. Unless you are able to suggest any steps which we might usefully take we can see no 
alternative to the divorce being finalised on July 12 next." 
 
 On July 11, 1967, Mr. Boyle wrote to Mr. Husain a letter in the following terms: "We write to inform you that we will not be 
attending at your office tomorrow in view of certain advice we have received nor, we understand, will Mrs. Qureshi be attending." 
The advice referred to was apparently that Mr. Husain had no jurisdiction to act as chairman of an arbitration council, and that 
nothing should be done that might appear to be conceding any such jurisdiction or the validity of any talaq that might ensue or be 
sanctioned. 
 
 On July 12, 1967, the husband together with Mr. Thorne, attended on Mr. Husain at the High Commission office. Neither the 
wife nor Mr. Boyle attended. Mr. Boyle's letter of July 11 apparently not yet being to hand, Mr. Husain confirmed by a telephone 
call to Mr. Boyle's office that neither he nor his client intended to attend. Discussion with the husband and Mr. Thorne must then 
have satisfied Mr. Husain that no reconciliation could be expected. 
 
 On July 25, 1967, Mr. Boyle wrote to the husband's solicitors a letter in the following terms:  
     "We shall be obliged if you would let us know the outcome of the hearing at the office of High Commissioner of Pakistan on 
July 12. We should also be obliged to hear from you as to whether it is now considered that the letter of divorce dated April 27, 
1967, has taken effect. We ourselves have taken the advice of counsel versed in both English and Pakistani law and he advised 
that on hearing from you confirming that in your view the divorce is complete we should institute proceedings in the High Court 
for a declaration as to the validity or otherwise of the alleged divorce. We are also advised that the document dated October 12, 
1966, concerning the sadaqa of 9000 rupees, is in fact now due to our client and we shall be obliged to hear from you as to what 
proposals your client has for settling this amount."  
 (It was subsequently agreed between the solicitors that questions of liability in maintenance and for the sadaqa should be left for 
decision in the present proceedings.) 
 
*189 On August 7, 1967, Mr. Husain drew up the following document, sending copies to the wife and the husband:  
     "In the matter of dissolution of marriage in accordance with the provision of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. AND 
In the matter of Dr. Mohamed Abdul Hai Qureshi, s/o late Abdul Nabi Qureshi of "Al-Quraish," behind "Naz" Cinema, Karachi-3, 
presently living at Farnham Hospital, Hale Road, Farnham, Surrey and Mrs. Ayesha Qureshi of 10 Acacia Avenue, Wembley, 
Middx. In pursuance of the notice issued by this office vide No. CON/8/1/A/67, dated 10th May 1967 both the parties with their 
respective representatives appeared before me on the 25th May 1967. Heard both the parties and efforts were made to bring about 
a reconciliation between the estranged parties. Both the parties sought time to see if they could settle up the matter among 
themselves amicably and so the proceedings of the arbitration council was adjourned till the 12th July 1967. On 12 July, 1967 Dr. 
Qureshi with his representative appeared before the arbitration council but the solicitor of Mrs. Qureshi informed me that they 
would not attend the arbitration council. The decision had, therefore, to be taken ex-parte. Dr. Qureshi was adamant to see the 
marriage dissolved and was not agreeable to any reconciliation. Hence it was not possible to grant a new lease of life to the 
marriage. It was therefore, ordered that the divorce would be absolute on 1st August 1967, that is, the notice of divorce as received 
by this office, as provided under section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961."  
 
  The significance of the date, August 1, 1967, is that it is 90 days from the purported pronouncement of talaq. 
 
 On August 11, 1967, the husband ceased making payments under the maintenance order of December 9, 1966; and he made no 
payment thereafter up to the date of the hearing before me. On November 28, 1967, the wife lodged a complaint in the magistrates' 
court in respect of the arrears of maintenance. On December 12, 1967, the husband lodged a complaint, claiming that he was no 
longer liable to pay maintenance at the rate of £5 a week, on two grounds: first, that he and the wife were divorced and, second, 
that the wife's circumstances had changed, in that she was by then in gainful employment. Both complaints came before the 
magistrates on January 5, 1968, when both were adjourned sine die. The reason for that was that the present proceedings were 
impending in the High Court; the wife presented her original petition on January 12, 1968. 
 
 On February 8, 1968, the husband was issued by the Pakistani High Commission in London with his current passport. It purports 
to show him by nationality to be a citizen of Pakistan, domiciled in Pakistan, and (under heading "Home in Pakistan") having an 
accommodation address in Islamabad. I know nothing of the contents of any previous passport. 
 
 On August 28, 1968, the husband completed the purchase of the Farnborough house, where he is now living. 
 
*190The Pleadings 
 
 By a document called her amended re-amended petition the wife alleged that she was not aware of the husband's domicile: 
alternatively that both he and she were domiciled in England. She alleged that each had been bona fide residents in England since 
the date of the marriage, March 19, 1966. She prayed: (a) that the court might declare that her marriage with the husband subsists 
and that her status is one of a married woman; (b) that she might be granted such sums by way of maintenance as might be just or 
that she might continue to receive the sum of £5 a week from the husband as ordered by the magistrates' court [on December 9, 
1966.] In the alternative, she prayed, if the court were of opinion that her marriage with the husband had been validly dissolved: 
(i) that she was entitled to recover dower in the sum of £788 13s. 5d., and (ii) that she was entitled to maintenance in the sum of 
£5 as ordered by this court, from August 11, 1967. 
 
 By his amended answer the husband denied that he was or had been domiciled in England. He prayed that the prayer of the 
petition might be rejected and that the court should declare that the divorce (by talaq) was valid. So far as the claim for 
maintenance was concerned, the husband alleged that it was not maintainable in a petition for a declaration of the subsistence of a 
marriage and as to the wife's status as a married woman. As for the claim to dower, the husband alleged that the dower is payable 
(if at all) only on the dissolution of the marriage or upon his death and he denied that the wife was entitled to include a prayer for 
its recovery in her petition for a declaration as aforesaid. He further alleged that the dower (as to recovery of which he made no 
admission) was not a matrimonial relief within the meaning of the English law, but that the wife's right (if any) to dower (if any) 
was ex contractu and as such it is not a cause of action (if at all) maintainable in the Divorce Division of the High Court. 
 
 The principal relief asked for on each side is, therefore, a declaration as to status under R.S.C., Ord. 15, r. 16 and Ord. 112, r. 3. 
 
Domicile 
 
 It is common ground that, if the husband is domiciled in England, talaq will not be accorded recognition by an English court. The 
situation which would obtain if he were domiciled in India was not exhaustively explored. The main domiciliary situations for the 
husband claimed by the parties respectively were a domicile in Pakistan by the husband and a domicile in England by the wife; 
though the wife was also content to allege alternatively merely that the husband had lost any domicile he had acquired in Pakistan. 
It was expressly disclaimed that the wife had assumed any domicile independently of the husband at any time since the marriage. 
The domicile of the parties might also have some bearing on the jurisdiction of the court. It is therefore the first issue to be 
determined. 
 
 It was only faintly controverted that in 1957 the husband abandoned his domicile of origin in India and acquired a domicile of 
choice in Pakistan. The most significant event, in my view, was the change of nationality: cf. D'Etchegoyen v. D'Etchegoyen 
(1888) 13 P.D. 132, 134, and Wahl v.Attorney-General(1932) 147 L.T. 382 *191 , 383, 385. There is also the movement of other 
members of his family. I accept that Pakistan was far more attractive than India culturally and politically, with consequent 
 
 repercussions on career prospects. The evidence in favour of the abandonment of the domicile of origin in India, and the 
acquisition of a domicile of choice in Pakistan, seems to me to be overwhelming. 
 
 The wife, however, claims that the husband has abandoned his domicile of choice in Pakistan. The legal background of the 
argument on her behalf rests on three propositions, all of which I accept as correct. First, a domicile of choice is less retentive, and 
therefore more easily abandoned, than a domicile of origin. Secondly, a person may change his domicile without any intention to 
do so - indeed, without being conscious of doing so: see D'Etchegoyen v. D'Etchegoyen, 13 P.D. 132, 134, Gulbenkian v. 
Gulbenkian [1937] 4 All E.R. 618, 627 (though it has been said that the evidence in such circumstances must be very clear: 
D'Etchegoyen v. D'Etchegoyen, 13 P.D. 132, 134). Thirdly, given the necessary fact of a physical departure from the country of 
domicile of choice, for its abandonment the animus that must be shown is not necessarily non revertendi; it is sufficient that the 
residence in the new country is sine animo revertendi; and in this connection there may be a "withering away" of an intention to 
return to the country of the domicile of choice (see In re Flynn [1968] 1 W.L.R. 103, 115 to 117; although I think that what 
Megarry J. said in that case on these matters was obiter, these seem to me to be valid and valuable tools of analysis: see also The 
Lauderdale Peerage (1885) 10 App.Cas. 692, 739, by Lord Selborne; Fremlin v. Fremlin (1913) 16 C.L.R. 212, 233, by Isaacs J., 
with whom Gavan Duffy J. agreed.) 
 
 So far as the facts are concerned, as Megarry J. said in In re Flynn, decd. [1968] 1 W.L.R. 103, 107:  
     "In one sense there is no end to the evidence that may be adduced: for the whole of a man's life and all that he has said and 
done, however trivial, may be prayed in aid in determining what his intention was at any given moment of time. ... All that the 
courts can do is to draw inferences from what has been said and done; and in doing this, too much detail may stultify." 
 
 I therefore propose to refer only to the matters on which the parties placed particular reliance and to those which struck me as 
being particularly significant. For the wife it was principally urged, first, that the husband had spent less than a year out of his 35 
in Pakistan; secondly, that English social customs were obviously congenial to him; thirdly, that he had held, and could hope to 
continue to hold, responsible and remunerative posts under the National Health Service in this country (resignation from which 
would involve financial sacrifice), whereas his prospects in Pakistan were less favourable and were deteriorating with the 
effluxion of time; fourthly, that the letters that the husband wrote before marriage are inconsistent with an intention to return to 
Pakistan; and, fifthly, that he had told her that he intended to remain in England. 
 
 I do not accept that the husband ever declared or evinced to the wife an intention to make this country his permanent home or not 
to return to *192 Pakistan: this seems to me inconsistent with her evidence before the magistrates, some passages from which I 
have cited. Nor can I take the husband's letters before marriage as providing any serious evidence of his domiciliary situation: they 
seem to me to be typical effusions of the Weltschmertz, restlessness and self-pity which are common form among many young 
people. The other matters are certainly to be weighed carefully, but together with all the other circumstances of the case. 
 
 The principal evidence relied on by the husband for the retention of his domicile of choice in Pakistan was criticised as 
amounting to nothing more than his ipse dixit. It is true that, in determining domicile, the courts approach direct declarations of 
intention with some caution: see Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 8th ed. (1967), pp. 96, 97. But this is because a 
declaration may be influenced by self-interest; it may be inconsistent with conduct (which, in this connection, may well speak 
louder than words); and, if the word "domicile" is used, the declarant is unlikely to have understood the meaning of a legal term 
embodying concepts of great complexity. In my view the law was authoritatively declared by Lord Buckmaster in Ross v. Ellison 
(or Ross) [1930] A.C. 1, 6, 7, in a passage with which Viscount Dunedin, Lord Warrington and Lord Atkin were content merely to 
express agreement:  
     "Declarations as to intention are rightly regarded in determining the question of a change of domicile, but they must be 
examined by considering the person to whom, the purpose for which, and the circumstances in which they are made, and they 
must further be fortified and carried into effect by conduct and action consistent with the declared expression."  
 Although I believed the husband when he told me in evidence that he intended to return to Pakistan after having another attempt 
to qualify as F.R.C.S. (whether or not he does in fact qualify), this evidence might not have sufficed alone, on the ground of his 
knowledgeable self-interest in the matter. The statement in the passport that his domicile was in Pakistan must similarly be 
received with caution, since it must have been based on a statement of the husband's at a time when his domicile was to his 
knowledge a matter of legal significance: though a domicile may be changed with a specific legal end in view (Drexel v. Drexel 
[1916] 1 Ch. 251 - the objective there being a forum for divorce), and in principle it seems to me that a domicile may be similarly 
retained. The evidence given by both spouses before the magistrates at the end of 1966 was, in my view, of great importance. So 
 
 were the declarations made by the husband to Mr. Thorne: they are personal friends and have seen each other on an average once 
a month since the autumn of 1966. Mr. Thorne told me that the husband had undeviatingly stated that he had every intention of 
returning to Pakistan. In the early days he would add, "as soon as I have got my fellowship": latterly these words were omitted 
(presumably because hope has somewhat been fading). The husband would use the words, "I am a Pakistani and I am going 
home." Under cross-examination Mr. Thorne could not recall any change in emphasis over the year the husband always said that 
he was a Pakistani and that he was going home one day. It is true that Mr. Thorne accepted that on May 25, 1967, no one claimed, 
*193 in response to Mr. Boyle's objections, that Mr. Husain had jurisdiction because the husband was domiciled in Pakistan. But I 
am unable to treat such omission as derogating significantly from the probative effect of the declarations which I am satisfied the 
husband made as to his intention - many at a time when he had no possible interest other than in speaking his true mind on the 
matter: see D'Etchegoyen v. D'Etchegoyen, 13 P.D. 132, 135. 
 
 Nor does the husband's case rest solely on his declarations. He retained his Pakistani citizenship throughout: and there is no 
evidence that he ever contemplated applying for British nationality. In 1962 the husband took out in London an endowment policy 
of insurance with a Pakistani company, in Pakistani currency, the sum assured being payable in Pakistan; and in 1967 he raised 
money on it to buy land in Karachi for construction of a house (though this was after the purported pronouncement of talaq.) 
Moreover, it is stated in Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 8th ed. (1967), at p. 95, "There is a presumption against the 
acquisition of the domicile of choice by a person in a country whose religion, manners and customs differ widely from those of his 
own country," citing a number of authorities; and see also Fremlin v. Fremlin (1913) 16 C.L.R. 212, 233. This seems to me not so 
much a proposition of law as an expression of common experience: people are generally unlikely to make a permanent home in a 
country which is ethnically and culturally alien - particularly where one which is culturally and ethnically congenial is available as 
an alternative. Nor am I bound, I think, to pretend ignorance of certain racial tensions and intolerances in this country of recent 
years and their possible repercussion on domiciliary intention. 
 
 It was argued on behalf of the wife that residence in England with the intention of passing an examination or of obtaining a 
qualification was analogous to residence with the intention to remain until the happening of some doubtful event, such as the 
making of a fortune (Bruce v. Bruce (1790) 2 Bos. & P. 229, 230; Doucet v. Geoghegan (1878) 9 Ch.D. 441) or the death of a 
mistress (Anderson v. Laneuville (1854) 9 Moo.P.C.C. 325, 335) which will not necessarily affect domicile; see also Aikman v. 
Aikman (1861) 3 Macq. 854, 858, by Lord Campbell. But such contingencies are, so to speak, open-ended; not so, ordinarily, the 
attempt at a qualification. 
 
 I was satisfied that the husband at all times during his residence in this country intended to return to Pakistan; and that he had 
never lost his Pakistani domicile of choice. I made an interim finding to this effect (reserving my reasons), so as to define the 
compass of the ensuing argument. 
 
Jurisdiction 
 
 Counsel were all agreed that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Garthwaite v. Garthwaite [1964] P. 356 has been 
misunderstood. It does not decide that the court has jurisdiction to make a declaration as to status under R.S.C., Ord. 15, r. 16, 
only if, on the petitioner's own case, he or she is domiciled in England at the commencement of the proceedings. (If that were the 
case, the wife would not be entitled to the declaration she seeks in her petition.) Garthwaite v. Garthwaite in reality decides that 
(in *194 addition to jurisdiction based on domicile) the court has power to make a declaration under R.S.C., Ord. 15, r. 16, in such 
circumstances as would have given the English ecclesiastical courts in their totality before 1857 jurisdiction to accord matrimonial 
relief - in particular to grant a decree of restitution of conjugal rights. I respectfully concur with this view of the decision: see 
Willmer L.J. at pp. 383-385, Danckwerts L.J. in the first paragraph of his judgment at p. 385, and Diplock L.J., particularly in the 
middle of p. 397. In Har-Shefi v. Har-Shefi [1953] P. 161, 174, Hodson L.J. agreed with Barnard J. that petitions in nullity were 
analogous to declarations under R.S.C., Ord. 25, r. 5 (now Ord. 15, r. 16), and thought that jurisdiction in respect of each should 
be decided on the same principles. The ecclesiastical courts before 1857 had jurisdiction to entertain suits for marital relief if both 
parties were, at the date of commencement of proceedings, resident in the territorial area over which the court exercised 
jurisdiction. The High Court still has jurisdiction to entertain a suit for nullity, judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights 
where the parties are resident in England at the commencement of proceedings, see Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 8th 
ed. (1967), rule 43, p. 333; see also rule 44, pp. 344-345. Both the wife and the husband have been resident in England at the 
commencement of and throughout the present proceedings. It follows that each party is entitled to the declaration sought under 
R.S.C., Ord. 15, r. 16, as to the effect of the purported talaq. It is possible that the wife might be entitled to the declaration she 
 
 seeks on the further ground that according to her contention both parties were domiciled in England at the time of the petition; but 
I prefer not to rest my decision on this ground, because it is arguable that, on the court deciding the issue of domicile against her, 
it should not proceed further in the suit. 
 
 So far as the municipal jurisdiction of this court is concerned, I propose to consider first the wife's claims as to maintenance. I am 
satisfied that the High Court has no power itself to make any order for maintenance ancillary to a declaration under R.S.C., Ord. 
15, r. 16: cf. Matrimonial Causes Act 1965, ss. 16, 19, 20 and 21. Counsel for the Queen's Proctor urged, however, that the court 
should declare in the present proceedings that an effective talaq did not necessarily terminate the maintenance order of December 
9, 1966 (see Wood v. Wood [1957] P. 254); and that this is one of those exceptional cases envisaged in Guaranty Trust Co. of 
New York v. Hannay & Co. [1915] 2 K.B. 536 (see especially pp. 563-565, 572) where the court should declare that a person is 
liable in an existing or possible action. It was argued that it is desirable that the justices should have such guidance, so as to avoid 
a possible appeal to the Divisional Court. I did not find it necessary to decide this question of jurisdiction, because in the event it 
seemed to me to be preferable to deal with the matter by way of interim judgment, indicating to the justices that they could 
proceed properly with the cross-complaints that stood adjourned before them without waiting for final judgment in the High 
Court. I shall refer later to the terms of the interim judgment. 
 
 As for the wife's claim to dower and the husband's denial of the jurisdiction of this division of the High Court to determine the 
matter, the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925, s. 43, provides:  
     "The High Court ... shall, in every cause or matter pending before *195 the court grant ... all such remedies whatsoever as any 
of the parties thereto may appear to be entitled to in respect of any legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by them in 
the cause or matter, so that, as far as possible, all matters in controversy between the parties may be completely and finally 
determined, and all multiplicity of legal proceedings concerning any of those matters avoided."  
 (See also the notes to the section in The Supreme Court Practice, 1970, vol. 2, pp. 882, 883.) In Hart v. Hart (1881) 18 Ch.D. 670, 
680, 681, Kay J. had no doubt that the Divorce Division could have decreed specific performance of the terms of a separation 
agreement negotiated in compromise of a divorce suit. It was conceded on behalf of the husband that, if his marriage with the wife 
has been validly dissolved, the sum claimed by way of dower is payable to her on demand. It is, therefore, immaterial whether the 
claim arises ex contractu or as an incident of status: judgment in the matter can be given in the present suit, according to the 
decision on the validity of the talaq in the eyes of English law. To hold otherwise would be to put the forensic clock back a 
hundred years; and, indeed, the denial of jurisdiction to deal with the matter in this division and in this suit was abandoned during 
argument. 
 
The Pakistani law 
 
 Having found that the court has jurisdiction to declare the parties' status, my next task is to endeavour to ascertain whether what 
happened here would be held in Pakistani law to be effective to dissolve the marriage; since prima facie the effectiveness of a 
divorce is to be referred to the law of the domicile, which I have found to be in Pakistan. 
 
 The issue before me has unfortunately never fallen for decision by a court in Pakistan, but the expert witnesses were agreed that 
the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance would be construed according to English rules of construction; and there are two decisions of 
the Supreme Court of Pakistan which show clearly what was the object of the Ordinance, so providing a guide to its construction 
and scope: Gardezi v. Yusuf, P.L.D. 1963 Sup. Ct. 51 and Jatoi v. Jatoi, P.L.D. 1967 Sup.Ct. 580. At p. 75 of Gardezi v. Yusuf 
(paragraph 39) it was said that the object of section 7 of the Ordinance was "to prevent hasty dissolution of marriages by talaq, 
pronounced by the husband, unilaterally, without an attempt being made to prevent disruption of the matrimonial status"; and at p. 
76 (paragraph 42), "the policy of the Ordinance seems to be to provide some curbs on too facile pronouncements of divorce and 
unnecessary or unjustified plural marriages." Moreover, the two cases make it clear that the Ordinance applies to parties to a 
marriage in a register office in England (save for the provisions as to registration), and that it is irrelevant that one of the parties is 
not a Muslim or a citizen of Pakistan, provided that the other is one. 
 
 The first point for decision in this part of the case is whether the appointment of Mr. Husain, the head of chancery in London, as 
chairman of the relevant arbitration council, was ultra vires section 2 (b). Dr. Fatmi, the wife's expert witness, was inclined to 
doubt the vires. In his view the proper chairman in the case of the husband's purported talaq was the chairman of the appropriate 
union council in West Pakistan, *196 though the latter could appoint the head of chancery in London as his surrogate. Dr. Fatmi 
pointed out that, by section 11 (3) of the Ordinance, the rules thereunder were to be considered as part of the Ordinance itself. He 
 
 was of opinion that, since the husband's Pakistani residence had been in West Pakistan, the West Pakistan rules would be 
applicable; and that they provide for the chairman of a union council in West Pakistan to be the chairman of the arbitration council 
(see rule 3). But rule 3 seems only to apply to talaq where the wife was at the time of the talaq resident in West Pakistan, or where 
the last joint residence was there, or where the husband is permanently resident there; none of which conditions applies in the 
present case. Moreover, by section 1 (2), the ordinance is to apply to all Muslim citizens of Pakistan, wherever they may be: if 
they were in London, there would be no conceivable purpose in appointing the chairman of a local authority in Pakistan as the 
primary chairman of the arbitration council. Whatever difficulties arise from the literal force of the words of section 2 (b) as they 
now stand, I am clearly of opinion that before their amendment in 1964 the appointment of heads of chancery to act as chairmen 
of arbitration councils abroad was intra vires; and, since the 1964 amendment obviously had an internal constitutional 
significance. I do not believe that it would be construed as invalidating the appointment of heads of chancery as chairmen of 
arbitration councils abroad. It was not disputed that heads of chancery had exercised functions under the Ordinance on a number 
of occasions without their power to do so being questioned. 
 
 But Dr. Fatmi argued, secondly, that, even if Mr. Husain was validly appointed as chairman of an appropriate arbitration council, 
he was incapable of acting as such because no rules were made under section for arbitration councils abroad: the only rules made 
had reference to arbitration councils in East and West Pakistan respectively. In particular, Dr. Fatmi emphasised that by the 
proviso to section 2 (a) there is a reference to a party nominating a representative within the "prescribed" time: and by section 2 
(c) "prescribed" means "prescribed by rules made under section 11": no time was prescribed for the nomination of a representative 
to an arbitration council outside Pakistan. But in my judgment, where a legislative authority by an enactment setting up a tribunal 
or other body envisages rules to be made governing the procedure of such tribunal or body, and no such rules are made, the 
tribunal or body is not necessarily thereby disabled from performing its function. In such case the tribunal or body acts effectively 
provided it acts in accordance with natural justice and to promote the objective with which it was set up, and possibly by analogy 
with the rules of procedure prescribed for comparable tribunals or bodies. I am satisfied that Mr. Husain acted according to natural 
justice and to promote the objectives of the Ordinance. As for "prescribed" time where no time is prescribed, it is sufficient in my 
view if the act required is done within a reasonable time. In response to Mr. Husain's letter of May 3, 1967, requesting the wife to 
attend on him with a "representative," she brought Mr. Boyle to the meeting of May 25. Both Mr. Husain's letter and the meeting 
were within a reasonable time from the receipt of the document of talaq (indeed, within the time stipulated in the West Pakistan 
rules); and *197 Mr. Husain made it plain at the meeting that Mr. Boyle was present as a "representative" of the wife. 
 
 But Dr. Fatmi argued, thirdly, that Mr. Husain failed to act in accordance with the West Pakistan rules (as Dr. Fatmi considered 
necessary), or at least by analogy with them, in two further respects. He failed to comply with rule 5 (4) by failing to require the 
wife to make a fresh nomination of a representative when Mr. Boyle indicated that he was no longer proposing to attend as a 
member of an arbitration council, and he failed to comply with rule 6 (1) by failing to require the wife to nominate her 
representative in writing. These failures, in his view, vitiated the proceedings. But the wife in fact brought Mr. Boyle to the 
meeting of May 25, in response to Mr. Hussain's request to her to nominate a representative and even if Mr. Hussain had called on 
the wife to make a fresh nomination she would not have done so. I do not believe that immaterial and technical failure to comply 
with rules, that at most were applicable only by analogy would be held to vitiate the proceedings. Moreover, in my view, the 
provisions of rules 5 (4) and 6 (1), in so far as relevant at all, would be construed as directory and not imperative: see Montreal 
Street Railway Co. v. Normandin [1917] A.C. 170, 175 and Marsh v. Marsh [1945] A.C. 271, 284. I do not think that a Pakistan 
court would hold that the proceedings before Mr. Husain were invalid and the resultant sanctioning of the talaq ineffective. 
 
 It will be apparent that on the foregoing issues of foreign law I have in general preferred the evidence of the husband's expert 
witness, Mr. Saaid, to that of Dr. Fatmi; though I have in addition tried to form my own view by scrutinising the written material 
placed before me (see Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd ed. (1956) vol. 15, pp. 329, 330), particularly as their language is English 
and their construction is according to English law. But for a residual issue I must rely entirely on the expert evidence. Assuming 
that Dr. Fatmi is right in thinking that there was no means by which the Ordinance could be complied with outside Pakistan, 
would the document of April 27, 1967, operate as an effective immediate talaq under the substantive Islamic law as it existed 
unmodified by the Ordinance? Mr. Saaid answered this question in the affirmative. Dr. Fatmi would have agreed, had it not been 
that the document purported to be made in accordance with and to invoke the Ordinance. I prefer the view of Mr. Saaid. 
 
 It follows that, in my judgment, according to Pakistani law the marriage between the wife and the husband was dissolved in 
August 1967 by substantive Islamic law as procedurally modified by the Ordinance (in my opinion, the preferable view), or 
alternatively on April 27, 1967, by substantive Islamic law not so modified. 
 
  
Attitude of English law to non-judicial divorce 
 
 There can be no doubt that the law of the domicile is prima facie the proper law for determining the efficacy of a purported 
divorce to bring about a change of status by dissolving a marriage: Harvey (orse. Farnie) v. Farnie (1882) 8 App.Cas. 43. There is 
equally no doubt that here, as elsewhere, there is a residual discretion in an English court to refuse to recognise the proper rule of 
foreign law, when to do so would cause *198 injustice - I shall be discussing the application of this discretion later in this 
judgment. The issue which I have to determine under the present heading is whether there is a rule of English law which compels 
refusal of recognition to a divorce valid by the law of domicile, if it is not the creature of judicial act or performed in judicial 
presence, either generally, or if the marriage is celebrated in England, or if the purported divorce takes place in England, or both. 
 
 I am satisfied that there is no general rule to this effect: see Sasson v. Sasson [1924] A.C. 1007; Har-Shefi v. Har-Shefi [1953] P. 
161; Har-Shefi v. Har-Shefi (No. 2) [1953] P. 220; Russ (orse. Geffers) v. Russ (Russ orse. De Waele intervening) [1964] P. 315. 
I was also referred to a number of cases either unreported or reported only in newspapers in which a divorce valid by the law of 
the domicile was recognised by the courts of this country notwithstanding the absence of judicial intervention or presence in the 
divorce. In so far as Rex v. Hammersmith Superintendent Registrar of Marriages, Ex parte Mir-Anwaruddin [1917] 1 K.B. 634 
may appear to be laying down the contrary, it is, in my view, in conflict with the other Court of Appeal decisions which I have 
cited, and not to be followed: see Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. [1944] K.B. 718, 725, 726; [1946] A.C. 163. Nor can it be 
a material factor that the marriage purported to be dissolved took place in England (any more than it is where there is a decree of 
divorce by a foreign court of competent jurisdiction, as in Harvey (orse. Farnie) v. Farnie, 8 App.Cas. 43). It is true that the 
Hammersmith Marriage case was at one time thought to establish the anomalous proposition that a Christian marriage in England 
could not be dissolved by the pronouncement of talaq, even when that would have been a valid dissolution by the law of the 
domicile. But none of the members of the Court of Appeal in Russ (orse. Geffers) v. Russ [1964] P. 315 considered that to be a 
sustainable proposition, or even a matter justifying the distinction of the two cases. Indeed, Donovan L.J. said, at p. 331:  
     "... only Swinfen Eady L.J. went to the length of holding that it was impossible in law for a Christian marriage contracted in 
England to be dissolved by Talaknama. This indeed had been the principal contention of the Solicitor-General, but no other judge 
in terms acceded to it ... the decision ought not, in my opinion, to be regarded as laying down ... that a Christian marriage in 
England cannot, in the eye of English law, ever be dissolved by Talaknama, notwithstanding that the law of the parties' domicile 
permits it." 
 
 It was, however, claimed on behalf of the wife that non-judicial divorce, not least one amounting to unilateral repudiation of an 
innocent partner, should be refused recognition if it purports to take place in England, it being contrary to public policy that the 
safeguards of the English matrimonial law should be thereby by-passed. But in my view this contention is inconsistent with Har-
Shefi v. Har-Shefi [1953] P. 161; see also Mandel v. Mandel [1955] V.L.R. 51, a reserved judgment of Lowe J. What Davies L.J. 
said in Russ (orse. Geffers) v. Russ [1964] P. 315, 335 about the relevance of the talaq taking place in this country was expressly 
directed to the exercise of the residual discretion. Nor, when it comes to considerations of public policy, can I close my eyes to the 
fact that a recent statutory *199 change in the law permits (albeit subject to certain conditions and safeguards in some 
circumstances) the repudiation of an innocent spouse. I confess that I share the misgiving implied by Lowe J. at the possible 
mischief that might accrue if the safeguards inherent in judicially pronounced divorce can be by-passed in this country. But courts 
of law have no means of judging the possible extent of any such mischief, or the repercussions of attempting to deal with them by 
judicial law-making. The court already has adequate power to refuse to recognise the legal rule of the domicile where it would 
cause injustice in a particular case. It seems to me to be preferable for the courts to proceed generally on legal principle, and to 
leave any necessary modifications called for by public policy to other organs of the constitution. 
 
 If, as I think, it is immaterial that the marriage purported to be dissolved took place in England or that the purported divorce took 
place in England, I cannot see how the co-incidence of these two factors can make any material difference. 
 
 I respectfully agree with the view expressed in Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 8th ed. (1967) at pp. 319-320:  
     "In spite of earlier dicta to the contrary, it is now clear that English courts will recognise non-judicial divorces obtained by 
mutual agreement between the spouses or unilaterally by one party to the marriage in accordance with a religious law (e.g., a 
Jewish ghet or a Mohammedan talak), provided the parties are domiciled in a country (e.g., Israel or Egypt) the territorial laws of 
which permit such a method. The recognition of such divorces is perfectly consistent with the status theory of divorce and with the 
paramount importance of domicile in questions of status. If the cause for divorce is immaterial so ought the method to be. It is 
 
 immaterial that the religious divorce takes place in England, provided of course that the parties are not domiciled in England."  
Cheshire, Private International Law, 8th ed. (1970) pp. 369-372, is to similar effect; see also Graveson, The Conflict of Laws, 6th 
ed. (1969) pp. 330-333. 
 
 In my view, therefore, the fact that there has been no judicial intervention or even presence is irrelevant if the purported divorce is 
effective by the law of the domicile to terminate the marriage in question, and it should be recognised as such, unless the result 
would be offensive to the conscience of the English court. 
 
 My conclusions, that the talaq was valid according to the law of the domicile and that there is no rule of English law which 
precludes its recognition by reason of its non-forensic character, make it unnecessary for me to consider an argument advanced to 
the effect that the office of the High Commissioner for Pakistan is to be accorded extra-territorial status and considered as part of 
Pakistan, so that the talaq was pronounced, or the arbitration council sat, in Pakistan. In Varanand v. Varanand (1964) 108 S.J. 
693, Scarman J. granted a declaration that a marriage between two Thais, celebrated in England, had been validly dissolved by an 
agreement signed by the parties at the Royal Thai Embassy in London relinquishing their status as husband and wife. There was 
no judicial pronouncement *200 or presence, but an expert in Thai law had given evidence that the certificate issued by the 
embassy would be accepted by the court in Thailand as evidence of a valid divorce. Scarman J. seems to have proceeded partly on 
the extra-territorial character of a foreign embassy: a divorce there, he said (The Times, July 25, 1964), "involved no sort of 
infringement of the royal prerogative of justice." But Scarman J. did not hear adversary argument on the point. As at present 
advised, there seems to me to be considerable difficulty, both in law and fact, in the way of this line of argument for the husband. 
 
The claim for maintenance 
 
 As I have indicated, I dealt with this part of the case in an interim judgment. The relevant portion was as follows:  
     "It is now not really disputed, and in any event I hold, first, that the High Court has no jurisdiction to order that the wife is 
entitled to maintenance either in the sum of £5 as ordered by the magistrates, or any other sum, as from August 11, 1967, or any 
other date, in proceedings such as these. Second, the magistrates' court order is not in any event automatically terminated by 
divorce: see Wood v. Wood [1957] P. 254. Third, therefore, the jurisdiction of the magistrates as to either (a) variation of 
maintenance, or (b) enforcement of arrears, is not directly affected by the decision of this court whether or not this marriage has 
been validly terminated by talaq, since that question has little, if any, bearing on the factual situation which is relevant to the 
deliberation of the justices. Fourth, the order of £5 per week of December 9, 1966, continues until it is varied, though it may be 
varied retrospectively at least to the date of the husband's summons for variation.  
     "It follows, in my view, that the magistrates can and should resume consideration of the complaints that they had before them 
on January 5, 1968, without awaiting the decision of this court on the main issue, and should exercise their discretion on those 
matters of complaint before them. All questions of maintenance and enforcement are entirely in the judicial discretion of the 
magistrates on these matters being properly brought before them.  
     "I said that the jurisdiction of the magistrates is not directly affected by the decision of this court whether or not the marriage 
was terminated by talaq. That is true. But the way they ultimately exercise their discretion as to quantum of maintenance, or 
enforcement of arrears, may be indirectly affected by the decision of this court. The reason for that is this. It is common ground 
that if the marriage has been validly terminated by talaq, that sum [the dower] is payable. The payment, or non-payment, of such a 
sum might well have an effect on how the magistrates exercise their discretion on the two matters to which I have referred. But 
that question does not arise until any such payment is actually made. The justices can engage on the investigation of the 
complaints before them on the assumption that the wife has not obtained any such sum, nor the husband parted with it. If and 
when it is paid, that might be a reason for varying any order that the *201 justices might have made in the meantime on the 
assumption, as is the fact, that it has not been paid." 
 
The residual discretion 
 
 Some of the main authorities on this matter are collected in Cheni (orse. Rodriguez) v. Cheni [1965] P. 85, 98-99. This is the part 
of the case that I have found most difficult of determination. I can well understand that the wife, who has satisfied an English 
court that she has been gravely wronged by the husband, should feel resentment that he should be able to cast her off at his will, 
and that she should wish to see her matrimonial status vindicated. It has also been argued on her behalf that she should not be 
precluded from herself invoking the jurisdiction of an English divorce court, not only to secure the dissolution of her marriage but 
also to secure an order for ancillary relief. She claims that recognition of the talaq and the denial of rights otherwise available to 
 
 her under English law would be unconscionable. 
 
 There are, however, five factors which in the end incline me to think that the judicial discretion should not be exercised to refuse 
recognition to the otherwise applicable rule of foreign law. First, I think that, as Scarman J. said in Varanand v. Varanand, 108 S.J. 
693: "the court's discretion to refuse recognition to foreign status is one to be most sparingly exercised. " Secondly, if the marriage 
is in any event to be dissolved, I can see no purpose in postponing its dissolution. Thirdly, I am satisfied that the husband intends 
to return to Pakistan: I think that the courts there would recognise the talaq as validly terminating the marriage, take no notice of 
the exercise by an English court of a residual discretion to depart from accepted rules of private international law, and refuse to 
enforce any English order for ancillary relief: see Jatoi v. Jatoi, P.L.D. 1967 Sup.Ct. 580. Fourthly, it is only if the marriage is 
recognised as dissolved that the wife is entitled to dower. Whatever the judgment of this court, the husband will not return to the 
wife. I trust that it will not be thought cynical if I feel that she is really better off with a judgment for a considerable sum of 
money, which is likely to be more easily enforceable while the husband is in this country, than with a largely meaningless right to 
be recognised locally as his wife. Lastly, the rule of foreign law under which the husband has proceeded has the authority of the 
holy scriptures of the common faith of himself and the wife. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 I therefore give judgment for the husband on that part of the prayer of his amended answer that prays that the court may declare 
that the talaq divorce was valid; and for the wife on that part of the prayer of her petition that claims the sum of £788 13s. 5d. by 
way of dower. 
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Solicitors: Bell, Krish & Co., Farnham; Smallpeice & Merriman, Guildford; Queen's Proctor. 
 
Order accordingly. No order as to costs. (D. R. E. ) 
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